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1. Prologue 
1.1 Research Question and Outline 
Since Baumol’s (1968) call to arms, entrepreneurship research has undergone a remarkable 
development. By now it seems as if the Schumpeterian entrepreneur had (re-)conquered its 
position in economic sciences (c.f. Schumpeter, 1912, 93). The entrepreneur’s relevance for 
economic growth is barely denied (Baumol, 2004; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999; Reynolds, 
1997). Particularly, her contribution to innovation is widely acknowledged (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1990; Audretsch 1995). A growing community of scholars regularly meets at en-
trepreneurship conferences to advance the field. Numerous journals deal with the issue, and 
research on entrepreneurship constantly transcends the traditional boundaries between the 
academic disciplines by combining management questions with the economics’ view and by 
integrating e.g. psychological and sociological approaches. Nevertheless, the mission has not 
been accomplished yet. So far, no general theory on entrepreneurship exists. The channels by 
which entrepreneurs contribute to innovation and growth are still not exhaustively explored 
(c.f. Fritsch, 2011a). Neither are the determinants of entrepreneurship. Along this line, the 
question arises whether entrepreneurship is a universal instrument, or if country specific fac-
tors might play a decisive role and have to be taken care of. This thesis will contribute to this 
discussion by analyzing interactions between institutions and entrepreneurship. It will empiri-
cally assess institutional factors influencing the occupational choice of becoming an entrepre-
neur, the effects of institutional changes on people’s attitude towards entrepreneurship, and 
how entrepreneurial preferences evolve in different institutional settings. 
Even more remarkable than the developments in the academic field is the development of 
policies geared towards entrepreneurship. It seems as if entrepreneurship was one of the few 
subjects where research and policy development go hand in hand. Indeed, various countries 
nowadays impose policies to support entrepreneurship. The goals of such policies are wide-
spread. In the context of developing countries, entrepreneurship policies aim at building up 
very basic market structures, e.g. by micro financing (Baumol et al., 2007, 133-184). Transi-
tion economies support entrepreneurship in order to catch up technologically (Smallbone and 
Welter, 2001; OECD, 1998). Accordingly, not even the socialist Cuba can afford to do with-
out entrepreneurship anymore. Industrialized countries, on the other hand, strive to preserve 
their lead by fostering entrepreneurship in order to organize the innovation process more effi-
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ciently. Thus policy makers aim at bridging the gap between (basic) research and its (econom-
ic) application – with entrepreneurship, inter alia (e.g. ECOM, 2004; 2003). But the effective-
ness of entrepreneurship policies is still in question. The thesis in hand addresses this issue by 
investigating conditions for and effects of policies for entrepreneurship support. The evalua-
tion of entrepreneurship policies fits well into the major context, since policies’ effectiveness 
depends on the institutional framework they are executed in – just as policies themselves may 
alter institutions, thus potentially contributing to the entrepreneurial dynamics related to insti-
tutional change. 
Many policy makers seem to have the success story of Silicon Valley in mind when they im-
plement entrepreneurship policies – with Silicon Valley being the ideal-typical manifestation 
of economic growth that materializes out of a process of creative destruction. But Silicon Val-
ley is rather difficult to mimic, as Leslie and Kargon (1996) set out. They precisely portray 
how even Frederick Terman, the former provost of Stanford university and thus one of the 
“fathers” of Silicon Valley, failed in reproducing his own (i.e. the Silicon Valley’s) success at 
other sites in the US. One reason for his failure lies in the differences in the institutional 
framework at the different locations. Interestingly, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science 
and Technology in South Korea turned out to be the most successful duplicate of Silicon Val-
ley Terman set up with strong support of the Korean government. Thus institutions are seem-
ingly relevant for the success of entrepreneurship policies. Moreover, the institutional frame-
work can be assumed to have an independent effect on entrepreneurship apart from policies as 
well (e.g. Acs and Audretsch, 1989; 1987;). This does not only refer to laws and regulations 
potentially influencing entrepreneurial success (e.g. Djankov et al., 2002). Institutions also 
imply a notion of culture, norms, and values. For instance, the story of Silicon Valley cannot 
be told without referring to the “entrepreneurial spirit” at work around Santa Clara. This spirit 
is probably not as vivid at all other places in the world (c.f. Tiessen, 1997). Thus policy mak-
ers may set laws and regulations, but they must consider such soft factors when designing 
effective entrepreneurship policies. Consequently, these factors must not be disregarded when 
analyzing entrepreneurship policies. The interrelation between “hard” and “soft” institutional 
factors will be discussed in detail throughout this thesis. 
In the following chapters I will analyze the interplay between entrepreneurship and institu-
tions from different points of view. Particularly, I will address the effects of explicit and of 
implicit institutions on entrepreneurship. In the course of this thesis I will also investigate the 
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effectiveness of some policy measures for entrepreneurship support. Eventually I will turn to 
causes and effects of institutional change by itself. The whole thesis is inspired by the work of 
Audretsch and Fritsch (2002). They identify four different types of regional “growth regimes” 
in Germany conditional on the entrepreneurial activity they observe in the West German 
planning regions (almost equivalent to labor market regions). These regimes vary significant-
ly over time and so do the importance and the effectiveness of entrepreneurship in the respec-
tive regions (c.f. Nelson and Winter 1982; Winter 1984). This raises the question how differ-
ent regimes do actually affect entrepreneurship, and where the regimes’ differences result 
from. Subsequently, I understand “regime” as set of rules that dominate a regional market. 
More generally, a regime is a set of institutions prevalent in a certain region. Accordingly, this 
thesis will approach the question "How do institutions influence entrepreneurship?", and, giv-
en the results obtained by Audretsch and Fritsch, "Where do regional differences in the insti-
tutional framework for entrepreneurship come from?"  
Following North (1990; 1991) I differentiate between explicit institutions, i.e. formally as-
cribed rules, regulations and “modi operandi”, and implicit institutions, i.e. informal rules 
resulting from culture and tradition that latently affect market interactions. Chapter 2 expands 
on this distinction and investigates the implicit institutions’ influence on entrepreneurship by 
exploiting the German history of separation and reunification as a quasi-natural experiment. 
Chapter 3 picks up on the results and thoroughly analyzes persistent differences between East 
and West Germany to explore how institutions affect entrepreneurial preferences. Chapter 4 
shifts the focus towards explicit institutions and analyzes educational effects on entrepreneur-
ship, thus explaining where differences in the preferences for entrepreneurship between East 
and West Germany result from. Chapter 5 explicitly analyzes an adjustment in the explicit 
institutions regarding university education by evaluating some policy measures for supporting 
academic entrepreneurship. Chapter 6 eventually shifts the focus towards the institutional 
dynamics itself and investigates the role of information dissemination in the process of insti-
tutional change. Chapter 7 concludes. This introductory chapter proceeds by discussing the 
potential effects of explicit and implicit institutions on entrepreneurship in more depth; thus 
giving a more detailed overview over the subsequent chapters along this line. 
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1.2 Institutions and Entrepreneurship 
Baumol (1990) argues that the economic effects of entrepreneurship crucially depend on the 
institutional framework entrepreneurship takes place in. If the institutions provide adverse 
incentives, entrepreneurs concentrate on rent seeking behavior which eventually leads to a 
welfare loss. Only if the institutions understood as “rules of the game” grant high enough 
payoffs for productive endeavors and guarantee that the entrepreneur can appropriate its prof-
it, then entrepreneurship is allocated to productive means. Consequently, the rule of market, 
protection of property rights and equal justice can be understood as basic requirements on the 
institutional setup to enable productive entrepreneurship (c.f. Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; 
Acemoglu et al. 2005; Scully, 1988). But institutional influences on entrepreneurship go be-
yond these basic requirements. Saxenian (1994) demonstrates that differences between the 
development of Silicon Valley and Route 128 not least stem from differences in the institu-
tions prevalent at the respective sites. As Gilson (1999) points out, California and Massachu-
setts differ in their legal institutions. While Massachusetts enforces covenants not to compete, 
California does not, thus facilitating labor mobility and consequently knowledge transfers. 
Apart from that, Saxenian (1994) more generally discusses differences in the market structure, 
particularly in the organization of the value chain. But she also stresses the importance of so-
cial ties and business culture, which are rather “soft” and informal factors that nevertheless 
affect entrepreneurship. In line with this reasoning, Baumol (1990) points out that the entre-
preneur’s reputation may play a role as non-pecuniar benefit when individuals choose their 
preferred occupation. 
Both formal and informal factors influencing entrepreneurship can be subsumed under the 
term 'institutions'. „Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property 
rights)“ (North 1991, 97). I refer to the set of formal rules as explicit institutions, since they 
are explicitly codified, publicly known and usually include instruments to sanction deviant 
behavior. On the contrary, I consider North’s “informal constraints” to be implicit institutions, 
since they are usually not codified and often not codifiable. Nevertheless, implicit institutions 
are known to the market actors and affect their behavior. Typically, implicit institutions result 
from cultural norms and traditions and are transmitted by social interaction. Deviant behavior 
is of course not justiciable, but it is sanctioned socially, e.g. by obstruction. This can effec-
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tively ensure liability, as Ellickson (1991) points out. He shows how farmers in Shasta County 
regulate land use and settle disputes over livestock without referring to explicit laws but ad-
here to implicit norms instead. Thus very generally, norms and values that are prevalent in 
certain regional communities affect decisions made at regional markets by determining which 
actions are considered to be appropriate. And evidently, norms and values should influence 
peoples’ choice of occupation (Busenitz and Lau, 1996). Anyhow, the institutional effects on 
entrepreneurship, particularly the effects of implicit institutions, are not exhaustively explored 
yet.  
With respect to the regulatory framework for entrepreneurship, it is the explicit institutions 
that can directly be influenced by policy makers. But a “regime” as described by Audretsch 
and Fritsch (2002) goes beyond that. A regime can be understood as the aggregate of implicit 
and explicit institutions in its entity (c.f. Boettke and Coyne, 2009). Consequently, it is the 
interplay of explicit and implicit institutions that determines how entrepreneurship-friendly 
the rules of the game at some regional market are – or if the regime regulating some market 
poses a hurdle to entrepreneurship. Essentially, regimes may differ with regard to a regions’ 
economic structure and consequently its labor market conditions, thus providing more or less 
opportunities to begin an entrepreneurial endeavor. Moreover, subsidies and grants are explic-
it measures that can contribute to regimes’ differences and their effects on entrepreneurship. 
But implicit norms and values as they might e.g. result from culture and tradition are also part 
of a regional regime. If, for instance, entrepreneurs have a high prestige in one region while in 
another region entrepreneurs are rather seen as expropriators, then this has a significant influ-
ence on the potential (non-pecuniary) benefits from becoming an entrepreneur at these two 
regional labor markets. The thesis at hand will discuss this issue from different points of view 
and empirically disentangle the effects of explicit and of implicit institutions on entrepreneur-
ship. 
Even though institutions are regarded to be quite stable, Audretsch and Fritsch (2002) observe 
significant changes in the regional growth regimes over time. It is fair to assume that explicit 
institutions are more time variant, since they can be influenced by policy and promptly adapt 
to developments of the economic environment, while implicit institutions are arguably less 
dynamic (Williamson, 2000). Indeed, this thesis shows that socio-cultural developments lead-
ing to changes in the implicit institutions may take several generations. Since a regime’s ef-
fects do not exclusively result from the effective sum of its institutions, but rather from the 
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interaction of explicit and implicit institutions (Weingast, 1997; 1995) this should be a rele-
vant policy issue. If entrepreneurs are for instance held in high esteem according to a culture’s 
norms and values, this could multiply the effects of policies applied to support entrepreneur-
ship. Whether policies on the other hand can make up for a potentially bad reputation of en-
trepreneurs is questionable. But even if the entrepreneur is in best social standing, this will 
probably not persuade people to start an entrepreneurial endeavor if the economic conditions 
do not provide sufficient opportunities for entrepreneurship. Hence a regime’s efficiency 
eventually depends on complementarities of its explicit and implicit institutions. This com-
plex relation will be problematized repeatedly in the course of the thesis at hand. 
In the subsequent chapters I will detail on the differences between regional regimes with re-
spect to their explicit and implicit institutions. First, I will further discuss the interaction of 
explicit and implicit institutions and pin down the implicit institutions’ influence on entrepre-
neurship. In a next step, I will analyze the formation of implicit institutions more thoroughly 
and further investigate their effect on individuals’ entrepreneurial preferences. Subsequently, I 
will expand on the formation of entrepreneurial preferences and investigate how education 
affects the intention to become an entrepreneur, thus shifting the focus towards explicit insti-
tutions. Hereafter I will explicitly assess the effect of different policy measures on entrepre-
neurship. The analysis of entrepreneurship education at universities and its influence on stu-
dents’ entrepreneurial intentions eventually rounds out this line of argument by investigating 
the outcome of a change in the explicit institutions. Throughout the course of analysis, a cou-
ple of questions on institutional change arise that cannot be entirely assessed in the respective 
chapters. Given the institutions’ influence on entrepreneurship, can institutions be altered to 
affect entrepreneurship? How could this be done, and how long would it take? Hence I con-
clude my thesis with a chapter that addresses these questions in a more general context. As-
suming that voting behavior is another manifestation of norms and values prevalent in some 
regional regime, I will investigate institutional change by analyzing the effects of information 
and its dissemination on electoral outcomes.  
1.3 Explicit Institutions, Implicit institutions, and Entrepreneurship 
Chapter 2 approaches the question if implicit institutions affect entrepreneurship. Usually, the 
effects of implicit and explicit institutions are difficult to disentangle, since both types of in-
stitutions typically vary simultaneously. The analysis in chapter 2 works out the effect of im-
plicit institutions by exploiting the German history of separation and reunification as quasi-
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natural experiment. For 45 years East and West Germany were governed by two diametrical 
regimes. In the West, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) granted individual freedom, 
property rights and the rule of the market. In the East, the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) established a socialist system with one party rule and a centrally planned economy. 
But the separation did not only lead to different explicit institutions. The implicit institutions, 
i.e. societal norms and values, diverged as well, particularly since the Socialist Party in the 
East tried very hard to influence its people’s worldview and to shape its citizens’ beliefs. 
Since East Germans’ mobility was forcefully restricted by the Iron Curtain, this socialist 
treatment can be regarded to be exogenous – and hence used for empirical investigations. 
Indeed chapter 2 confirms that implicit institutions significantly differ between East and West 
Germany, even years after reunification. This is assumed to be the result of the socialist 
treatment of the East German group of individuals. Furthermore, this analysis reveals a signif-
icant correlation between various norm and value variables and an individual’s probability to 
be an entrepreneur. Accordingly, the differences in the implicit institutions between East and 
West Germany should translate into differences in the propensity to become an entrepreneur – 
and there is strong evidence that this is indeed the case. Societal norms and values apparently 
influence the individuals’ interest in entrepreneurship and their desire to become an entrepre-
neur. Due to the socialist treatment in the GDR, implicit institutions in East Germany are still 
very much affected by socialist norms and values. According to these institutions, East Ger-
mans are significantly less inclined to start an entrepreneurial endeavor – nevertheless they 
do. Actually, the start-up rates are significantly higher in East Germany than in West Germa-
ny. This is indicative of the implicit institutions’ relevance for entrepreneurship in relation to 
other factors: Implicit institutions affect the individual desire to become an entrepreneur. But 
it seems as if the “hard”, explicit institutional factors like sales market structure or labor mar-
ket conditions were more important for the decision to start an own business (c.f. 
Blanchflower et al.,2001; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). At least this is the case in East 
Germany, where the reunifications’ aftermath granted manifold opportunities for entrepre-
neurship (c.f. Reynolds et al., 2005) – but also caused necessities for lots of people to carve 
out a career in self-employment (c.f. Kirzner, 1973).  
Anyhow, the German reunification provides an outstanding opportunity to investigate institu-
tional influences on entrepreneurship in a quasi-experimental setup. Hence I use this approach 
repeatedly throughout this thesis. As Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) argue, the division 
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of German exogenously separated parts of the country that were quite similar in their econom-
ic development up to the end of World War II (c.f. Bach and Trabold 2000; Frijters et al. 
2004; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 2005; Fuchs-Schündeln 2008). At the latest with the 
closing of the Berlin wall in 1961 people could not evade the socialist treatment in the Eastern 
part of Germany any more. This treatment included the implementation of explicit and implic-
it socialist institutions that were hostile towards entrepreneurship. But also the German reuni-
fication in 1990 occurred as exogenous shock. Even those East Germans who rallied against 
the regime and demanded their individual liberties could not foresee the unprecedented devel-
opment. Consequently, nobody anticipated that East Germany would entirely adapt the explic-
it institutions of West Germany at one go in 1990. „Moreover, institutions typically change 
incrementally rather than in discontinuous fashion“ (North 1990, 6). As a consequence, par-
ticularly the individuals in East Germany took some time to familiarize themselves with the 
implicit institutions inherent to the market economy. Accordingly, the East German treatment 
group holds on to norms and values that were shaped by the regime of the GDR. On that note 
history disentangled explicit and implicit institutions in Germany exogenously, thus providing 
a unique opportunity to analyze institutional influences on entrepreneurship. 
1.4 Regional Differences in Implicit Institutions and the Formation of Entrepreneurial 
Preferences 
Chapter 3 picks up the previous chapter’s results and explores the implicit institutions inherit-
ed from socialism in East Germany more thoroughly, thus linking individual level variables to 
the institutional level (c.f. Busenitz et al. 2000). In order to better understand how norms and 
values translate into the decision to become an entrepreneur, this chapter investigates how 
East Germans’ preferences differ from the West German preference structure. As compared to 
the West German control group, East Germans tend more to rely on the state, favor welfare 
state interventions and are overall more skeptical towards competition and performance incen-
tives. Accordingly, East Germans are less inclined to engage in entrepreneurship. These pref-
erences are arguably the outcome of the socialist experience, i.e. the treatment with the explic-
it and particularly implicit institutions of the GDR. Chapter 3 shows that the East Germans’ 
skepticism towards some basic norms of the market economy and their state reliant prefer-
ences cannot be explained by the idiosyncratic heterogeneity of individuals or by differences 
in the economic conditions alone, but are indeed the result of the state controlled socialization 
under a socialist regime.  
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Anyhow, chapter 3 also discusses a potential second channel by which the socialist regime 
might have affected norms, values and preferences in East Germany, i.e. selective migration. 
In the early years after the Second World War up to the closing of the Berlin wall the latest, 
migration from Russian occupied East Germany to the increasingly sovereign West Germany 
was still possible, albeit at increasing costs. There is strong evidence that particularly skilled, 
libertarian and self-reliant individuals took their chances to move on from socialism to the 
free market economy. Consequently, differences in the preference structure, especially with 
respect to state- or self-reliance, must to some degree result from this migration induced 
change in the composition of the East German population. This vote by feet casted by a selec-
tive, self-reliant group of individuals is another effect of socialism. But after the final closing 
of the inner German border, the socialist regime did not cease to propagate socialist values in 
order to educate what the ruling party considered to be good citizens. Consequently, even the 
East German cohorts born decades after the Iron Curtain closed (and migration stopped) show 
a pronounced treatment effect of exposure to socialist institutions, as chapter 3 confirms in 
line with chapter 2. 
As long as preferences differ between regions, e.g. between East and West Germany, this is a 
clear indication that institutions differ as well. And if norms and values differ this hints at 
differences in the implicit institutions. This is of particular interest against the findings from 
chapter 2 that start up rates are higher in East Germany than in comparable West German dis-
tricts. The results from chapter 3 suggest that even more East Germans would ceteris paribus 
become entrepreneurs if they had the same preferences as the average West German, i.e. if 
implicit institutions between East and West Germany were the same. But up till now the im-
plicit institutions in East Germany still present a barrier to entrepreneurship. Thus the high 
start up rates in East Germany must be ascribed to the turbulence related to the reunification 
process and the exceptional economic conditions in East Germany (c.f. Fritsch, 2004). This 
reasoning also fits the results of Schindele (2010). She shows that East Germany is “catching 
up” in terms of self employment shares, but that the rate of convergence is rather low. The 
comparably high but decreasing rate of start-ups found in chapter 2 could be related to this 
process.  
This leads to the question whether implicit institutions will converge to an all-German level 
sometime. The analysis in chapter 2 shows that people do adapt to the institutions of the 
community they live in, e.g. if they move from East to West Germany. It is rather the dynam-
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ics of this process which is in question. Now that the explicit institutions are similar all over 
Germany, it is mainly the implicit institutions that have not entirely reunified. But since peo-
ple grow up under similar conditions, are socialized and educated within one economy, they 
are likely to become more equal in the norms and values they adhere to. Nevertheless, Alesina 
and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) predict that it will take 20 to 40 years until East Germans’ pref-
erences will equal the preference structure of their West German counterparts (c.f. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin,1991). The process of socialization and education leading to a convergence of 
norms, values and preferences will be the analyzed in chapter 4, with an explicit focus on ed-
ucational effects on entrepreneurship. 
1.5 Institutional Change, Entrepreneurship, and Education 
Chapter 4 shifts the focus towards the effects of explicit institutions on entrepreneurship. 
More precisely, this chapter analyzes the effects of education on entrepreneurial preferences, 
i.e. the intention to become an entrepreneur. Though, chapter 4 expands on the previous chap-
ters methodologically. Chapter 2 and 3 show that treatment with socialist institutions has a 
negative influence on entrepreneurship. Socialism sustainably shaped implicit institutions that 
were opposed to entrepreneurial values and continue to affect the East German treatment 
group. Thus, East Germans still express less self-reliant preferences and are less willing to 
become an entrepreneur. But how did the socialist regime manage to generate such a long-
lasting effect? Chapter 4 approaches this question by investigating the effects of socialist edu-
cation on the entrepreneurial intentions of university students in reunified Germany. By com-
paring the subsample of university students that received pre-university education in the GDR 
with university students that always went to school in the FRG, chapter 4 identifies education 
as channel by which the socialist treatment affects East Germans’ attitude towards entrepre-
neurship. Moreover, this chapter confirms that the institutional effects derived in chapters 2 
and 3 do not only result from selective migration, an issue discussed in chapter 3, but also 
from the ongoing treatment with socialism in the GDR after the closing of the Iron Curtain. 
Chapter 4 analyzes German university students’ entrepreneurial intentions conditional on 
whether they went to school in East or in West Germany. Noticeably, university students are 
interesting study subjects, since, given their qualification, they provide a promising subject 
pool for “high impact entrepreneurship” (Acs, 2008). The sampling of the analysis ensures 
that students that went to school in East Germany got at least some years of socialist educa-
tion in the GDR. Controlling for a variety of idiosyncratic factors it turns out that this treat-
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ment sustainably crowded out entrepreneurial spirit. Students who went to school in the GDR 
are significantly less likely to have entrepreneurial intentions than students who were contin-
uously educated in the free market economy. This effect holds if only students at West Ger-
man universities are considered, i.e. students that study in a similar institutional environment 
but went school under different regimes. Eventually, it turns out that East German students 
who got a full socialist treatment, i.e. that were educated in the GDR all the time until finish-
ing high school, show a more pronounced treatment effect and are less likely to have entre-
preneurial intentions than the partial treatment group of East German students who got at least 
some years of schooling in reunified Germany after the GDR ceased to exist. 
Accordingly, it is indeed the education under the socialist regime of the GDR that affected 
individuals’ preferences with regard to entrepreneurship. More specifically, a socialization in 
line with the implicit institutions of the GDR and the pre-university schooling in the stately 
organized educational system crowded out the entrepreneurial spirit of contemporary univer-
sity students, an otherwise rather mobile and arguably quite open-minded subsample of the 
population. On the other hand, schooling under the libertarian regime of the Federal Republic 
after reunification elicits the entrepreneurial intentions of East German university students. 
Apparently, individual preferences for entrepreneurship can be affected by educational 
measures, thus potentially providing an opportunity to foster the convergence of implicit insti-
tutions between East and West Germany. The effectiveness of educational measures with re-
spect to students’ preferences towards entrepreneurship will be assessed in chapter 5 more 
thoroughly.  
1.6 Universities, Policies and Educational Effects on Entrepreneurial Preferences 
Chapter 5 turns to the effects of policy-induced adjustments in the institutional framework on 
entrepreneurship. This chapter investigates how changes in the educational system affect in-
dividuals’ attitude towards entrepreneurship as occupational alternative. Given the results 
from the previous chapter it is reasonable to assume that policy can influence people’s prefer-
ences towards entrepreneurship. Using the same dataset but another subsample as chapter 4, 
chapter 5 assesses the effectiveness of different measures of entrepreneurship education ap-
plied at German universities. In 1998 the Federal Government of Germany introduced the 
“EXIST” program to support academic entrepreneurship (c.f. Astebro and Bazzazian, 2011). 
With this program, universities can get public funding to include entrepreneurship education 
into their portfolio. At the same time, an increasing number of universities started to establish 
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chairs for entrepreneurship at their sites. This is another measure to integrate entrepreneurship 
education into a university’s curriculum. While pre-university education turned out to have an 
effect on university students’ entrepreneurial intentions in chapter 4, chapter 5 explicitly ana-
lyzes the effect of entrepreneurship education at universities on students’ attitude towards an 
occupational future as entrepreneur. 
The least one might expect from measures of entrepreneurship education applied at universi-
ties is that they improve the students’ information on opportunities and challenges related to 
an occupation as entrepreneur. But chapter 5 reveals that the application of any of the 
measures under investigation does not necessarily increase the probability that students have 
made up their minds on whether they would like to become an entrepreneur in the future. On 
the contrary, students at universities that participate in the EXIST program or at universities 
that have a chair for entrepreneurship are even less likely to express an opinion on this ques-
tion than students at any other university. So either entrepreneurship education puzzles the 
students and particularly the wannabe entrepreneurs, or it triggers a thought process in which 
students give up unreflecting prejudices on entrepreneurship in favor of an indifferent attitude 
(c.f. Oosterbeek et al. 2010). Anyhow, if a university applies both measures simultaneously, 
i.e. a university participates in the publicly funded EXIST program for entrepreneurship sup-
port and has a chair for entrepreneurship, then students are significantly more likely to be able 
to state whether they consider entrepreneurship to be an occupational alternative for them-
selves. So apparently only this intense treatment with several measures of entrepreneurship 
education really helps students to update their beliefs and make up their minds on whether 
they would like to become an entrepreneur in the future.  
In general, the simultaneous application of both measures has an independent effect on the 
students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship. If both measures are applied, this leads to a sig-
nificant increase in the students’ overall interest in entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, students at 
universities that participate in EXIST and have a chair for entrepreneurship are significantly 
less likely to have concrete entrepreneurial intentions. However, these students with entrepre-
neurial intentions have some comparatively promising attributes. Even though all EXIST uni-
versities do in general succeed in eliciting the desire to become an entrepreneur, it seems that 
only universities that fully institutionalize entrepreneurship education and develop a strong 
focus on this issue manage to create an entrepreneurial culture, thus achieving the predefined 
policy goals. Using a rich dataset, the analysis in chapter 5 comprehensively controls for po-
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tential confounds and relates the differences in the measures’ effects to differences in the 
measures’ effectiveness. Indeed, there are strong indications that the measures selectively 
affect different types of students. So on the whole, chapter 5 clearly shows that education does 
influence individuals’ preferences, more precisely, that measures of entrepreneurship educa-
tion at universities do affect students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship as occupational alter-
native. But different educational measures affect students’ preferences differently. Conse-
quently, the institutional framework at the university sites turns out to be decisive for the ef-
fectiveness of entrepreneurship education.  
By now, all chapters have confirmed the relevance of institutions for entrepreneurship. But 
they have also unveiled certain difficulties in assessing the dynamics related to institutional 
change. Exploiting German history as quasi natural experiment, chapter 1 reveals that the im-
plicit institutions in East Germany still show the effects of the socialist treatment in the GDR. 
Chapter 2 pins this effect down to a negative influence of state reliant preferences on entre-
preneurship. Thus the socialist regime shaped implicit institutions which outlived the system’s 
collapse and still affect individual preferences, which in turn influence the individual’s entre-
preneurial intentions. This necessarily raises the question if and when institutions will con-
verge. Chapter 3 explains that the socialist regime affected individual preferences and implicit 
institutions by education, and shows that educational measures help to adjust norms and val-
ues between East and West Germany. Anyhow, it remains unclear how effective educational 
measures can be as means to foster institutional conversion. Chapter 4 shows that education 
affects the attitude towards entrepreneurship and discusses the institutions’ informational 
function that helps people to make up their minds. It furthermore identifies differences in the 
effectiveness of different measures of entrepreneurship education. But the concrete mecha-
nism by which information translates into preferences cannot be explained.  
All investigations so far touch the question how institutions themselves change, a question 
that goes beyond the focus of the empirical investigations presented in chapters 2-5. Since the 
implicit institutions inherited from the GDR turn out to be a barrier to entrepreneurship, the 
transition process in East Germany could probably be fastened by increasing the dynamics of 
institutional change. Education seems to be one means to achieve this aim, but this can be 
assumed to have rather long term effects. Anyhow, information seems to play an important 
role in the process of institutional change, particularly with respect to the change of implicit 
institutions. But information affects individuals quite selectively and can even yield adverse 
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effects, as chapter 5 expounds. In an endeavor to understand the mechanisms of institutional 
change a little bit better, this thesis finally takes up a more general point of view on this issue. 
Shifting the focus away from entrepreneurship, the last chapter investigates the process of 
institutional change itself and analyzes the relevance of information for the transformation of 
implicit institutions. 
1.7 Information Dissemination and Institutional Change 
The previous chapters show that information affects people’s preferences, and that this might 
contribute to institutional change. In chapter 6, I shift the focus away from entrepreneurship 
and more generally explore the processes leading to a change of preferences and (implicit) 
institutions. Chapter 3 uses, in line with Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), (self reported) 
election behavior to proxy implicit institutions by differentiating left wing party votes from 
right wing party votes. In the last chapter of the thesis in hand I expand on this approach. In-
deed, the German multi party system reflects a couple of social cleavages that correspond to 
norms and values and thus can be used as a proxy for implicit institutions. Accordingly, elec-
tion patterns are regionally sticky to a fair degree (Voigtlaender and Voth, 2012), with parti-
san voters habitually electing the party representing their value preferences. For instance, vot-
ers of the Liberal Party usually adhere to libertarian values and individualistic norms, while 
votes for the Christian Democratic Party rather represent Christian values and conservative 
norms. Nevertheless, voters change their minds from time to time and elect a different party 
when they do not feel represented by their previous favorite anymore. Information should be 
particularly important for this variance in the voting behavior. Anyhow, if it turns out that a 
region’s political majorities have changed persistently, this indicates a shift in the importance 
of certain norms and values and consequently a potential change in the implicit institutions 
prevalent in that region. 
Chapter 6 takes up these considerations by investigating the effect of the introduction of a 
new information medium, i.e. the internet, on voting behavior. The technological shock in-
duced by the Internet caused a significant upheaval in the market for media, thus radically 
altering the way in which information is disseminated. The internet provides information in 
large scale at broad scope and at low cost. People can self-select information on whatever 
topic they are interested in, any time. Consequently, the new medium should affect the way in 
which people form an opinion. This could again influence people’s preferences and mindsets. 
These preferences are most obviously expressed in the decision to elect a particular party and 
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thus the norms and values this party stands for. Indeed, chapter 6 finds a significant effect of 
the introduction of the Internet on election outcomes. Interestingly, it is particularly the estab-
lished parties that benefit from the Internet. Small parties rather lose vote shares. Moreover, 
parties from the extreme right wing of the political spectrum lose ground if the Internet ad-
vances while extreme left wing parties are rather unaffected. Apart from that, the introduction 
of the Internet leads to a reduction of the election turnout. This indeed hints at the connection 
to the formation of implicit institutions, since the implicit rule to cast one’s vote is less 
obeyed in regions where the Internet is intensely used as source of information. This result 
also resembles the results obtained in chapter 5, where more information provided on entre-
preneurship led to an increase in the indifference towards entrepreneurship. Eventually, Chap-
ter 6 finds significant differences in the election patterns between East and West Germany, 
again supporting the result that implicit institutions differ between both parts of the country. 
Amongst others, the analysis of chapter 6 points out the difficulties related to the measure-
ment of Internet effects on economically relevant outcomes. First, there is the selection prob-
lem related to Internet use that is solved in chapter 6 by using data on Internet availability 
instead. Second, there is the problem of simultaneity that is reduced by using regional control 
variables as well as region fixed effects. Moreover, time trends have to be taken care of by 
exploiting the panel structure of the election data. Nevertheless, this procedure cannot entirely 
rule out that unobserved heterogeneity might drive the results and that the estimations suffer 
from an omitted variable bias. Chapter 6 addresses these concerns quite thoroughly by using a 
distance based Instrumental Variables approach to identify the causal effect of the Internet on 
voting behavior, thus approximating the effect of the change in information dissemination on 
implicit institutions. Hence the last chapter also rounds out this thesis methodologically: The 
IV approach used in chapter 6 completes the set of methods used in the previous chapters, i.e. 
the exploitation of the quasi-natural experiment provided by German history in the first chap-
ters, and the diff-in-diff approach utilized in chapter 5, to assess institutional effects on entre-
preneurship. 
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2. Explicit Institutions, Implicit institutions, and Entrepreneurship1 
2.1 Introduction 
In 1956, Soviet Union premier Nikita Khrushchev, when addressing Western ambassadors, 
said “we will bury you”. At the time, such a threat did not seem farfetched; after all, the 
USSR had just won the space race by launching Sputnik and the West was, indeed, running 
scared. There was a general consensus that the central planning taking place in the Soviet Un-
ion would produce persistently high growth rates (Moore, 1992). However, after some 30 
years, it became clear that this fear, at least, was baseless. As nicely set out by Audretsch 
(2007), the socialist planned economy did well at large-scale mass production but lost ground 
when it came to the creativity necessary for new ideas and growth-enhancing innovation. The 
socialization of profits worked against Schumpeter’s pioneer rent as motivation for entrepre-
neurial action and hence individuals lacked any incentive to build on existing knowledge and 
develop new ideas. Accordingly, technological progress leading to economic growth was 
comparatively slow, which eventually led to the system’s collapse. In the long run, the free 
market economy proved to be superior, not the least because it provided individual freedom 
for entrepreneurial activity. 
The general history of these two economic systems is amongst others a lesson in the im-
portance of prevailing institutions to entrepreneurship. Delving a little deeper and following 
North (1990), at least two different kinds of institutions can be discerned. First are the explicit 
institutions in the form of laws e.g. regarding property rights and individual freedom. Second 
are the implicit institutions, in the form of prevailing values and norms, which e.g. help de-
termine an individual’s risk attitude or capacity for opportunity recognition. The collapse of 
the former socialist countries led to a change in the explicit institutions, with many of these 
countries heading in the direction of a market economy. A paramount example of this devel-
opment can be seen in reunified Germany, where the former socialist eastern part of the coun-
try fully adopted the explicit institutions of the West. But did the implicit institutions trans-
form as well? A large body of literature suggests that societal norms and values develop over 
time, are quite persistent, and change only gradually over the course of one or two generations 
(Halaby, 2003; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Rainer and Siedler, 2009).  
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on Bauernschuster, Stefan, Falck, Oliver, Gold, Robert and Heblich, Stephan (2012), 
Explicitly Implicit. How Institutional Differences Influence Entrepreneurship, in: R. Crescenzi and M. Percoco 
(Eds.), Geography, Institutions and Regional Economic Performance, Berlin: Springer, forthcoming. 
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This chapter’s goal is to assess the influence of the socialist regime in the former GDR on 
implicit institutions which in turn affect the decision to become an entrepreneur. Given the 
intuitive, complex interaction between explicit and implicit institutions, it does not seem fea-
sible to design policy aimed at enhancing entrepreneurial activity, e.g. in former socialist 
countries, without disentangling these institutions and their effects. In order to do so, we draw 
upon Germany’s recent history, which provides us with a quasi-natural experiment to study 
the effects of implicit institutions on entrepreneurship. In today’s reunified Germany, citizens 
from both the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) as well as from the Federal Re-
public of Germany (FRG) face a similar explicit institutional framework for entrepreneurs. 
However, the legacy of a divided Germany may result in persistent differences in the implicit 
institutions potentially overshadowing future developments.  
In particular, we expect that the experience of a socialist environment, along with an educa-
tion and socialization according to communist values, will continue to influence the attitudes 
of individuals who were raised in the former GDR (cf. Mortimer and Lorence, 1979; Hout, 
1984). As the implicit institutions prevailing in the GDR were hostile toward a market econ-
omy, it seems plausible to suppose that they also influence economic decisions such as the 
choice to become an entrepreneur. Therefore, we suspect that individuals who were born and 
raised in East Germany possess less entrepreneurial spirit than their fellow citizens in West 
Germany. 
It is a challenge for analysis as well as for policy design that these effects cannot be found in 
macro-level data. Using the German Social Insurance Statistic we compare the number of 
firm foundations in East German regions to that of West German regions and show that start-
up rates are persistently higher in East Germany. The reason for macro-level data not reveal-
ing the negative effects of the socialist regime on entrepreneurship is quite obvious: The con-
ditions and opportunities available in each part of the country differ significantly, which can 
be explained by an ongoing catch-up process resulting from the implementation and devel-
opment of market structures after reunification.  
Yet the individual motivation to become an entrepreneur as it is influenced by implicit institu-
tions should still vary despite the catch-up process and all the economic incentives offered to 
affect the same. Everything else equal, we assume East Germans to possess less entrepreneur-
ial spirit than their West German counterparts. Using micro-level data from the German Gen-
eral Social Survey (ALLBUS), a socioeconomic survey conducted on a sample of the German 
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micro-census, we compare East and West Germans on a set of different norm and value vari-
ables and find substantial differences. Moreover, we can show that these differences are 
strongly associated with the probability of being an entrepreneur.  
Further, we would like to make the point that regional heterogeneity is not the only channel 
for our results. There is more to the legacy of the socialist regime than “just” a poor and less 
developed economic environment. This is demonstrated by looking at the subsample of indi-
viduals who were born in East Germany but migrated to West Germany after the fall of the 
Iron Curtain. Even this selective subsample shows a clear effect of the treatment with socialist 
norms and values negatively associated with entrepreneurship. As an anti-test we look at 
those individuals who were born in East Germany but emigrated to West Germany in the ear-
ly days of the GDR before the Berlin Wall was build, and hence are less likely to have ab-
sorbed socialist values. As expected, the subsample of early East-West movers does not differ 
from West Germans born in the FRG in the same way the late East German movers do. This 
anti-test gives further support for our hypothesis that the socialist regime in the former GDR 
created an environment with implicit institutions hostile to entrepreneurship – and that these 
institutions sustainably crowded out entrepreneurial spirit in East Germany. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops in more detail the 
role of explicit and implicit institutions in entrepreneurial activity. Section 2.3 introduces the 
German history of separation and reunification as quasi-natural experiment. Section 2.4 de-
scribes the differences in entrepreneurial activity between East and West Germany based on 
macro-level data. Section 2.5 uses micro-data to analyze the effect of the socialist regime on a 
whole set of societal norms and values and shows that these implicit institutions are negative-
ly associated with entrepreneurship to a substantial degree. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Entrepreneurship and Institutional Incentives 
2.2.1 What Drives Entrepreneurship? 
The decision to start a business and become an entrepreneur is influenced by various factors, 
not least by personal characteristics. As Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) show, these include an 
individual’s risk attitude as well as his or her motivation (Schumpeter, 1912) and skills 
(Lazear, 2005), along with the ability to spot niches in the market (Kirzner, 1973), raise finan-
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cial resources (Michelacci and Silva, 2007; Guiso et al., 2004), and networking ability (Sand-
ers and Nee, 1996; Stuart and Sorenson, 2005).2 
The decision to start a business is also influenced by external characteristics based in the sur-
rounding institutional framework. This is made obvious in Saxenian’s (1994) comparison 
between the evolution of Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 in Boston, Massachu-
setts. Much of Silicon Valley’s greater success compared to Route 128 is the result of institu-
tional factors. Apparently, the absence of legal restrictions on job mobility and the resulting 
diffusion of knowledge led to a vertically disintegrated, entrepreneurial business culture in 
Silicon Valley, where new ideas quickly result in new firms (cf. Gilson, 1999; Klepper, 
2009). Public research facilities, leading to increased knowledge flows, and public funding are 
another example of institutional factors that stimulate entrepreneurship. By contrast, an exten-
sive welfare system could affect individual risk-aversion and (leisure) time preferences in 
ways that lessen the incentive to become an entrepreneur (Parker and Robson, 2004; Fölster, 
2002). 
Both personal and external characteristics are factors in an individual’s decision-making pro-
cess, but their relative importance depends on the person’s psychological makeup. For in-
stance, entrepreneurial individuals are expected to be more risk accepting, self-confident, and 
independent (cf. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Parker, 2004). 
Accordingly, individuals with strong entrepreneurial intentions are likely to overcome finan-
cial or other constraints, whereas less entrepreneurial individuals might be discouraged more 
easily. An individual’s self-image is strongly influenced by his or her education and overall 
socialization (Halaby, 2003; Falck et al., 2009), which determine how the person understands 
the prevailing social norms and habits, which in turn shape the individual’s view of who he or 
she is and what the individual and others should or should not do (Bernhard et al., 2006). Ac-
cordingly, these non-codified social obligations act as implicit institutions that do not explicit-
ly prescribe individual behavior, but nevertheless have a crucial impact on economical deci-
sions and actions (North, 1991). Particularly, they affect an individual’s tendency to have a 
rather entrepreneurial or a rather bureaucratic job orientation (Miller and Swanson, 1958). 
                                                 
2 For an overview, see Parker (2004). 
20 
 
2.2.2 Implicit Institutions and Entrepreneurship 
We define implicit institutions as the mindsets individuals develop by being exposed to their 
society’s norms, values and traditions. With regard to entrepreneurship, these implicit institu-
tions might influence an individual’s desire to be an entrepreneur, as well as his or her risk 
attitude and capacity for opportunity recognition. Consider an individual growing up in an 
environment of freedom, liberalism, and self-realization. This person might never have read 
about Schumpeter’s (1912) entrepreneurial virtues, but he or she will certainly have a better 
understanding of them, even if not explicit, than will an individual growing up in an egalitari-
an society where competition and individual self-realization are proscribed (cf. Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). In an environment where self-reliance and self-realization are not 
rewarded by the expectation of future profits, most people would rather work 9 to 5 for pre-
dictable wages. The resulting increase of risk aversion and decrease of individual incentive 
will eventually crowd out the entrepreneurial spirit altogether. 
It is this situation that describes the business environment prevalent in the former socialist 
countries of the Eastern Bloc. These planned economies had no room for entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and their suppressive political regimes favored communist ideals and egalitarianism 
over liberalism and individuality. Private property was nationalized and for nearly 50 years 
people were raised and educated according to socialist values — a period long enough to de-
velop the belief that conformity was the norm, individuality a form of deviance.3 Thus, im-
plicit institutions rejecting entrepreneurship were established and internalized over a fairly 
long period, making them unlikely to vanish over night, regardless of how the rest of the 
world changed. Everything else equal, individuals from Eastern Germany should consequent-
ly show a lower propensity to become an entrepreneur than their fellow citizens from the 
West, thus confirming the hypothesis that implicit institutions do exert influence on the indi-
viduals’ occupational choice. 
2.3 German Reunification as a Quasi-Natural Experiment 
German separation and its termination through reunification can be viewed as an exogenous 
shock (Bach and Trabold, 2000; Frijters et al., 2004; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005; 
Fuchs-Schündeln, 2008). After World War II, Germany was divided into two parts. At this 
                                                 
3 Eventually, this lack of individual incentives also contributed to the low level of productivity in Eastern Bloc 
countries (VanArk ,1996), particularly to the lack of productivity of the GDR as compared to the FRG (VanArk, 
1995).   
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time, both parts of the country were mostly indistinguishable with respect to economic 
measures (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007), but diverged diametrically afterwards. By 
1952, the inner German border was so fiercely guarded that it was extraordinary difficult for 
East Germans to enter West Germany. The city of Berlin was the only place where it was still 
feasible to cross the border. However, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 closed even this 
gate. During the following decades, the two German states developed very differently. Under 
the influence of the Western Allies, West Germany became a democratic state with a free 
market economy, whereas East Germany turned into a socialist, centrally planned economy 
under the influence of the Soviet Union. Naturally, these diametrical contexts influenced their 
inhabitants’ worldviews and attitudes toward the state and society. And as a consequence, the 
East and West Germans were not only physically separated by walls and barbed-wire fences 
but became also separated from each other by their implicit institutions. It was only when the 
Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and Germany was subsequently reunified that this sharp separation 
came to an end. 
German reunification in 1990 resulted in the present situation where all Germans, regardless 
of whether they were raised in the GDR or the FRG, now share a common democratic consti-
tution that guarantees the rule of law, property rights, and (economic) freedom. In other 
words, all market actors in Germany today operate within a very similar institutional frame-
work. However, implicit institutions (i.e., mindsets and value systems) cannot be changed by 
edict and we therefore expect persisting differences in the social norms and values prevalent 
in these two formerly separated parts of Germany. Considering that the socialist ideology sys-
tematically oppressed entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial virtues, the suspected differences 
in implicit institutions between East Germans and West Germans should result in systematic 
differences in the desire to become an entrepreneur that continue to exist years after the Ger-
man reunification. 
2.4 Empirics on the Macro Level 
2.4.1 Analytical Framework 
We hypothesize that implicit institutions have an influence on the decision to start a business 
and become an entrepreneur. Since East Germans were brought up in a socialist country, we 
suppose they may be more critical toward entrepreneurship than their fellow citizens who 
grew up in the Federal Republic of Germany. All else equal, this should be expressed by a 
smaller number of entrepreneurs in the eastern part of Germany as compared to the western 
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part. However, this ceteris paribus condition is difficult to fulfill due to substantial structural 
differences between East and West Germany, as we detail next. 
As “agents of change and growth” (OECD, 1998, 11), entrepreneurs are expected to play a 
crucial role in the transition from a central planned economy, such as that of the former GDR, 
to a free market economy, such as it now exists in reunified Germany. “Entrepreneurs not 
only seek out potentially profitable economic opportunities but are also willing to take risks to 
see if their hunches are right” (OECD, 1998, 11). The immense structural change that oc-
curred in East Germany following the “jump start” of reunification (Sinn and Sinn, 1992) cer-
tainly created a great set of opportunities to start up new businesses and firms. Hence, the 
very first years after reunification are characterized by intense entrepreneurial activity in the 
East German regions. Implementation of a market economy in the former socialist region re-
sulted in the privatization of state-owned firms as well as in new firm startups in all sectors. It 
was, in short, an extraordinary promising time to become an entrepreneur. The absence of an 
established market structure, not to mention the lack of competitors, was fertile ground for 
new ventures.  
We use data provided by the German Social Insurance Statistics to examine differences in the 
level of entrepreneurial activity as measured by firm foundations. The Social Insurance Statis-
tics requires each employer to report certain information, e.g., qualifications, about every em-
ployee subject to obligatory social insurance. The information collected can be transformed 
into an establishment file that provides longitudinal information about the establishments and 
their employees.4  
Since the decision to become an entrepreneur is, amongst others, subject to regional heteroge-
neity, we try to identify regions in West Germany and in Each Germany that are similar with 
regard to the regional factors driving entrepreneurship. Accordingly, we concentrate on re-
gions in West Germany that are close to the former border with East Germany. Before reuni-
fication, these FRG regions were classified as peripheral and they received reduced public 
infrastructure investment. The private sector also invested rather modestly in the border re-
gion and consequently, these regions were economically underdeveloped and still are to a 
great extent. Despite all these problems, a few of these regions near the former border always 
have and continue to do quite well. We omit these particular border regions from our analysis. 
Instead, we concentrate on the border regions that are classified as development regions under 
                                                 
4 For a detailed description of this data, see Fritsch and Brixy (2004). A detailed description of how the number 
of start-ups is computed is provided by the authors upon request. 
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Objective 2 from 2000-2006 (respectively, Objective 5b from 1994-1999) of the European 
Structural Funds. To compensate for the gap resulting from the exclusion of the non-funded 
regions, we additionally include the Objective 2 regions in eastern Bavaria, which did not lie 
on the inner German border but border on the Czech Republic, former CSFR. Thus, these 
regions also faced the problems inherent to being on the outskirts of the free world, hemmed 
in by the Iron curtain.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Area under Investigation 
  East   West  
Number of regions (NUTS3)  47   50  
 Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max. 
Total no. of firms 1,170 3,047 7,337 1,480 3,009 6,390 
No. of firms in manufacturing 91 322 977 115 363 687 
Total no. of employees 16,424 18,969 115,063 11,681 36,704 109,056 
No. of employees in manufacturing 2,119 6,448 17,138 2,677 12,376 61,546 
Total no. of start-ups 103 329 1272 105 276 745 
No. of  start-ups in manufacturing 4 23 79 3 19 53 
Total no. of firm shutdowns 0 279 1160 0 198 739 
No. of shutdowns in manufacturing 0 23.33 97 0 19 57 
Inhabitants 44,076 108,160 237,833 49,462 124,086 266,070 
Population density 40 252 1,170 42 204 1,534 
GDP 834,195 1,904,423 5,811,596 858,014 2,814,694 9,005,517 
GDP per capita 12.06 17.51 30.14 12.78 23.05 73.89 
Notes: Figures refer to the 47 East German and 50 West German (former) border districts depicted in Figure 1. 
The whole area of the former GDR falls into Objective 1 of the Structural Funds, thus making 
it eligible for public funding of economic development. We concentrate on the East German 
districts that adjoin the former inner-German border plus those districts that adjoin these bor-
der districts. These regions along the border are similar to their western counterparts with re-
spect to geography and natural resources. Furthermore, their situation in the GDR was compa-
rable to the conditions to the western districts in one important aspect: all of these districts 
were located at the far end of the respective country. Thus, the border region is most suitable 
for comparing East and West Germany, since the districts within these regions are most simi-
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lar to each other. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for the observed districts which 
are graphically depicted in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Area under Investigation 
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2.4.2 Differences in Start-Up Rates 
To assess differences in the entrepreneurial activity between East and West Germany, we 
begin with a comparison of the start-up activities for every region and for each year from 
1999 to 2004. In doing so, we calculate two different start-up rates by dividing the number of 
start-ups by number of employees and number of firms in manufacturing respectively. Ac-
cording to our hypothesis, implicit institutions should have a negative effect on start-up rates 
in the eastern regions if all confounding factors were the same. However, as Table 2 reveals, 
this effect cannot be found using macro data. In fact, the start-up rates in the eastern regions 
exceed the western start-up rates in every year of analysis, regardless of how the rate is calcu-
lated. 
Table 2: Start-Up Rates in Manufacturing: Comparison between East and West German Districts 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of  West 20.54 21.38 17.80 18.88 17.82 16.76 
start-ups in  East 33.32 23.36 20.72 21.96 19.70 19.19 
manufacturing Diff. 12.78*** 1.98 2.92** 3.08* 1.88 2.43* 
Start-up rate I  West 0.205 0.208 0.177 0.186 0.188 0.190 
(labor market East 0.544 0.384 0.346 0.360 0.329 0.325 
approach, % ) Diff. 0.339*** 0.176*** 0.169*** 0.175*** 0.140*** 0.135*** 
Start-up rate II  West 5.626 5.909 5.150 5.456 5.293 5.162 
(ecological  East 9.629 7.125 6.694 7.123 6.585 6.682 
approach, %) Diff. 4.003*** 1.216*** 1.544*** 1.666*** 1.291*** 1.519*** 
Notes: Table reports district averages for the 47 East German and 50 West German (former) border districts 
depicted in Figure 1. Start-up rate I is calculated by dividing the number of start-ups in manufacturing by the 
number of employees in manufacturing. Start-up rate II is calculated by dividing the number of start-ups in man-
ufacturing by the overall number of firms in manufacturing. Both start-up rates are reported in percent. * denotes 
10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significance, *** denotes 1% level of significance. 
Overall, the number of startups in manufacturing decreases in both West and East Germany, 
albeit not uniformly. Over time, the difference between the eastern and the western districts 
loses its significance. If we follow a labor market approach and calculate start-up rate I as the 
number of startups in manufacturing divided by the number of employees in manufacturing, 
we see a decline in both the West and the East over time. The difference between East and 
West decreases but remains significant. Under this start-up rate, the probability that an em-
ployee in the East German regions founds a business in manufacturing is continuously higher, 
even 14 years after reunification. If we take an ecological approach5 and calculate start-up 
rate II as the number of startups divided by the number of manufacturing firms in the respec-
                                                 
5 For a comparison of the labor market approach and the ecological approach, see Audretsch and Fritsch (1994). 
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tive regions, we obtain a slightly different result with more variance. This start-up rate is rela-
tively stable in the western districts, but experiences a remarkable decline in the eastern dis-
tricts from 1999 to 2000. After 2000, the rate seemingly decreases in the eastern area even 
though it continues to be significantly higher than the start-up rates in the western area. 
All together, these regional data do not show that implicit institutions inherited from the so-
cialist era in Eastern Germany have a negative influence on the start-up activity in the eastern 
parts of the country. There are three possible reasons for this counterintuitive result. It might 
be that (1) implicit institutions do not vary between the two regions at all. Or, perhaps it is 
that (2) implicit institutions do differ between the two regions, but do not affect entrepreneur-
ship. Alternatively, it could also be that (3) implicit institutions are significantly different in 
East as compared to West Germany and do hinder entrepreneurship in eastern Germany, but 
that this effect is overcompensated by the prevailing transition process. 
Which of these is true, cannot be satisfyingly examined using district-level data. This is be-
cause the transition process is still in progress and the turbulence induced by reunification still 
blurs macro-level data (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Fritsch, 2004; Schindele, 2010). We 
see significant differences in both opportunity entrepreneurship (cf. Reynolds et al., 2005) as 
well as necessity entrepreneurship (cf. Kirzner, 1973) in the eastern part of our area under 
investigation. The figures presented in Table 3 provide even more evidence that East Germa-
ny is experiencing an ongoing development process that distorts the empirical analysis of ag-
gregated data. 
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Table 3: Persisting Differences between East and West German Districts  
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
GDP West 2,713 2,755 2,825 2,838 2,851 2,906 
(million Euro) East 1,810 1,846 1,893 1,927 1,947 2,004 
 Diff. 903*** 910*** 932*** 911*** 904*** 903*** 
GDP per capita  West 22.17 22.52 23.13 23.25 23.34 23.89 
(thousand Euro) East 16.28 16.70 17.32 17.84 18.17 18.76 
 Diff. 5.88*** 5.82*** 5.81*** 5.42*** 5.17*** 5.13*** 
Firms in West 377.36 374.62 366.4 358.8 353.24 345.18 
manufacturing East 346.81 335.15 324.91 315.26 307.00 300.53 
 Diff. 30.55 39.47 41.49* 43.54* 46.24* 44.6* 
Employees in West 12,649 12,675 12,673 12,350 12,081 11,829 
manufacturing East 6,324 6,488 6,549 6,503 6,419 6,404 
 Diff. 6,324*** 6,186*** 6,124*** 5,847*** 5,662*** 5,425*** 
Shutdowns in West 28.24 28.16 29.38 28.22 . . 
manufacturing East 38.38 34.45 35.89 31.26 . . 
 Diff. 10.14*** 6.29** 6.51** 3.04 . . 
Inhabitants West 123,999 124,078 124,149 124,230 124,146 123,911 
 East 110,009 109,375 108,579 107,783 106,996 106,218 
 Diff. 13,990* 14,703* 15,570** 16,447** 17,149** 17,692** 
Notes: Table reports district averages for the 47 East German and 50 West German (former) border districts 
depicted in Figure 1. * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significance, *** denotes 1% 
level of significance. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we hence face up to the problems of macro-level data and 
turn to micro-level data instead to further investigate the role of implicit institutions in entre-
preneurship. 
2.5 Empirics at the Micro Level 
In order to examine our hypothesis that implicit institutions developed under the socialist re-
gime of the GDR negatively influence entrepreneurship, we now adjust our empirical strategy 
and turn to micro-level data. First, we show that the socialist regime in the former GDR really 
changed societal norms and values related to entrepreneurship. Second, we collect evidence 
that these brought about implicit institutions indeed have a negative impact on an individual’s 
propensity to become an entrepreneur.  
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To these ends, the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) is a valuable data source.6 The 
dataset is based on biennial, representative surveys of the German population conducted 
through personal interviews. ALLBUS covers a wide range of topics pivotal to empirical re-
search in social sciences. A core set of questions is asked in every wave of the survey, with 
various sets of additional questions added in different years.7  
2.5.1 Entrepreneurial Attitudes of East and West Germans 
We use the 1991 wave, which contains information on individual risk attitude with regard to 
job security, and the 1994, 1998, 2000 and 2004 waves, which contain information on indi-
vidual’s norms and values expectedly related to entrepreneurship. A first look at variables 
concerning individual attitudes towards the state’s responsibility (norms), the economy and 
society (values), as well as risk-aversion reveal significant differences in implicit institutions 
between East and West Germans. 
Table 4 shows simple mean comparisons of a whole set of value and norm variables between 
West Germans and East Germans. Briefly summing up the results, the descriptive analysis 
clearly and consistently shows that East Germans tend to be less self-reliant and more reliant 
on the state; reveal a rather skeptical attitude towards the market economy; and show higher 
levels of risk-aversion than their West German counterparts. As can be seen in the last column 
of Table 4, t-tests confirm that these differences are all significant at a 1 percent level. Thus, 
implicit institutions as shaped by the socialist regime appear to exist in the eastern parts of 
Germany even years after reunification. 
                                                 
6 The ALLBUS program was financially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) from 1980 to 
1986 and in 1991. Further surveys were financed on a national and federal state (Laender) level via the GESIS 
network (Gesellschaft Sozialwissenschaftlicher Infrastruktureinrichtungen). 
7 Terwey et al. (2007) provide detailed information on the ALLBUS surveys in general and present all variables 
available in the cumulated dataset from 1980 until 2006. 
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Table 4: Differences in Attitudes between East and West Germans 
  
East  
Germans 
West  
Germans Difference 
Level of agreement on a scale from 1(fully agree)  to 4(don't agree at all) 
Role of Enterprise:  2.206 1.972 0.234 *** 
"Employers' profits foster the economy." 0.031 0.020 
 (obs.: 900 and 1,704) 
  Welfare State: "The current social 2.992 2.485 0.507 *** 
security system reduces work incentives." 0.031 0.023 
 (obs.: 900 and 1,700) 
  Fairness: "Economic profits 3.363 2.942 0.421 *** 
are distributed fairly in Germany." 0.021 0.018 
 (obs.: 887 and 1,674) 
  Income Differences: "Income differences 2.564 2.293 0.271 *** 
give incentives to work hard." 0.019 0.015 
 (obs.: 2,304 and 3,210) 
  Rank Differences: "Rank differences are 2.727 2.464 0.262 *** 
performance based and hence acceptable." 0.019 0.015 
 (obs.: 2,324 and 3,196) 
  Status Differences: "Social status 3.221 2.629 0.592 *** 
differences are just – by and large" 0.016 0.015 
 (obs.: 2,341 and 3,208) 
  State Intervention: "The state has to care for employment 1.951 2.287 -0.336 *** 
and price stability  even if this cuts the rights of employers." 0.030 0.022 
 (obs.: 894 and 1,688) 
  National Assistance: "The state has to care 1.437 1.802 -0.366 *** 
for the sick, poor, old and unemployed." 0.013 0.013 
 (obs.: 2,380 and 3,267) 
  Performance: "Everybody should get the money 2.639 2.754 -0.115 *** 
one needs - regardless of any performance." 0.020 0.016 
 (obs.: 2,327 and 3,230)     
  
East  
Germans 
West  
Germans Difference 
Level of importance on a scale from 1 (not important)  to 7 (very important) 
Risk Attitude: "How important 6.661 6.087 0.574*** 
is a secure job to you?" 0.029 0.047 
 (obs.: 631 and 859) 
  
Notes: In the cells below the respective questions we report the number of observations in parentheses. The first 
number refers to East Germans, i.e., individuals who currently live in East Germany. The second number refers 
to West Germans. Column 1 and Column 2 depict group means for East Germans and West Germans respective-
ly, while Column 3 shows mean differences; standard errors are given in italics; * denotes 10% level of signifi-
cance, ** denotes 5% level of significance, *** denotes 1% level of significance. 
 
30 
 
2.5.2 Occupational Choice and Entrepreneurial Attitude 
In order to assess whether these implicit institutions are indeed associated with the decision to 
become an entrepreneur, we include the attitude variables depicted in Table 4 into an occupa-
tional choice equation. Although we believe that they are all related with the decision to be-
come an entrepreneur, we deliberately choose only eight of the ten attitude variables to in-
clude in a multivariate setting. The reason for this is that two of the variables might severely 
suffer from reverse causality, namely the statement on the “Role of enterprise” and the “Inter-
vention of the state”. It might very well be that being an entrepreneur positively affects the 
agreement to the statement that employers’ profits foster the economy. The same is true for 
the state intervention variable: Being an entrepreneur might drive the statement that the state 
has to care for employment and price stability even if this cuts the rights of employers. Since 
we do not know how this potential reverse causality problem might bias the coefficients of the 
other attitude variables of interest, we do not include them in our estimations.  
The estimated occupational choice equation is described by Equation (1): 
iiii Xatty ???? ?????? 21)|1Pr(       (1) 
where )|1Pr( ??iy  is the conditional probability of being an entrepreneur. y is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of unity if person i is an entrepreneur and takes the value 0 if per-
son i is dependently employed. att is the level of agreement with the statements revealing atti-
tudes. X is a set of control variables that might influence a person’s occupational choice, i.e., 
we include control variables for gender, home ownership, marital status, nationality, educa-
tion, working experience, and individual unemployment history. All control variables except 
working experience differ significantly between East and West Germany. Finally, we include 
a dummy for East Germany and year dummies if appropriate. We estimate occupational 
choice equations by simple probit models.  
In order to make use of all information on the attitude variables available over the years, we 
run four estimations, where each single estimation includes, in addition to the controls, only 
those attitude variables having a perfect overlap with respect to the years they were collected. 
In particular, we run a probit occupational choice model for the year 1991 using the “Risk 
attitude” variable. Another probit estimation is executed for the years 1994 and 2004 where 
we have got information on the “Welfare state” and “Fairness” attitudes. The third estimation 
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uses information on the “Performance” and “National assistance” attitudes for the years 1991, 
1994, 2000, and 2004, whereas the final estimation exploits information on “Income differ-
ences”, “Rank differences”, and “Status differences” attitudes provided in the years 1991, 
1994, 1998, 2000, and 2004. The results of the models are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5: Occupational Choice of Becoming an Entrepreneur 
 Cross section Repeated cross section 
Repeated cross 
section 
Repeated cross 
section 
  1991 1994, 2004 
1991, 1994, 2000, 
2004 
1991, 1994, 1998, 
2000, 2004 
Risk Attitude -.020 ***    
  .004    
Welfare State  -.034 ***   
   .006   
Fairness  -.017 **   
  .008   
Performance   .016 ***  
   .004  
National Assistance   .029 ***  
   .005  
Income Differences    -.004 
    .004 
Rank Differences    -.014 *** 
    .005 
Status Differences    -.015 *** 
    .005 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1,591 2,911 6,276 7,285 
Wald test 93.21 *** 150.73*** 333.45*** 372.38*** 
Pseudo R² 0.112 0.078 0.079 0.078 
Notes: The table reports probit marginal effects where the dependent variable occupational status is unity for 
entrepreneurs and zero for employees. The variable “Risk attitude” refers to the question “How important is a 
secure job for you?”, where the level of importance ranges from 1 (not important) to 7 (very important). The 
variable “Welfare state” refers to the statement “The current social security system reduces work incentives.” 
The variable “Fairness” refers to the statement “Economic profits are distributed fairly in Germany.”, “Perfor-
mance” refers to the statement “Everybody should get the money he needs – regardless of any performance.”, 
“National Assistance” refers to the statement “The state has to care for the sick, poor, old and unemployed.”, 
“Income Differences” refers to the statement “Income differences give incentives to work hard.”, “Rank Differ-
ences” refers to the statement “Rank differences are performance based and therefore acceptable.”, and “Status 
Differences” refers to the statement “Social status differences are just – by and large.” All these statements could 
be evaluated on a scale from 1 (fully agree) to 4 (disagree). Robust standard errors are given in italics. * denotes 
10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of significance, *** denotes 1% level of significance. 
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As can be seen from Table 5, the coefficients on all the attitude variables under investigation 
point to the direction we would suspect and are precisely estimated. Almost all of them are 
found statistically significant at a 1% level. Summing it up, the results suggest that a lack of 
self-reliance, a skeptical attitude towards the market economy, as well as risk-aversion is as-
sociated with a lower probability of being an entrepreneur. Accordingly, implicit institutions 
are indeed associated with an individual’s propensity to start an entrepreneurial endeavor.  
In order to assess whether the differences in implicit institutions between East and West Ger-
mans shown in Table 4 translate into differences in the individual probability to become an 
entrepreneur, we compute predicted values following Equation (2), where we should see a 
higher probability to become an entrepreneur for West Germans than for East Germans: 
)()( 2,,12,,1 ?????? westmeaneastmeanwestmeanwestmean XattXatt ???????     (2) 
To compute the betas, we run a probit model on the sample of West Germans in our dataset. 
In order to isolate the marginal effects of the differences in implicit institutions, we assume 
that West Germans and East German do not differ in the distribution of the control variables 
as well as in the effect of all variables on entrepreneurship. However, they do differ in the 
distribution of our attitudes variables as we have shown above. We compute the predicted 
values according to Equation (2) for the four probit equations presented in Table 5 separately. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6: Predicted Probabilities of Being an Entrepreneur 
  
East Germans 
(in percent) 
West Germans 
(in percent) 
Difference 
(in percentage points) 
Probit 1 5.8 7.8 -2.0 
 (1991)    
Probit 2 7.2 9.0 -1.8 
 (1994, 2004)    
Probit 3 7.4 8.8 - 1.4 
(1991, 1994, 2000, 2004)    
Probit 4 7.8 9.3 - 1.5 
(1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2004)    
Notes: The table reports predicted probabilities of being an entrepreneur for East and West Germans conditional 
the attitude variables reported in Table 5. Probit 1 contains the variable “Risk attitude” (How important is a se-
cure job for you). Probit 2 uses the variables “Welfare state” (The current social security system reduces work 
incentives) and “Fairness” (Economic profits are distributed fairly in Germany). Probit 3 conditions on  “Per-
formance” (Everybody should get the money he needs – regardless of any performance) and “National Assis-
tance” (The state has to care for the sick, poor, old and unemployed). Probit 4 uses the variables “Income Differ-
ences” (Income differences give incentives to work hard), “Rank Differences” (Rank differences are perfor-
mance based and therefore acceptable) and “Status Differences” (Social status differences are just – by and 
large). 
33 
 
As we can see from Table 6, the differences in implicit institutions translate into differences 
in the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Across all four specifications we observe that 
the socialist regime in the former GDR made East Germans less likely to become entrepre-
neurs than West Germans. The differences in the probabilities of becoming an entrepreneur 
show up clearly and amount up to 2 percentage points. Not surprisingly, the largest difference 
can be found in the first specification, where we use data on risk attitudes which are only 
available in 1991, i.e., shortly after the German reunification. The effects of the socialist re-
gime on entrepreneurship (via implicit institutions) are substantial: norms and values devel-
oped under the socialist regime make people between 16% and 26% less likely to be an entre-
preneur. 
Of course, it is important to note that we cannot claim to identify causal effects of implicit 
institutions on entrepreneurship here because, despite of controlling for well-known and im-
portant determinants of occupational choice, unobserved characteristics might be correlated 
with the risk attitude, norm and value variables and at the same time have an impact on an 
individual’s occupational choice, which would cause the error term to be correlated with the 
variable of interest. However, what we can show so far is that the socialist regime led to an 
environment where we find implicit institutions to be negatively associated with entrepreneur-
ship, without knowing the details about the accurate channels though. 
2.5.3 What’s the Channel? - More than “Just” (Un-)Observed Regional Characteristics? 
So far, we can argue that the socialist regime in the former GDR left an environment where 
societal norms and values are prevalent which are negatively associated with entrepreneur-
ship. One might argue that the substantial norm and value differences are mainly due to ob-
servable and unobservable labor market heterogeneity, since e.g. the level of unemployment 
in East Germany is much higher than it is in West Germany. Note in this context that our da-
taset includes only the dependently employed and entrepreneurs; the unemployed are exclud-
ed. Nevertheless, even for those who are employed, economic conditions may differ a lot be-
tween East and West Germany with the consequence that e.g., people living in East Germany 
might on average be more afraid of getting unemployed than those living in West Germany 
which could influence their norms and values. In a next step, we would like to show that there 
is more behind the norm and value differences than this, i.e., we set out to demonstrate that 
the legacy of the socialist regime is not “just” unobserved regional characteristics which affect 
implicit institutions.  
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Therefore, we refine our analysis to concentrate on those East Germans who moved to West 
Germany after 1989 (late movers) and compare them to born and raised West Germans. These 
movers had been socialized in the former GDR and thus had been “treated” with the com-
munist ideology but were now confronted with the same economic conditions as their West 
German counterparts in their new West German residences.  
This strategy could be reasonably criticized on the grounds that the group of movers might be 
subject to a selection bias, i.e. that movers are in general energetic and self-reliant and thus 
different in attitude compared to the average East German. Indeed, simple descriptive statis-
tics show that East Germans who moved to West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall are 
on average younger (35.6 vs. 39.5) and better qualified than the average East German; moreo-
ver, there is a relatively high share of males (57.1% vs. 53.1%) and singles (45.5% vs. 31.5%) 
in this subgroup. Furthermore, OLS regressions of our norm and value variables on the indi-
viduals’ characteristics show that on average singles are less risk averse; and that being male 
and young is associated with less reliance on the state (as depicted in the question whether the 
current social security system reduces work incentives). However, note that the selectivity of 
the group of movers should consequently work against us by reducing the differences in 
norms and values between East and West Germans. This means that any remaining differ-
ences for this subgroup mark a lower bound and are likely to be more pronounced in the over-
all East German sample. 
The mean values of the societal norms and value variables presented in Table 7 are in line 
with our expectation that the subgroup of East German movers should show smaller differ-
ences to West Germans than other East Germans. But even if the selection problem, which 
works against us, is present to some degree, we still find differences even between this selec-
tive East German subgroup and West Germans. All differences continue to run in the same 
direction as before and most of them are still statistically significant. Thus, these differences 
support the view that we indeed have an effect of the socialist ideological treatment on implic-
it institutions, which does not merely go through the channel of observable and unobservable 
characteristics of a comparatively poor economic environment. 
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Table 7: Differences between West Germans and East German Late Movers  
  
East German 
late movers 
West  
Germans Difference 
Level of agreement on a scale from 1(fully agree)  to 4(don't agree at all) 
Role of Enterprise:  2.190 1.972 0.218 ** 
"Employers' profits foster the economy." 0.114 0.020 
 (obs.: 58 and 1,704) 
  Welfare State: "The current social 2.746 2.485 0.261** 
security system reduces work incentives." 0.117 0.023 
 (obs.:59 and 1,700) 
  Fairness: "Economic profits 3.169 2.942 0.227 *** 
are distributed fairly in Germany." 0.088 0.018 
 (obs.: 59 and 1,674) 
  Income Differences: "Income differences 2.485 2.293 0.192 ** 
give incentives to work hard." 0.087 0.015 
 (obs.: 97 and 3,210) 
  Rank Differences: "Rank differences are 2.490 2.464 0.026 
performance based and hence acceptable." 0.086 0.015 
 (obs.:100 and 3,196) 
  Status Differences: "Social status 2.880 2.629 0.251 *** 
differences are just – by and large" 0.079 0.015 
 (obs.: 100 and 3,208) 
  State Intervention: "The state has to care for employment 2.102 2.287 -0.185 * 
and price stability  even if this cuts the rights of employers." 0.110 0.022 
 (obs.: 59 and 1,688) 
  National Assistance: "The state has to care 1.737 1.802 -0.065 
for the sick, poor, old and unemployed." 0.073 0.013 
 (obs.: 99 and 3,267) 
  Performance: "Everybody should get the money 2.650 2.754 -0.104 
one needs - regardless of any performance." 0.094 0.016 
 (obs.: 100 and 3,230)     
  
East German 
late movers 
West  
Germans Difference 
Level of importance on a scale from 1 (not important)  to 7 (very important) 
Risk Attitude: "How important 6.857 6.087 0.770*** 
is a secure job to you?" 0.097 0.047 
 (obs.: 14 and 631)  
  
Notes: In the cells below the respective questions we report the number of observations in parentheses. The first 
number refers to late East German late movers, i.e., East Germans that were born in the former GDR but moved 
to West Germany not before 1989. The second number refers to West Germans. Column 1 and Column 2 depict 
group means for late East German movers and West Germans respectively, while Column 3 shows mean differ-
ences; standard errors are given in italics; * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of signifi-
cance, *** denotes 1% level of significance. 
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The number of observations for East Germans who moved to West Germany after 1989 is not 
large, but still provides insightful results. To obtain these observation figures, we collapsed 
information on norms and values, if it was available, for different points in time. Note the 
great difference in the attitude towards risk between East German movers and West Germans. 
This information on risk attitude is only gathered in 1991. Consequently, we only observe 
those East German movers who moved to West Germany between 1989 and 1991, i.e., right 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This explains both the low number of observations as well as 
the great gap in the means. When this information was collected, these movers did not have 
much time to adapt to West German norms and values. Rather, this is the group for which the 
socialist past was still very recent indeed. 
In a last step, we include the level differences in the attitude variables into occupational 
choice probit models and compute marginal effects for the East German late movers and the 
West Germans according to Equation (3): 
)()( 2,,,12,,1 ?????? westmeanmovereastmeanwestmeanwestmean XattXatt ???????       (3) 
Just as described above, we compute the betas by running a probit model on the sample of 
West Germans. Again, we assume that West Germans and East German migrants do not differ 
in the distribution of the control variables as well as in the effect of all variables on entrepre-
neurship in order to isolate the effect of the differences in implicit institutions on entrepre-
neurship. Estimation results are reported in Table 8. 
Table 8: Predicted Probabilities of Being an Entrepreneur 
  
East German  late movers 
(in percent) 
West Germans 
(in percent) 
Difference 
(in percentage points) 
Probit 1 5.2 7.8 -2.6 
 (1991)    
Probit 2 8 9.0 -1.0 
 (1994, 2004)    
Probit 3 8 8.8 - 0.8 
(1991, 1994, 2000, 2004)    
Probit 4 8.7 9.3 - 0.6 
(1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2004)    
Notes: The table reports predicted probabilities of being an entrepreneur for East Germans that moved to West 
Germany not before 1989 (late movers) and West Germans conditional the attitude variables reported in Table 5. 
Probit 1 contains the variable “Risk attitude” (How important is a secure job for you). Probit 2 uses the variables 
“Welfare state” (The current social security system reduces work incentives) and “Fairness” (Economic profits 
are distributed fairly in Germany). Probit 3 conditions on “Performance” (Everybody should get the money he 
needs – regardless of any performance) and “National Assistance” (The state has to care for the sick, poor, old 
and unemployed). Probit 4 uses the variables “Income Differences” (Income differences give incentives to work 
hard), “Rank Differences” (Rank differences are performance based and therefore acceptable) and “Status Dif-
ferences” (Social status differences are just – by and large). 
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A comparison of the probabilities of being an entrepreneur between West Germans and East 
German late movers reveals that under the assumptions mentioned above, on average, the 
likelihood of being an entrepreneur is higher for West Germans than for East Germans who 
were socialized in the GDR but moved to West Germany after the fall of the Berlin wall. The-
se differences are on average less pronounced now, especially when allowing for a greater 
time span after reunification, than they were before when comparing West Germans to all 
East Germans. However, they are still considerable and vary in a range from 0.6 to 2.6 per-
centage points. By looking at this selective subgroup, we can conclude that the socialist re-
gime in the former GDR led to implicit institutions which are negatively associated with en-
trepreneurship and that this legacy of the socialist regime not only runs via the channel of 
observable and unobservable characteristics of a poor and less developed economic environ-
ment. Indeed, it is interesting to observe that even for this very selective subgroup we find 
evidence for the socialist treatment which is negatively associated with entrepreneurship. 
As an anti-test, we concentrate on those East Germans who moved to West Germany before 
the Berlin Wall was built, i.e. not later than 1961 (early movers). Generally, these individuals 
were socialized in the same economic and political system as the West Germans and we thus 
expect that their attitudes will not differ from West German attitudes in the same way as the 
attitudes of the later movers (i.e., East Germans who moved after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and thus lived under a well established socialist regime). Simple mean comparisons of the 
attitudes variables presented in Table 9 support our view that the early movers indeed do not 
differ from West Germans in a way people adherent to socialist institutions would.  
For a few variables, we do not find any difference at all between these early movers and West 
Germans. Still, we observe differences on some attitude variables. But bear in mind that these 
differences are fully in line with what we would expect when comparing this mobile, probably 
more self-reliant subgroup of movers to the average West German. It is only the significant 
difference in the attitude toward the welfare state that might seem puzzling at first sight. 
However, note that also this subgroup is selective on the controls in a way that should work 
against us. Amongst others, early East German movers are on average older than the average 
West German (51.3 vs. 39.6). Since regressions show that agreeing to the statement that the 
current social security system reduces work incentives is a concave function of age, the result-
ing difference in this attitude variable between early movers and West Germans should not be 
too distressing. 
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Table 9: Differences between West Germans and East German Early Movers  
  
East German 
early movers 
West  
Germans Difference 
Level of agreement on a scale from 1(fully agree)  to 4(don't agree at all) 
Role of Enterprise:  1.757 1.972 -0.215 * 
"Employers' profits foster the economy." 0.131 0.020 
 (obs.: 37 and 1,704) 
  Welfare State: "The current social 2.892 2.485 0.407*** 
security system reduces work incentives." 0.163 0.023 
 (obs.:37 and 1,700) 
  Fairness: "Economic profits 2.943 2.942 0.001 
are distributed fairly in Germany." 0.108 0.018 
 (obs.: 35 and 1,674) 
  Income Differences: "Income differences 2.078 2.293 -0.215 ** 
give incentives to work hard." 0.092 0.015 
 (obs.: 77 and 3,210) 
  Rank Differences: "Rank differences are 2.333 2.464 -0.131 * 
performance based and hence acceptable." 0.101 0.015 
 (obs.:78 and 3,196) 
  Status Differences: "Social status 2.519 2.629 -0.110 
differences are just – by and large" 0.095 0.015 
 (obs.: 79 and 3,208) 
  State Intervention: "The state has to care for employment 2.500 2.287 0.213 * 
and price stability  even if this cuts the rights of employers." 0.148 0.022 
 (obs.: 34 and 1,688) 
  National Assistance: "The state has to care 1.938 1.802 0.135 * 
for the sick, poor, old and unemployed." 0.098 0.013 
 (obs.: 80 and 3,267) 
  Performance: "Everybody should get the money 2.813 2.754 0.059 
one needs - regardless of any performance." 0.104 0.016 
 (obs.: 80 and 3,230)     
  
East German 
early movers 
West  
Germans Difference 
Level of importance on a scale from 1 (not important)  to 7 (very important) 
Risk Attitude: "How important 6.269 6.087 0.182 
is a secure job to you?" 0.269 0.047 
 (obs.: 26 and 631)  
  Notes: In the cells below the respective questions we report the number of observations in parentheses. The first 
number refers to late East German early movers, i.e., East Germans that were born in the former GDR but moved 
to West Germany already before 1962. The second number refers to West Germans. Column 1 and Column 2 
depict group means for late East German movers and West Germans respectively, while Column 3 shows mean 
differences; standard errors are given in italics; * denotes 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level of 
significance, *** denotes 1% level of significance. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter is to disentangle the effects of explicit and implicit institutions on 
individuals’ entrepreneurial intentions. Explicit institutions can change rather quickly; implic-
it institutions, however, here defined as societal values and norms, develop and change much 
more slowly. To identify the effect of implicit institutions on an individual’s entrepreneurial 
intentions requires a quasi-natural experiment, that is, a situation where people now living 
under the same explicit institutions were raised and socialized under different regimes and 
thus — assumedly — developed different observable values and norms. In this regard, Ger-
many provides a suitable experimental setup due to its unique history of separation into two 
distinct systems and states, the socialist GDR and the non-socialist FRG, following World 
War II. Because, according to Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), both parts of the country 
were quite comparable before this split, observable differences after the separation are in all 
probability driven by the prevailing ideologies in each part, which gradually produced differ-
ent values. 
We suppose that the socialist regime in the former GDR influenced implicit institutions in a 
way which is negative for entrepreneurship. However, comparing the start-up rates of East 
Germany with those of West Germany, we find that entrepreneurial activity is higher in the 
former GDR than it is in the regions that always belonged to the FRG. This result holds if we 
focus on the corridor along the former inner-German border, thus encompassing only regions 
having similar natural conditions and equal experience with being located so close to the Iron 
Curtain. This higher level of entrepreneurial activity appears to be the result of significant 
differences in both opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship in East Germany, and thus 
obscures the hypothesized effect of the socialist regime on implicit institutions negatively 
affecting entrepreneurship. Indeed, we see some evidence of economic development conver-
gence with West Germany in the former GDR, but the eastern part of the country is still 
“catching up”. In the face of this transition, comparatively many people found their own busi-
ness, even if their job orientation is not exceedingly entrepreneurial. Whether opportunity or 
necessity entrepreneurship is dominant within this process might be an interesting question 
for further research. 
Using micro-level data, we show that the socialist regime in the former GDR had indeed a 
causal effect on implicit institutions, i.e., a whole set of different norm and value variables. 
Further analyses clearly reveal that these implicit institutions were shaped in a way which is 
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negatively associated with entrepreneurship. To analyze whether the influence of the socialist 
past runs merely via the channel of observable and unobservable labor market characteristics, 
i.e., a generally bad economic environment, in East Germany, we switch the focus to those 
individuals who were born in East Germany and then migrated to West Germany after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall.8 We find that the socialist legacy can even be found in this very selective 
subgroup of East Germans. Hence, we suggest that the differences in implicit institutions are 
not merely driven by bad economic conditions in East Germany. Further, we conduct an anti-
test and look at those who left the GDR in the early days (before the Berlin Wall was built) 
and moved to West Germany. We find that the early movers, who did not live under the influ-
ence of the socialist regime, do not differ from West Germans in the way the late movers’ 
treatment group does. 
Our analyses suggest that implicit institutions in the form of values and norms prevail over 
and above explicit institutions. Individuals in a presently similar environment but who were 
socialized under different ideologies do differ in their underlying mindsets. These differences 
can affect economic decisions, perhaps most especially the decision about whether to start a 
business. This finding should be a particularly important consideration in the design of poli-
cies geared toward stimulating entrepreneurial activities. Our findings strongly advise against 
too-general catch-all policies. Some facets of entrepreneurship are no doubt universal, such as 
the necessary financing. However, our study shows that the incentives to become an entrepre-
neur are also affected by social factors which might vary between regions. Growing up under 
a socialist regime appears to be one such factor. According to Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 
(2007), underlying values, or in our terms, implicit institutions, can take several generations 
to change. Supporting this change might be another policy issue.   
                                                 
8 See for migration patterns of East Germans Burda (1993), Burda et al. (1998), and Hunt (2006). 
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3. Regional Differences in Implicit Institutions and the Formation of  
Entrepreneurial Preferences9 
3.1  Introduction 
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have experienced dramatic changes in the last 
decades. After the Eastern Bloc collapsed, most of the currently existing states gradually 
adopted the rules of Western market economies, which triggered a dynamic catch-up process 
enabling CEE economies to modernize and grow. Nevertheless, it is often argued that the so-
cialist past of these economies still casts a shadow over their current development, posing an 
obstacle to the ongoing transition process. The experience of more than 40 years of central 
planning heavily affected the economic structures in these countries and crowded out entre-
preneurial spirit, which eventually led to the systems’ economic collapse (cf. Audretsch, 
2007).  
This lack of entrepreneurial spirit can at least in part be ascribed to a lack of self-reliance 
(Schumpeter, 1912) and a lack of preferences for independence and competition 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). These preferences, which in the following are referred to 
as ‘state-reliant preferences’, were developed over several decades of socialist education and 
socialization in a centrally planned economy and will presumably not change overnight. Con-
sequently, the lack of entrepreneurial spirit may still be present today and have a dampening 
effect on these countries’ growth path. However, empirically the legacy of the socialist past is 
often difficult to pin down since institutions change only slowly and therefore, state-reliant 
preferences might also be an outcome of still rather market unfriendly current institutions in 
CEE countries. 
In this chapter, we exploit the German reunification as an ideal setup for the analysis of how a 
socialist regime influenced individuals’ preferences. In contrast to other socialist countries, 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) adopted the institutions of a market economy quasi 
overnight when reunifying with West Germany. We can thus rule out simultaneity issues, i.e. 
that current market-unfriendly institutions affect individuals’ preferences, and vice versa. 
Taking China as an example it is not obvious whether the slowly changing institutions boost 
                                                 
9 This chapter is based on Bauernschuster, Stefan, Falck, Oliver, Gold, Robert and Heblich, Stephan (2012), The 
Shadows of the Socialist Past: Lack of Self-Reliance Hinders Entrepreneurship, European Journal of Political 
Economy, 28, 485-497.   
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the Chinese entrepreneurial spirit; or whether the increasing number of entrepreneurs de-
mands more independence and thus induces institutional reforms.10 
We find empirical evidence that the socialist regime in the former GDR did have an effect on 
state-reliant preferences and that these preferences are persistent even years after the break-
down of the GDR. Our analysis shows that East Germans (born and) living in the regions of 
the former socialist GDR are less self-reliant than their West German counterparts who have 
always lived in the democratic FRG. These shadows of the past loom large and are not ex-
plained by individual characteristics or by differences in economic development between East 
and West Germany alone.  
To further assess whether the analyzed preference differences affect individuals’ entrepre-
neurial spirit, we test the impact of state-reliance in the context of an occupational choice 
equation (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979). We find that state-reliance is indeed negatively asso-
ciated with the likelihood of being an entrepreneur. This association is particularly strong 
when looking at entrepreneurs with employees as compared to self-employed individuals that 
do not employ further employees. In this way, the shadows of the socialist past hinder entre-
preneurship. Our finding can also cast light on results from the Global Entrepreneurship Mon-
itor country report for Germany in 2000 (Sternberg et al., 2000). While experts evaluate the 
entrepreneurial prospects in East Germany even better than in West Germany, this feeling is 
not prevalent in the overall East German population. Our empirical analysis suggests that a 
lack of entrepreneurial spirit bred by the socialist regime might at least partly be responsible 
for this puzzle.  
Why was the socialist regime in the GDR so successful in shaping individuals’ preferences 
and why are these preferences so persistent after the breakdown of the GDR? Education and 
socialization were controlled by the state to a fairly high degree in the GDR. Nor was educa-
tion restricted to just children and adolescents. Minors were educated in day care facilities, 
schools, and in the socialist youth organization (FDJ). Adults received their socialist educa-
tion in the state-owned companies and cooperatives they worked for and at public cultural 
facilities. Marxism as scientific method and Marxist economic theory were prominent sub-
jects. Furthermore, people were also taught that they should cherish the collective more than 
the individual, trust the Socialist party completely11, and believe that the state was always 
                                                 
10 For a discussion of entrepreneurship in China, see Koll (2011). 
11 A popular song in the GDR sung at official gatherings was entitled “The party is always right”. 
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acting in their best interests. This education was complemented by injunctions and warnings 
about the “decadent” and “imperialistic” West. People were “treated” with this socialist prop-
aganda for more than one generation and it is hard to believe that 40 years of extreme treat-
ment with Marxist theory and communist ideology would not affect their worldview. Their 
constant indoctrination, observation, and experiences with the peculiarities of a centrally 
planned economy, as well as being witness to steady opposition toward the Western world 
should have influenced peoples’ beliefs about the role of the state, their role as an individual 
within society, and their expectations about which goals they might and should achieve in 
their lives. Hence the preferences were deliberately manipulated in an intense way unthinka-
ble in an individualistic society.12 
In the wake of the German reunification, the “jump start” (Sinn and Sinn, 1992) or “shock 
treatment” (Brezinski and Fritsch, 1995) with institutions of a market economy had drastic 
consequences for the East German economy. Many East German firms went bankrupt and the 
unemployment rate rose to more than 20 percent. As wages rose rapidly despite the low 
productivity in East Germany, West German firms had little incentive to open new branches 
in East Germany.13 Consequently, the vast majority of new businesses had been set up by East 
Germans even though they were confronted with these unfavorable economic conditions 
(Fritsch, 2004). In addition to economic necessities, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) or Estrin 
et al. (2006) put forward another argument in favor of the entrepreneur as an agent of change 
in transition economics. They argue that, in the transition from a socialist regime to a market 
economy, entrepreneurs have to be the main actors while existing firms are less well placed to 
be the engine of structural change because they are themselves the outcomes of the planning 
system.14 
Having the unfavorable economic conditions in East Germany in mind, one might wonder 
whether preferences are affected by prevailing economic conditions in East Germany that 
differ from West German economic conditions (Galor and Michalopoulos, 2011; Hoorn and 
Maseland, 2010). To overcome this issue, we could compare West Germans’ preferences with 
preferences of those East Germans who moved to West Germany after reunification and thus 
live in the same economic environment. However, these movers presumably are a very selec-
                                                 
12 See Kornai (1992) for a detailed analysis of the political economy of socialist economies. 
13 Exceptions are entrepreneurs with social ties to East Germany (Burchardi and Hassan, 2011). 
14 For further discussions of entrepreneurship in the post-socialist transition economies, see Acs and 
Audretsch (1993), Bergmann and Sternberg (2007), Earle and Sakova (2000), Hanley (2000), Johnson and 
Loveman (1995), or Smallbone and Welter (2001). 
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tive group of East Germans. We thus follow Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) and com-
pare preferences of East Germans with those of West Germans conditional on the prevailing 
economic conditions in East and West Germany.15  
Our chapter is closely related to the literature that empirically exploits discontinuities due to 
the event of German reunification, e.g. in precautionary savings (Fuchs-Schündeln and 
Schündeln, 2005), life satisfaction (Fuchs-Schündeln, 2009) or market access (Redding and 
Sturm, 2008). While these authors exploit discontinuities due to the event of the German reu-
nification, we emphasize the persistence of preferences shaped under the past socialist regime. 
Thus, our chapter is also related to the literature that show that differences in preferences be-
tween East and West Germans are persistent even after reunification and change only slowly 
((Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007) for redistributive preferences; (Rainer and Siedler, 
2009) for trust; (Bauernschuster and Rainer, 2012) for sex role attitudes). 
Finally, for the first time in the economic literature, we investigate an additional channel 
through which the socialist regime could have had effects. Nearly 3 million individuals fled 
from the Russian occupational zone (which would later become East Germany) in the time 
span ranging from the end of World War II to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. 
With communism looming, one could well imagine that individuals that fled from the Russian 
occupational zone were more self-reliant and had stronger preferences for independence than 
the average East German and that consequently, the people that remained in East Germany 
were less self-reliant than the average West German already before the socialist propaganda 
actually set in. We provide some pieces of evidence for this channel which has so far not been 
considered in the economic literature exploiting the German division and reunification as a 
natural experiment. In fact, it was shown that East and West Germany did not differ in many 
aspects (economic development, voting behavior) before the war (Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündeln, 2007). However, the large movements in the aftermath of World War II have been 
neglected.  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces our data and pro-
vides evidence that the socialist regime in the GDR bred state-reliant preferences, while Sec-
tion 3.3 investigates the association between state-reliant preferences and entrepreneurship. 
Section 3.4 discusses an alternative channel through which the socialist regime could have 
                                                 
15 Runst (2011) analyzes culture and entrepreneurship in East Germany; however, he abstracts from differences 
in regional conditions. 
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had an impact on its population even before the socialist propaganda set in. Section 3.5 con-
cludes.  
3.2 State-Reliance in East and West Germany 
To explore our hypothesis that the lack of self-reliance developed under the socialist regime 
of the former GDR negatively influence entrepreneurship today, we first provide evidence 
that the socialist regime in the former GDR really did have an effect on preferences related to 
self-reliance or state-reliance. Second, we collect evidence that these “manipulated” prefer-
ences are indeed meaningful and, third, that they are negatively associated with an individu-
al’s propensity to become an entrepreneur. 
The German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) is a valuable data source in this pursuit.16 The 
data set is based on biennial, representative surveys of the German population conducted 
through personal interviews. ALLBUS covers a wide range of topics pivotal to empirical re-
search in the social sciences. A core set of questions is asked in every wave of the survey, 
with various sets of additional questions complementing the survey in different years.17 Since 
we are interested in the occupational choices of interviewees, we retain only entrepreneurs 
and employed workers in our sample and exclude non-working, unemployed or retired indi-
viduals. For entrepreneurs, we can observe whether the entrepreneur is “merely self-
employed” without any employees or whether the entrepreneur employs any workers. In a 
first step, we do not further exploit this information and count every self-employed respond-
ent as entrepreneur; however, later in this chapter, we will distinguish between these different 
kinds of entrepreneurs. In order to enhance our East versus West German comparison, we 
drop all observations from non-Germans from our sample as well as all observations from 
individuals living in Berlin.18 We use the 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2004 waves, which 
contain information on individuals’ preferences as to state-reliance or self-reliance.  
                                                 
16 The ALLBUS program was financially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) from 1980 to 
1986 and in 1991. Further surveys were financed on a national and state (Laender) level via the GESIS network 
(Gesellschaft Sozialwissenschaftlicher Infrastruktureinrichtungen). 
17 Terwey et al. (2007) provide detailed information on the ALLBUS surveys in general and present all variables 
available in the cumulated data set from 1980 until 2006. 
18 In particular for our regional covariates, it would have been difficult to clearly distinguish between West Ber-
lin (which was part of the former Federal Republic of Germany) and East Berlin (which was part of the former 
German Democratic Republic). 
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample underlying the analyses of this chapter. 90 
percent of all individuals in our sample are employed workers whereas 10 percent are entre-
preneurs. Our sample consists of 58 percent males and 42 percent females. Most of the ob-
served individuals (39 percent) have medium secondary schooling (“Realschulabschluss”), 33 
percent have no or lower secondary schooling (“Hauptschulabschluss”), 9 percent have higher 
secondary education (“Abitur”) yet no university education, and 19 percent have a university 
degree. 79 percent of all individuals in our sample had not been unemployed by the time of 
the interview; 13 percent had been unemployed less than a year by the time of the interview, 
and 8 percent had had unemployment spells adding up to more than a year by the time of the 
interview. 65 percent of all individuals in our sample are married and live together with their 
partners, while 35 percent are single. 51 percent own a house or a flat while the remaining 49 
percent are tenants. On average, individuals are 40.32 years old and earn 1,550.50 Euros per 
month.  
Observations are distributed fairly across all German federal states with 36 percent living in 
East Germany and 64 percent in West Germany. We use this information on whether an indi-
vidual currently lives in East or West Germany in our estimations; however, later, we also 
draw on more precise information on whether an individual that currently lives in East Ger-
many (West Germany) was actually born in East Germany (West Germany). 
Table 2 provides an overview of the variables depicting preferences with respect to state-
reliance or self-reliance (and as a closely related concept also with respect to competition) that 
we analyze in this chapter. For the sake of brevity, we label these preferences state-reliant 
preferences (or self-reliant preferences).  
Table 2: Questions Revealing Preferences With Respect to State-reliance, Self-reliance, and Competition 
Do you agree? 
1) “The state has to care for the sick, poor, old, and unemployed.” 
2) “Everybody should get the money he needs — regardless of any performance.” 
3) “Income differences give incentives to work hard.” 
4) “Rank differences are performance based and therefore acceptable.” 
5) “Differences in social status are just — by and large.” 
6) “Economic profits are distributed fairly in Germany.” 
7) “The current welfare system reduces work incentives.” 
Notes: Information on replies to statements 1) and 2) is available in the ALLBUS survey for the years 1991, 
1994, 2000, and 2004. Information on replies to statements 3), 4), and 5) is available in the ALLBUS survey for 
the years 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2004, whereas information on replies to statements 6) and 7) is available 
in the ALLBUS survey for the years 1991 and 2004. 
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Originally, interviewees could express their level of agreement with statements 1) to 7) in 
Table 2 by picking one of four responses: “fully agree”, “rather agree”, “rather don’t agree”, 
and “don’t agree at all”. Figure 1 presents the distributions of the preference variables for East 
and West Germans. From these graphs, some first visual evidence appears that East Germans 
are more state-reliant than West Germans. For example, there are substantially more East 
Germans than West Germans who fully agree to the statement that the state should care for 
the sick, poor, and unemployed. Slightly more East Germans fully agree that everybody 
should get the money he needs – regardless of any performance. Further, East Germans are 
less likely to agree to the statement that the welfare system reduces work incentives. Moreo-
ver, we observe far more East Germans completely disagreeing with the statements that eco-
nomic profits are distributed fairly in Germany, or that rank differences or differences in so-
cial status are acceptable and fair. More East Germans than West Germans do not agree at all 
with the statement that income differences provide incentives to work hard. Altogether, Fig-
ure 1 provides first pieces of evidence that state-reliance is more common a phenomenon 
among East Germans than among West Germans.  
Figure 1: Preferences Expressing State-Reliance/Self-Reliance for West and East Germans 
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Figure 1 (continued): Preferences Expressing State-Reliance/Self-Reliance for West and East Germans  
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Figure 1 (continued): Preferences Expressing State-Reliance/Self-Reliance for West and East Germans  
 
 
 
Notes: The graphs show distributions of preferences expressing state-reliance for West Germans and East Ger-
mans. Statement 1): N = 3,695 for West and N = 2,349 for East; statement 2): N = 3,652 for West and N = 2,296 
for East; Statement 3): N = 4,476 for West and N = 2,652 for East; statement 4): N = 4,466 for West and N = 
2,669 for East; statement 5): N = 4,483 for West and N = 2,704 for East; statement 6): N = 1,887 for West and N 
= 881 for East; statement 7): N = 1,920 for West and N = 889 for East; statement.  
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To ease interpretation, we now group the two agreement levels “fully agree” and “rather 
agree” together to represent individuals who agree to the respective statement. The two disa-
greement levels “rather don’t agree” and “don’t agree at all” are grouped together to capture 
individuals who disagree. We then create seven dummy variables, which take on the value of 
unity for interviewee replies reflective of rather self-reliant preferences, and are zero for ra-
ther state-reliant preferences. To be more specific, we expect individuals having more self-
reliant (and therefore less state-reliant) preferences to disagree to statements 1) and 2), where-
as they should agree to statements 3) through 7). 
Figure 2: Self-Reliant Preferences for West and East Germans – Adjusted Measures 
 
Notes: The figure presents mean levels of disagreement with statements 1) and 2) of Table 1, mean levels of 
agreement with statements 3) through 7) of Table 1. Statement 1): N = 3,695 for West and N = 2,349 for East; 
statement 2): N = 3,652 for West and N = 2,296 for East; Statement 3): N = 4,476 for West and N = 2,652 for 
East; statement 4): N = 4,466 for West and N = 2,669 for East; statement 5): N = 4,483 for West and N = 2,704 
for East; statement 6): N = 1,887 for West and N = 881 for East; statement 7): N = 1,920 for West and N = 889 
for East. The observations for statements 1) and 2) are drawn from the years 1991, 1994, 2000, and 2004. The 
observations for statements 3), 4), and 5) are drawn from the years 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2004, whereas 
the observations for statements 6) and 7) are drawn from the years 1991 and 2004. 
Descriptive statistics for these adjusted preference variables are shown in Figure 2. East Ger-
mans show significantly lower levels of self-reliance than West Germans. For example, only 6 
percent of East Germans disagree to the statement that the state should care for the sick, poor, 
and unemployed, while this number is 16 percent for West Germans. 62 percent of all indi-
viduals from West Germany disagree that everybody should get the money he needs – regard-
less of any performance, compared to 58 percent of East Germans. 62 percent of West Ger-
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mans hold the opinion that income differences provide an incentive to work hard. This num-
ber drops to 49 percent for East Germans. Similarly, while 53 percent of West Germans agree 
to the statement that rank differences are performance based and therefore acceptable, only 40 
percent of East Germans think this is true. Differences in social status are regarded as being 
fair by 42 percent of all West Germans, yet only by 16 percent of all East Germans. Moreo-
ver, whereas 48 percent of West Germans think that the current social security system reduces 
work effort, only 28 percent of East Germans do so. Although these descriptive statistics pro-
vide first evidence supporting our hypothesis that the socialist regime in the former GDR 
made people more state-reliant and less reliant on their own skills and abilities, they should be 
interpreted with caution. East and West Germans might differ in many other characteristics 
that are correlated with the preferences we are interested in. Unobserved heterogeneity could 
thus account for the preference differences rather than the socialist past. 
To address the possibility that unobserved heterogeneity might drive the preference differ-
ences, we run multivariate probit regressions where we take the adjusted preference variables 
as our outcomes and include a wide range of control variables on an individual level. Specifi-
cally, we control for gender, age (and its square), education (lower secondary, medium sec-
ondary, higher secondary, or university), and family status (married and living with spouse or 
single). Furthermore, to proxy wealth, we include the logarithm of an individual’s net month-
ly income19 as well as a dichotomous variable that is unity for house or flat owners and zero 
for tenants. The house owner variable should also be a good proxy for an individual’s mobili-
ty (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999). Moreover, we account for an individual’s employment 
history by including a categorical control variable that describes the individual’s unemploy-
ment spells during the 10 years preceding the interview (none, less than a year, more than a 
year). Keep in mind that our sample is restricted to entrepreneurs and employees; thus current 
unemployed individuals are not included in the sample. Our variable of interest is a dummy 
variable that equals unity if a respondent is East German. The results of probit regressions 
with standard errors clustered at the state level are displayed in Table 3. 
  
                                                 
19 We compute real income by using the income in 2005 as the baseline and adjusting nominal income infor-
mation from other years by the inflation rate. 
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The emerging picture is remarkably similar to the one seen in Figure 2. Controlling for a wide 
range of individual characteristics in multivariate regressions does not affect our previous 
descriptive result that East Germans exhibit less self-reliance (but more state-reliance) than 
their West German counterparts. As can be seen from column (1) of Table 3, the probability 
of disagreeing with the statement that the state should care for the sick, poor, and unemployed 
is by 10 percentage points lower for East Germans. In column (4), we see that the likelihood 
of agreeing to the statement that rank differences are performance based and therefore ac-
ceptable is 9 percentage points lower for East Germans than for West Germans. As another 
example, for East Germans, the probability of acknowledging that the current social security 
system reduces work effort is 17 percentage points lower than for West Germans. Indeed, 
comparing the descriptive statistics and the point estimates of the multivariate regressions in 
detail, we find that the size of the preference gap is barely affected by the inclusion of indi-
vidual control variables in a multivariate setting.20 
To this point, we can argue that the socialist regime in the former GDR created an environ-
ment in which we observe a lack of self-reliance. However, it could be argued that the sub-
stantial differences in preferences expressing state-reliance are mainly due to local labor mar-
ket heterogeneity, since, e.g., the level of unemployment is much higher while GDP per capita 
is much lower in East Germany than it is in West Germany. We already control for a wide 
range of individual characteristics and restrict our sample to entrepreneurs and employed 
workers, i.e., unemployed individuals are not included in our sample. Nevertheless, even for 
those who are employed, economic conditions may differ a lot between East and West Ger-
many, with the consequence that people living in East Germany might, for example, have a 
greater fear of unemployment than those living in West Germany, which might in turn influ-
ence their preferences. In short, we can imagine that individuals in economically poorer re-
gions might have different preferences toward state-reliance / self-reliance than individuals 
living in more prosperous regions. Therefore, in a next step, we investigate whether the dif-
ferences in state-reliance are driven merely by regional heterogeneity, i.e., regional economic 
conditions that differ between East and West Germany, or whether the shadow of the socialist 
regime reaches deeper and further. 
                                                 
20 We do not find any systematic differences in the association of age and preferences between East and West 
Germany. Age is probably not a good proxy for an individual’s socialist indoctrination because the intensity of 
socialist propaganda varied over the existence of the GDR. 
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To control for regional economic heterogeneity, we include the unemployment rate as well as 
GDP per capita by state in our multivariate regressions.21 The data are provided by the Ger-
man Federal Statistical Office. Similar to this approach, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) 
use net payments between states from the German regional transfer system 
(Laenderfinanzausgleich) and other regional financial redistributions to control for regional 
heterogeneity in an investigation of preferences for redistribution. The figures of Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schündeln (hereafter, AFS) are available for two years, 1997 and 2002, and are highly 
correlated with our regional control variables. Indeed, the pairwise correlation coefficient be-
tween the unemployment rate and the AFS net transfers on a federal state level for 1997 
(2002) is -.94 (-.94); the correlation coefficient between real GDP per capita and the AFS net 
transfers for 1997 (2002) is -.64 (-.66).22 
The results of the regressions that account for regional heterogeneity are presented in Table 4. 
For six out of seven attitude variables, we continue to find that East Germans differ from 
West Germans in the expected direction. Only for responses to the statement that everybody 
should get the money he need (regardless of any performance), the East dummy switches its 
sign but is not significantly different from zero (column (2) of Table 4). Although in some 
cases the size of the East German coefficient decreases once we control for regional heteroge-
neity, the differences are still economically substantial and in five out of seven cases statisti-
cally significant at conventional levels. Overall, it seems that the shadow of the socialist past 
reaches deep and cannot be explained by mere differences in the economic prosperity between 
East and West Germany. Despite accounting for differences in unemployment rates and GDP 
per capita, East Germans are far more state-reliant (and less self-reliant) than West Ger-
mans.23 
                                                 
21 GDP per capita is expressed in real terms, i.e., we account for inflation and take 2005 as the baseline year. 
22 An alternative to including regional covariates might be looking at East Germans who lived under the socialist 
regime but moved to West Germany after the collapse of the GDR. Indeed, these East-West movers now face the 
same economic environment than West Germans, and an analysis of this subsample supports our results. How-
ever, at the same time this subsample of individuals that left East Germany is a highly selective one, which might 
blur our analysis. Therefore, we stick to the strategy of including regional covariates rather than focusing on a 
very selective and small group of individuals in our data. 
23 We have also used our repeated cross-section data to investigate any dynamics in the preference differences 
between East and West Germans in the years after reunification; yet, no clear picture emerges. For some vari-
ables, we observe a convergence process in line with Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007), for other variables, 
we observe constant and partly even increasing differences over time, which is similar to the findings of Bauern-
schuster and Rainer (2011).  
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In all our regressions, we include an individual’s real income as a control variable. However, 
living expenses differ significantly between East and West Germany. Since living expenses 
are lower in East Germany than in West Germany, an individual living in East Germany could 
be wealthier than an individual living in West Germany although real income might be the 
same. Unfortunately, there are no data available on purchasing power parities on a state level 
for our period of observation. The measure available, an individual’s real income, is therefore 
only an imperfect proxy for wealth that might due to its lack of purchasing power relevance 
absorb some useful variation between East and West Germany. Moreover, we observe many 
missing values for this income variable; indeed, roughly 13 percent of all interviewees do not 
report their monthly income.  
For these two reasons, we now drop the income variable from our regressions while still con-
trolling for all other individual level covariates, the year dummies, the regional unemploy-
ment rate as well as the regional GDP per capita. The results of these alternative specifica-
tions are depicted in Table 5. All coefficients have the expected sign with seven out of eight 
being statistically significant at the conventional levels. The point estimates are universally 
larger than the more conservative estimates presented in Table 4. Moreover, they tend to be 
more precisely estimated due to the larger number of observations. Still, in the rest of the 
chapter, in order to be cautious, we stick to the more conservative specifications where we 
include an individual’s monthly income as well as regional unemployment and GDP per capi-
ta as covariates. 
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As explained earlier, for ease of interpretation, we have coded our outcome variables as sim-
ple dichotomous variables. However, it is at least interesting also to exploit the full categori-
cal information for all the preference variables in one specification. To this end, we run or-
dered logit regressions for all our outcome variables. Again, the East dummy is the variable of 
interest while we control for the full set of individual level covariates, year dummies, the re-
gional unemployment rate and GDP per capita. Table 6 presents the marginal effects of the 
ordered logit regressions separately for all categories of the outcome variables.  
From column (1) of Table 6 we can see that East Germans are 16.1 percentage points more 
likely to “fully agree” to the statement that the state should care for the sick, poor, and unem-
ployed, while they are 10.5 percentage points less likely to “rather agree” with this statement, 
4.9 percentage points less likely to tick “rather don’t agree”, and 0.7 percentage points less 
likely to tick “don’t agree”. Take as another example column (5) of Table 6, where the out-
come variable is agreement to the statement that differences in social status are just. East 
Germans are 3.5 percentage points less likely to “fully agree” with that statement and 10.5 
percentage points less likely to “rather agree”. Instead, they are 3.7 percentage points more 
likely to rather not agree to that statement and 10.2 percentage points more likely not to agree. 
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If our preferences for self-reliance/ state-reliance are indeed caused by the socialist regime in 
the former GDR, we should find preference differences not only on an aggregated regional 
level between East and West Germany, but individuals in every single East German state 
should be different from their West German counterparts. We test whether this is true by sub-
stituting our variable of interest, i.e., the East dummy, by a vector of East German state dum-
mies. The results of this exercise clearly support our hypothesis. As compared to their West 
German counterparts, individuals from every single East German state exhibit higher levels of 
state-reliance than the average West German. The detailed results of these regressions are 
available from the authors upon request. Further, in order to account for even more regional 
characteristics, we include a categorical variable that captures the size of the community an 
individual lives in (seven categories ranging from “less than 2,000” up to “more than 
500,000“). Our results are virtually unaffected by this alternative specification. 
Our East dummy depicts whether an individual currently lives in East Germany or in West 
Germany. However, to be more precise, we actually would like to have a variable that cap-
tures whether an individual lived in East Germany during the socialist regime, i.e., was treated 
with the socialist propaganda. For the subsample of the years 1991, 1994, 2000, and 2004, the 
ALLBUS data provide information that let us distinguish whether an individual that currently 
lives in East Germany was also born in East Germany or not. The same information is availa-
ble for West Germans. We draw on this information to build a dichotomous variable that 
takes the value of unity for individuals who were born and currently live in East Germany 
(East-East), and is zero for individuals that were born and currently live in West Germany 
(West-West). Taking this modified East-West variable instead of the rough East dummy, we 
re-run our regressions – first only including the individual level controls and the year dum-
mies, and then also adding the unemployment rate and real GDP per capita as covariates. As 
can be seen in Table 7 and Table 8, the results of these estimations are very similar to the re-
sults obtained before when using the residence based East dummy. 
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In a next step, we ask whether our self-reported preferences truly reflect what individuals be-
lieve. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) point out that survey answers are not always very 
meaningful. To test whether our preference variables reflect actual attitudes and actions, we 
draw on a strategy employed by AFS. They show that in those German states where people 
exhibit stronger preferences for redistribution, the vote share of the leftist party is much high-
er than in other states where people are less in favor of redistribution.24 Thus if our attitude 
variables are meaningful, they should be strongly correlated with voting behavior. Those who 
are more self-reliant and less reliant on the state should be more likely to vote for the more 
rightist and liberal parties (CDU or FDP), whereas more state-reliant individuals should be 
more likely to vote for the more leftist parties (SPD or PDS25). Our micro data set allows us to 
test the association between preferences expressing state-reliance and voting behavior on an 
individual level.  
Table 9: State-Reliance and Voting Behavior (“Sonntagsfrage”) 
  Vote for PDS/SPD 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  mfx std.err. mfx std.err. mfx std.err. 
Preferences 
      (1)  -0.096*** 0.025 
    (2) -0.043** 0.017 
    (3) 
  
-0.007 0.016 
  (4) 
  
-0.038** 0.017 
  (5) 
  
-0.094*** 0.018 
  (6) 
    
-0.111*** 0.030 
(7) 
    
-0.072*** 0.024 
Individual level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Regional level controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,526 4,070 1,648 
Log pseudo likelihood -2,264.83 -2,617.83 -1,009.25 
                                                        
24 Moreover, AFS show that before World War I, World War II, and German separation, in 1898, the Social 
Democrats gained similar vote shares in East and West Germany. However, the Zentrum party, i.e., the largest 
party in the West at that time, was even more in favor of state intervention than the Conservative party, which 
was the largest party in the East aside from the Social Democrats. 
25 PDS is the successor party of the SED, the ruling party in the former GDR, whereas SPD has been the big 
labor party in West Germany. CDU is the Christian Democrats, FDP is the Liberal Democrats. 
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Table 9 (continued): State-Reliance and Voting Behavior (“Sonntagsfrage”) 
 
  Vote for CDU/FDP 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
 mfx std.err. mfx std.err. mfx std.err. 
Preferences 
      (1) 0.090*** 0.024 
    (2) 0.078*** 0.017 
    (3) 
  
0.050*** 0.016 
  (4) 
  
0.089*** 0.016 
  (5) 
  
0.148*** 0.016 
  (6) 
    
0.165*** 0.029 
(7) 
    
0.137*** 0.023 
Individual level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Regional level controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,526 4,070 1,648 
Log pseudo likelihood -2,250.91 -2,483.45 -1,016.56 
Notes: The table reports probit average marginal effects (mfx) using robust standard errors. The following con-
trol variables are included: gender, age (and its square), education, previous unemployment spells, marital status, 
a dummy for house/flat owners, the logarithm of real personal income, regional unemployment rate, regional 
GDP per capita, and year dummies. Our value variables correspond to the seven preference variables presented 
in Table 2 and are all coded as dummy variables that take on the value of unity for interviewee replies that are 
rather self-reliant, and zero for rather state-reliant preferences (cf. Figure 2). ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
To this end, we exploit information in the ALLBUS survey, where individuals are asked 
which party they would vote for if there were general elections the subsequent Sunday 
(“Sonntagsfrage”). We create two dummies as our outcome variables. The first takes on the 
value of unity for those saying they would vote for the more rightist/liberal parties (CDU and 
FDP); zero otherwise. The second outcome variable is unity for individuals stating they would 
vote for the more leftist parties; zero otherwise. We include all covariates from the previous 
regressions, i.e., gender, age (and its square), education, previous unemployment spells, mari-
tal status, a dummy for house/flat owners, the logarithm of real personal income, year dum-
mies, as well as the unemployment rate and GDP per capita on the state level. The results of 
these voting regressions are displayed in Table 9. Clearly, the results provide multivariate 
evidence that our attitudes are truly meaningful since they are strongly correlated with ex-
pressed voting behavior. To check the robustness of these associations, we used a different 
voting variable as our outcome, where individuals were asked to state which party they voted 
for in the last general elections. The results are virtually identical to those presented in Ta-
ble 9. 
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In summary, our multivariate results provide evidence that preferences expressing state-
reliance that were shaped under the socialist regime are prevalent in East Germany even years 
after reunification; the past does indeed cast a long shadow upon the present. These differ-
ences in preferences between East and West Germans are meaningful and are not explained 
by individual characteristics or by regional economic heterogeneity alone. 
3.3 State-reliance and entrepreneurship 
To assess whether the analyzed preferences expressing self-reliance/state-reliance are indeed 
associated with the decision to become an entrepreneur, we include these preference variables 
into an occupational choice equation. The estimated occupational choice model is: 
iiii Xvy ???? ?????? 21)|1Pr( ,    (1) 
where )|1Pr( ??iy  is the conditional probability of being an entrepreneur. y is an indicator 
variable that takes on the value of unity if individual i is an entrepreneur and 0 if individual i 
is an employed worker. v is a dummy preference variable, which is unity for individuals who 
exhibit preferences expressing self-reliance, and which is zero for individuals with prefer-
ences rather expressing state-reliance. X is a set of control variables that might influence an 
individual’s occupational choice and preferences. Here, we include the same control variables 
as in our earlier regressions — gender, age (and its square), education, marital status, previous 
unemployment spells, the house/flat owner dummy, and year dummies — as well as our re-
gional controls, i.e., unemployment rate and real GDP per capita on the federal state level. In 
contrast to the previous specifications, we no longer include an individual’s income since this 
variable is itself an outcome of occupational choice and thus would bias our results. Since the 
outcome is a dichotomous variable, the occupational choice equation is estimated by probit 
models using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
In column (1) of Table 10, we present the results of a simple occupational choice model with-
out any regional controls and without any preference variables. The results are in line with 
previous empirical research in entrepreneurship. Women are less likely to become entrepre-
neurs than men. Education is positively associated with the likelihood of becoming an entre-
preneur. Although not statistically significant, there is a tendency for experience to pay off, 
i.e., age is positively associated with entrepreneurship. Individuals with short unemployment 
spells during the last 10 years are more likely to become entrepreneurs than those without any 
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unemployment spells. This is in line with the fact that the eligibility for many public start-up 
subsidies is linked to previous unemployment of the applicant. It also seems that singles are 
more likely to become entrepreneurs, possibly because any risk involved in such an endeavor 
is theirs alone, i.e., they are not responsible for the safety, financial or otherwise, of a partner 
or family. Alternatively, one could say that being married shows a time allocation preference 
for family. House or flat owners are more likely to become entrepreneurs, perhaps due to the 
immobility implied by such ownership, which might well hinder an individual from changing 
occupational status.  
In column (2) of Table 10, we additionally account for regional heterogeneity by including the 
unemployment rate and real GDP per capita at the state level as control variables. We can see 
that the regional unemployment rate tends to be positively correlated with entrepreneurship, 
although this association is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on GDP per capita, on 
the other hand, is highly significant and positively associated with entrepreneurship. Thus, we 
observe more entrepreneurship in wealthier regions. The coefficients of the individual level 
covariates are hardly affected by the inclusion of these regional level control variables. 
We now use our preference variables to investigate whether the state-reliance (or the lack of 
self-reliance) that was shaped by the socialist regime is an additional channel through which 
entrepreneurship is negatively affected. To make use of all information on the preference var-
iables available over the years, we run three estimations, where each single estimation in-
cludes, in addition to all controls used in the estimations before, only those preference varia-
bles having a perfect overlap with respect to the years they were collected. Specifically, we 
run a probit occupational choice model on repeated cross-sectional data of the years 1991, 
1994, 2000, and 2004, where information on the preference variables (1) and (2) is available 
(column (3) of Table 10). Column (4) of Table 10 presents the results for an occupational 
choice model using repeated cross-section data for the years 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 
2004, where we have information on our preference variables (3), (4), and (5). Another probit 
estimation is executed for the years 1994 and 2004 where we have information on the prefer-
ence variables (6) and (7) (column (5) of Table 10.  
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All coefficients of our preference variables show the expected sign, with five out of seven 
being statistically highly significant. Again, the size of the value and attitude coefficients is 
economically substantial. For example, switching from agreeing with the statement that the 
state has to care for the sick, poor, and unemployed to disagreeing is associated with an in-
crease in the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur of 5.5 percentage points. Remember that 
for this variable, the disagreement gap between East and West Germans was roughly 7.1 per-
centage points (column (1) of Table 4). Accordingly, if East Germans developed the same 
preferences on this issue as West Germans, the share of entrepreneurs in East Germany would 
increase by 0.39 percentage points. Given that the unconditional difference in entrepreneur-
ship rates for the subsample of individuals answering this preference question is 1.1 percent-
age points, eliminating the disagreement gap on this question would reduce the difference in 
entrepreneurship rates by 35 percent. With respect to the statement that differences in social 
status are just (by and large), switching from disagreement to agreement results in a 3.4 per-
centage point increase in the propensity to become an entrepreneur. In other words, if East 
Germans reached the average West German preference level on this issue, the share of entre-
preneurs in East Germany would increase by roughly 0.44 percentage points and reduce the 
differences between East and West German entrepreneurship rates by 34 percent – the uncon-
ditional difference in entrepreneurship rates for the subsample of individuals answering to this 
preference question is 1.3 percentage points.  
We ran several specification checks in order to test the robustness of our findings. One con-
cern might be that East and West Germans have different connotations when confronted with 
the preference questions. To investigate this potential threat to our empirical results, we have 
added an East dummy as well as interactions of the East dummy with the preference variables 
to the occupational choice equations. For all seven preference variables, the interaction effect 
is not significantly different from zero which makes us confident that East Germans and West 
Germans do not interpret the questions on their preferences systematically differently. Anoth-
er concern might be that an individual’s unemployment history or regional unemployment 
might have different effects on an individual’s decision to become an entrepreneur in East and 
West Germany. This could for example be the case when public start-up subsidies are more 
easily given to East German unemployed individuals than to West German unemployed indi-
viduals. Therefore, we have included the East dummy as well as interactions of the East 
dummy with an individual‘s previous unemployment history and with the regional unem-
ployment rates in further specifications of our occupational choice equations. In a specifica-
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tion similar to the one presented in column (5) of Table 10, the interaction of the variable in-
dicating individual unemployment of less than a year with the East dummy is significant at 
the 10 percent level. All the other eight interactions are far from conventional significance 
levels. Further and most importantly, our finding of the negative effect of state-reliant prefer-
ences on entrepreneurship is not affected by this exercise.  
Since ALLBUS provides us with information on whether an entrepreneur employs any work-
ers or not, we can analyze whether we find any heterogeneity in the effects of state-reliance 
on entrepreneurship. To this end, we split the previous outcome variable to generate an alter-
native outcome variable that is unity for all entrepreneurs with more than one employed 
worker, and zero for employed workers. A further outcome variable is unity for all entrepre-
neurs with no or one employed worker, and zero for employed workers. We run probit models 
where we regress these two alternative outcome variables on the preferences expressing self-
reliance/state-reliance, our individual level covariates, year dummies, and regional covariates. 
The results presented in Table 11 show that preferences expressing self-reliance are more 
strongly associated with being an entrepreneur with more than one employee (upper panel) 
than with being an entrepreneur with no or one employee (lower panel). Note that adding the 
preference coefficient from the upper panel to the respective coefficient of the lower panel 
gives the coefficient for the standard outcome variable entrepreneur (irrespective of the num-
ber of employed workers) since all outcome variables are dichotomous and therefore, the co-
efficients present percentage points.  
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Table 11:  The Association between Preferences Expressing Self-Reliance and Entrepreneurship/ 
Self-employment 
  Entrepreneur (more than 1 employee) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  mfx std.err. mfx std.err. mfx std.err. 
Preferences 
      (1) 0.046*** 0.008 
    (2) 0.013** 0.006 
    (3) 
  
0.008 0.006 
  (4) 
  
0.010 0.006 
  (5) 
  
0.023*** 0.006 
  (6) 
    
0.022** 0.011 
(7) 
    
0.059*** 0.010 
Individual level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Regional level controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,443 6,288 2,501 
Log pseudo likelihood -1,046.58 -1,230.74 -484.86 
         Self-employed (up to 1 employee) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  mfx std.err. mfx std.err. mfx std.err. 
Preferences 
      (1) 0.013 0.009 
    (2) 0.013** 0.007 
    (3) 
  
0.002 0.006 
  (4) 
  
0.010 0.007 
  (5) 
  
0.015** 0.007 
  (6) 
    
-0.004 0.013 
(7) 
    
0.004 0.010 
Individual level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Regional level controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,439 6,294 2,523 
Log pseudo likelihood -1,071.70 -1,298.05 576.54 
Notes: The table reports probit average marginal effects (mfx) using robust standard errors. In the upper panel, 
the outcome variable is a dummy variable that is unity for entrepreneurs with more than one employee, and zero 
for employees. In the lower panel, the outcome variable is a dummy variable that is unity for entrepreneurs with 
no or at most one employee, and zero for employees. The following control variables are included: gender, age 
(and its square), education, previous unemployment spells, marital status, a dummy for house/flat owners, the 
logarithm of real personal income, year dummies, the regional unemployment rate, and the regional GDP per 
capita. Our value variables correspond to the seven values and attitudes presented in Table 2 and are all coded as 
dummy variables that take on the value of unity for interviewee replies that are rather self-reliant, and zero for 
rather state-reliant preferences (cf. Figure 2). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, re-
spectively. 
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Our estimates yield average effects of the socialist regime on individuals’ state-reliance which 
in turn influence entrepreneurship. However, as nicely outlined by Wyrwich (2010), East 
German regions considerably differ with respect to the industrial history before and during 
German separation. Therefore, one might suspect that the impact of the socialist regime on 
preferences expressing self-reliance/state-reliance and in turn on entrepreneurship could be 
heterogeneous across East German regions. Unfortunately, ALLBUS does not allow any 
small scale regional comparisons. However, in an attempt to address potential regional heter-
ogeneity due to differences in the industrial history, we draw on historic data on the share of 
entrepreneurs in 1907, i.e., before World War I, World War II, and German separation, at the 
federal state level. We run the preference estimations separately for the subsample of individ-
uals living in federal states with above average shares of entrepreneurs in 1907 on the one 
hand and with below average shares of entrepreneurs in 1907 on the other hand. No clear pic-
ture emerges, i.e., we do not find that the impact of the socialist regime was systematically 
different in regions with a historically high share of entrepreneurs as compared to regions 
with a historically low share of entrepreneurs. This does not necessarily mean that there is no 
regional heterogeneity but rather that given the data at hand we cannot satisfactorily address 
any issues concerning regionally heterogeneous impacts of the socialist regime in this chapter. 
For future work, it would certainly be interesting to analyze the legacy of the socialist past 
with more refined, regionally small scale data.  
3.4  The Socialist Regime and State-Reliant Preferences: A Discussion of an Alternative 
Channel 
Last but not least, we would like to draw attention to a channel which has been neglected so 
far in the economic literature on the effects of the socialist regime on individuals’ preferences. 
AFS analyze data from the general elections in 1898 and argue that before separation, indi-
viduals living in regions that would later become West Germany were, if anything, more in 
favor of state intervention than individuals living in regions that would later become East 
Germany. However, after the end of World War II, hundred thousands of people left what was 
then the Soviet zone of occupation (SZO) and should become the GDR in 1949. By 1961, 
when the Berlin Wall was built, more than 2.75 million people had left the SZO, or the GDR 
respectively, to live in West Germany (Falck et al., 2011). This constitutes a substantial frac-
tion of the whole population living in the SZO in 1945 (roughly 17 percent). It seems natural 
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to argue that those individuals that fled from the RSO are not a random draw from the whole 
population but a self-selected sample. 
Data from an additional retrospective survey in the German micro-census 1971, which covers 
a representative 1 percent sample of the whole German population, allows investigating some 
characteristics of those individuals that left the Russian zone of occupation and the GDR in its 
early days. The descriptive statistics from Table 12 reveal some peculiarities of those early 
East-West movers. They were clearly better educated than the average West German and far 
more often held white collar jobs or were civil servants. Thus, it seems that the socialist re-
gime already had its effect on its population before the Berlin Wall was actually built. One 
could well imagine that the people that remained in East Germany were less self-reliant than 
the average West German already before the socialist propaganda did set in. This could of 
course be interpreted as an early effect of the (approaching) socialist regime and thus as an 
alternative channel of how the socialist regime had an impact on its population.  
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Table 12: Descriptives of West Germans and Early East-West Movers 
  Local West Germans Early East-West movers 
Demographics   
Female 60.4 57.4 
Age 1950 (mean) 42.6 40.3 
Married 64.9 70.4 
Highest Education   
Basic school 64.3 44.6 
Secondary school 25.8 38.9 
High school 1.3 3.2 
Technical school 4.8 9.1 
University 1.4 3.0 
Assets   
Real estate 1939 48.5 40.3 
Occupation 1939   
Unemployed 0.3 0.2 
Unskilled worker 20.5 15.4 
Entrepreneur (agricultural) 3.6 2.0 
Entrepreneur (non-agricultural) 4.9 5.4 
Civil servant 2.7 3.9 
Civil servant (qualified) 1.4 3.7 
White collar worker 13.9 24.6 
Craftsman 12.8 13.0 
Pensioner, other non-employed 2.7 2.6 
Family worker 7.7 4.4 
Housewife 29.4 24.8 
N  146,786 5,633 
Notes: Unless otherwise stated, the table reports percentage shares. Early East-West movers are individuals who 
moved from East Germany to West Germany before the year 1961, i.e., before the construction of the Berlin 
Wall. The sample is restricted to those individuals who have completed education in 1939 and reported an occu-
pation in 1939. Data: MZU (1971). The German micro census provides official representative statistics of the 
population and the labor market in Germany. It has a sampling fraction of one percent of the German population. 
Unfortunately, we do not have any data on preferences expressing self-reliance or state-
reliance of movers measured at the time these individuals fled. This data could possibly pro-
vide further information on the possible selection effect. Yet, we can identify 129 individuals 
in the ALLBUS data who were born in East Germany and moved to West Germany before the 
Berlin Wall was built. For these early East-West movers, we can measure preferences ex-
pressing state-reliance in the 1990s and 2000s and compare their stated preferences to those of 
West Germans. Figure 3 depicts these statistics – first for all early East-West movers com-
pared to all individuals born in and currently living in West Germany, and then for a matched 
sample of early East-West movers and individuals born in and currently living in West Ger-
many. 
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Figure 3: Preferences Expressing State-Reliance/Self-Reliance for West Germans and Early East-West 
Movers 
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Figure 3 (continued) :  Preferences Expressing State-Reliance/Self-Reliance for West Germans and Early 
East-West Movers 
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Figure 3 (continued):  Preferences Expressing State-Reliance/Self-Reliance for West Germans and Early 
East-West Movers 
 
Notes: The graphs show distributions of preferences expressing state-reliance for individuals born in and current-
ly living in West Germany (West-West) and for individuals born in East Germany that moved to West Germany 
before the Berlin Wall was built in 1961 (Early East-West). The left graph in each picture shows the distributions 
for the whole sample, whereas the right graph in each picture shows the distributions for a nearest neighbor 
matched sample that ensures that individuals from both groups are equally old. 
We use nearest neighbor propensity score matching in order to ensure that individuals from 
both groups are on average equally old. The general picture of the difference between West 
Germans and the early East-West movers is very similar for the unmatched and the matched 
sample. Because the numbers of observations are very low, we do not draw any rigorous con-
clusions from this exercise. Still, the graphs might provide some further tentative but sugges-
tive evidence that the individuals that fled from the Russian occupation zone were a selected 
sample of more self-reliant individuals. Early East-West movers more often than West Ger-
mans do not agree at all to the statements that the state should care for the sick, poor and un-
employed, or that everybody should get the money he needs. Further, they are more likely 
than West Germans to agree to the statement that income differences provide incentives to 
work hard, and that rank differences are performance based and therefore acceptable. At the 
same time, however, early East-West movers less often than West Germans think that the 
current welfare system reduces work incentives, which we would interpret as a rather state-
reliant preference. Thus, in the end, the question to what extent the socialist regime had al-
ready an effect on the structure of its population even before the Berlin Wall was built re-
mains somewhat open and gives room for future research. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Our analysis shows that East Germans living in the regions of the former socialist GDR ex-
press significantly lower self-reliant preferences than do their West German counterparts. 
These effects of the socialist regime are large in size and are not explained by individual char-
acteristics or by differences in economic development between East and West Germany alone. 
We investigate the economic relevance of the differences in individuals’ state-reliant / self-
reliant preferences and find that state-reliant preferences are negatively associated with entre-
preneurship. If entrepreneurs are the agents of change in transition economies, our finding of 
a negative association between state-reliance and entrepreneurship suggests that state-reliant 
preferences persisting in East Germany as a shadow of the socialist past might slow down the 
transition process. 
Although our chapter collects some convincing pieces of evidence for state-reliant preferences 
hindering entrepreneurship in East Germany, we should keep in mind some caveats. First, the 
rich individual level data of ALLBUS provides us with valuable and extensive information on 
individuals’ state-reliant / self-reliant preferences. However, the data also come at a cost since 
they do not allow us to address any questions of small-scale regional heterogeneity. One 
could for example imagine that the impact of the socialist regime was less strong in some 
smaller regions that had bred an entrepreneurial culture historically. With our data, these 
small-scale regional heterogeneities remain hidden under an average effect of the socialist 
regime over all regions. A further caveat emerges due to the fact that the ALLBUS data do 
not come with a panel structure. Therefore, we cannot observe transitions into entrepreneur-
ship but can only exploit information on whether an individual is an entrepreneur at the time 
of the interview. Thus, we cannot completely rule out reverse causality, i.e., that preferences 
might also to some degree be influenced by occupational status. However, given the fact that 
preferences seem to be highly time-persistent while entrepreneurship is a highly dynamic pro-
cess reverse causality is arguably a minor issue. 
Last but not least, we challenge the idea that all preference differences between East Germans 
and West Germans are necessarily the outcome of being socialized by the propaganda of the 
socialist regime in the former GDR. Our alternative explanation for differences in preferences 
between East and West Germans for which we find first evidence is that differences were al-
ready present before the socialist socialization actually set in.  More precisely, we find that 
selection in terms of migration in the period between the end of World War II and the con-
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struction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 might have played a large role. This argument has so far 
been ignored in the economic literature dealing with German separation and reunification. It 
seems worthwhile for future research to explore in more detail differences in preferences, 
norms and attitudes between East and West Germany that were already in place before the 
socialist propaganda actually set in. Further, one might pose the question to which extent the 
border between East and West Germany was really exogenous in the first place. 
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4. Institutional Change, Entrepreneurship, and Education26 
4.1 Introduction 
In the United States, it seems that you cannot move without bumping into one; in Europe, 
they are fervently longed for; all over the world, universities are suspected of being their 
breeding ground—entrepreneurs, those mystical beings who are believed to have such a posi-
tive influence on innovation and economic growth—are enjoying a global demand. As to 
what drives the entrepreneur, Schumpeter quite romantically describes it as “the will to con-
quer,” “the dream and the will to found a private kingdom,” and “the joy of creating, of get-
ting things done” (1912, 93). All well and good, but it does not explain where these Schum-
peterian entrepreneurial endowments (cf. Lazear, 2005) come from. In this chapter, we shed 
some light on this crucial question. 
Are entrepreneurs born or made? Is it nature or nurture that is responsible for entrepreneurial 
endowments? We argue that such endowments are the result of a combination of innate genet-
ics as well as education, i.e. socialization, and schooling. In this article, we focus on the role 
of socialization and (pre-university) schooling, i.e., adolescents’ education in a broader sense 
and, thus, focus on the early (in the lifecycle) formation of entrepreneurial endowments. Early 
entrepreneurial endowments, unfortunately, are not directly observable, so we look at some-
thing that is—the entrepreneurial intentions of university students, i.e., their desire to become 
an entrepreneur in future. In this context, Falck et al. (2009) show that entrepreneurial inten-
tions expressed in adolescence strongly predict future actual entrepreneurship. We concen-
trate on university students, since this subject pool represents an important source for innova-
tive entrepreneurship contributing to economic development. In this chapter, we focus on 
some input factors for the production of academic entrepreneurs, i.e. on the entrepreneurial 
endowments of students when entering universities. These endowments represent the basis for 
further entrepreneurship education at universities, an issue that has become increasingly popu-
lar not only at business schools (Katz, 2003). 
To identify a causal effect of endogenous entrepreneurial endowments from socialization and 
schooling on entrepreneurial intentions, we exploit the 1990 (re-)unification of the Federal 
                                                 
26 This chapter is based on Falck, Oliver, Gold, Robert and Heblich, Stephan (2011), Entrepreneurship Educa-
tion, in: David B. Audretsch, Oliver Falck, Stephan Heblich and Adam Lederer (Eds.), Handbook of Research on 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 486-499. 
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Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as quasi-natural 
experiment. We compare German university students in reunified Germany who were educat-
ed in the East (former GDR) to those who were educated in the West (non-reunified FRG). 
These two sets of students had radically dissimilar forms of socialization and schooling before 
1990. Conditional on various background factors, we consider education under the East Ger-
man system of a planned economy as socialist treatment. We assume that being treated with a 
socialist ideology in younger years “cured” any entrepreneurial inclination. Accordingly, ce-
teris paribus, university students raised and educated in the GDR should be less interested in 
becoming entrepreneurs than fellow students brought up in the market-based economy of the 
FRG. 
We find, in a first step, significantly lower entrepreneurial intentions among the treatment 
group of East German university students after reunification. This result is robust with the 
inclusion of university fixed effects and various control variables. In a second step, we focus 
on a subsample of those students who finished secondary education while Germany was still 
divided. When comparing the entrepreneurial intentions of East German students who fin-
ished secondary education under the socialist regime with those of West German students, the 
treatment effect is even stronger. We cautiously interpret this as positive effect of a change in 
the schooling system on individual entrepreneurial endowments. These findings suggest that 
policy makers can influence entrepreneurial endowments via the school system. In a third 
step, we assess the problem of selection into universities by restricting our sample to students 
from either East or West Germany who are attending a West German university that is not 
located in the region where they received their secondary education. This procedure should 
avoid a bias that could arise from comparing mobile students from East Germany to students 
in West Germany who did not move because mobility is possibly related to the presence or 
absence of entrepreneurial characteristics, for example, attitudes toward risk. As the treatment 
effect of an education under a socialist regime remains significant, we are confident that we 
do indeed measure a causal effect. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews some major contri-
butions that analyze the formation of entrepreneurial endowments prior to university educa-
tion. Section 4.3 introduces our empirical strategy, and Section 4.4 describes our data set. In 
Section 4.5, we present our analyses of the impact of schooling and socialization on university 
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student entrepreneurial intentions. Section 4.6 concludes by discussing the implications of our 
work and offers some suggestions for further research. 
4.2 The Formation of Entrepreneurial Endowments 
Economic research on what drives the formation of cognitive and non-cognitive skills usually 
adopts a life-cycle perspective, that is, every individual has certain innate biological charac-
teristics that influence his or her endowments. Nicolaou et al. (2008) and Nicolaou and Shane 
(2009) analyze this in the context of entrepreneurship and their results suggest that genetic 
factors are an important explanation of individual differences in ability to identify entrepre-
neurial opportunities and for an overall tendency to become an entrepreneur. With these char-
acteristics as the foundation, socialization and schooling further contribute to the development 
of entrepreneurial endowments. 
As for socialization influences, parental role models are first and foremost. The fact that 
young children spend most of their time with their parents helps to explain the strong impact 
of parental background on the predilection for a certain occupation; or, as Marshall (1920) put 
it, “as years pass on, the child of the working man learns a great deal from what he sees and 
hears going on around him.” Following research by Aldrich et al. (1998), Dunn and Holtz-
Eakin (2000), and Hout and Rosen (2000), entrepreneurial parents leave an especially pro-
nounced mark on their children due to “their ability to provide contact between their children 
(while the children are relatively young) and the business workplace. … As the child receives 
continued exposure to the family business, he picks up, almost without realizing it, a working 
knowledge of how to run a business enterprise” (Lentz and Laband, 1990, 564). Fairlie and 
Robb (2007) take this one step farther and directly attribute the “entrepreneurial” effect to 
adolescent work experience in the family business. 
Children’s peers also play an important role in the process of socialization (Banduras, 1977) 
and could very well have an impact on the formation of entrepreneurial endowments (Falck et 
al., 2009). Let us assume that some of a child’s peers think of themselves and others as future 
entrepreneurs, although perhaps not with that exact terminology. These peers believe it would 
be “cool” to be their own boss, run their own business, and not take orders from anyone else. 
These children are quite likely adventurous, fun to hang out with, and “leaders of the pack” 
(cf. Akerlof and Kranton, 2002). And leadership, argues Baumol (1968), is one of the major 
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ingredients of entrepreneurial success.27 A child’s entrepreneurial peers may playfully rein-
force entrepreneurial endowments, setting the stage for Schumpeter’s “will to conquer” and 
“will to found a private kingdom”. 
There is not much literature directly on the influence of education on entrepreneurial endow-
ments, aside from the now common idea that human capital has a positive impact on entre-
preneurship (Evans and Leighton, 1989). However, following Lazear’s (2005) idea of entre-
preneurs being “jacks-of-all-trades” who possess a balanced portfolio of cognitive and non-
cognitive skills, extra-curricular activities might be more conducive to entrepreneurial en-
dowments than math or science. 
Along this line, Falck and Woessman (2010) argue that competition between schools results 
in school administrators being innovative with regard to courses, teaching methods, and, es-
pecially, extra-curricular activities, and that these latter can complement student qualifications 
beyond baseline educational goals. Such extra-curricular activities are likely to encourage or 
enhance entrepreneurial endowments such as social skills, innovativeness, or the willingness 
to put ideas into action, all of which have the potential to shape student intention to become 
an entrepreneur. Consistent with their hypothesis, the authors find cross-country evidence for 
a positive effect of competition from private schools on system-wide student entrepreneurial 
intentions at the national level. In a similar study at the national level, Sobel and King (2008) 
observe that voucher programs in the United States create greater rates of youth entrepreneur-
ship relative to traditional public schools without such programs. 
These initial findings suggest that both socialization and schooling contribute to the develop-
ment of those cognitive and non-cognitive skills and abilities generally falling under the ru-
bric of entrepreneurial endowments. In the following section, we develop our empirical strat-
egy to assess this issue and introduce our large sample of German university students. Based 
on this sample, we analyze the effect of socialization and schooling on individual entrepre-
neurial endowments. Specifically, we focus on how socialist education influences student 
desire to become an entrepreneur. 
                                                 
27 The entrepreneur’s job is “to locate new ideas and to put them into effect. He must lead, perhaps even inspire; 
he cannot allow things to get into a rut and for him today’s practice is never good enough for tomorrow. … He is 
the individual who exercises what in the business literature is called ‘leadership’” (Baumol, 1968, 65). 
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4.3 Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy for identifying the impact of schooling and socialization on individual 
entrepreneurial endowments is threefold. First, we analyze the joint pre-university impact of 
socialization and schooling by comparing university students who were raised in West Ger-
many to university students who were at least partly raised in East Germany before reunifica-
tion in 1990. Here, our identification is based on the fact that these two groups experienced 
different educational treatments. East German university students were (at least partly) treated 
with socialization and schooling in a planned economy; West German students were treated 
with socialization and schooling in a free market economy.28  
In a second step, we restrict our sample to university students who completed their secondary 
education before reunification in 1990. In this sample, university students were completely 
socialized and schooled either in a planned economy or in a free market economy. To address 
the problem of selection into universities, we restrict, in a third step, our sample to mobile 
students at West German universities, that is, those who left their “familiar” environment in 
either West or East Germany to attend a university located in West Germany.29 By focusing 
on mobile East and West German students, we deal with a potential bias that could arise from 
the fact that mobility might be related to the presence or absence of other entrepreneurial 
characteristics, for example, risk aversion. This leaves us with the following estimation equa-
tion for the different samples of university students: 
imutimutimuttumimut XDI ??????? ??????? 21  
where the dependent variable imutI  is a binary variable that equals unity if student i studying 
major m at university u in survey wave t reports that he or she certainly wants to become an 
entrepreneur and zero otherwise. University student entrepreneurial intention is our “as-close-
as-possible” measure for entrepreneurial endowments. The explanatory variable imutD  is a 
dummy variable that equals unity if the university student was socialized and schooled in a 
German state formerly belonging to the GDR and zero if he or she went to school in West 
Germany. The matrix imutX  includes a set of individual characteristics and family background 
variables (cf. Parker, 2004 for an extensive overview). A detailed list of all control variables 
                                                 
28 Note that we exclude students who completed secondary school in a country other than Germany from the 
whole analysis. 
29 Note that West Germany is far from being equally familiar to West German students as there are considerable 
cultural differences between German regions, the result of Germany being heavily fragmented until 1870 (cf. 
Falck et al., 2010). 
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is provided in Table A1 of the Appendix. Finally, we include a whole set of major fixed ef-
fects m? , university fixed effects u? , and survey wave fixed effects t? ; imut?  is an error term. 
As our outcome variable is binary, we use both probit and linear probability models. We clus-
ter our standard errors at the university level (cf. Moulton, 1986). 
4.4 Data 
The data for our empirical analyses are derived from a survey regularly conducted among 
university students in Germany. The survey is part of a research project on the situation of 
students at German universities (Studiensituation und studentische Orientierung). The project 
is based at the University of Konstanz and is supported by Germany’s Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research. The entire dataset is comprised of 10 waves of recurring surveys of 
university students. The university panel started in the winter term 1982/83 and was repeated 
every second or third year, with the most recent wave carried out during the 2006/07 winter 
term. Overall, the survey has 87,946 observations from 29 German universities, technical uni-
versities, and universities of applied sciences and covers questions about the study progress, 
work and learning habits, leisure time activities, attitudes, and job preferences. Included ques-
tions provide information about student family background and schooling. Information about 
demographic variables, such as age or gender, is also available. Altogether, the survey thus 
draws a rich picture of the conditions and perspectives of students at German universities. 
Descriptive statistics of our sample and the main variables of interest are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  
all  
students raised in FRG raised in GDR 
Observations 23,543 17,953 5,514 
Share of students with entrepreneurial intentions 22.82 23.52 20.53 
Age (mean) 24.99 25.59 23.04 
Share of female students 41.22 38.95 48.58 
Average number of children 0.102 0.102 0.100 
Marital status 
   married 7.3 7.56 6.44 
single, with permanent partner 49.71 49.99 49.01 
single, without permanent partner 42.23 41.63 43.94 
widowed/divorced 0.77 0.82 0.60 
Share with at least one self-employed parent 24.47 25.81 20.22 
Term (mean) 6.442 6.880 4.989 
Majors 
   linguistic and cultural studies 2,950 2,367 570 
psychology 420 324 95 
pedagogic 1,653 1,226 422 
sport 254 165 89 
law 1,735 1,176 556 
social sciences 545 435 107 
economic sciences 3,582 2,691 879 
mathematics & natural science 3,497 2,878 616 
medicine 1,823 1,381 440 
agronomy, forestry, nutrition science 480 341 135 
engineering 5,700 4,259 1,427 
arts 655 546 109 
other 163 112 49 
Survey waves 
   wave 5: 1992/93 8,709 6,61 2,053 
wave 6: 1994/95 8,035 6,262 1,759 
wave 7: 1997/98 6,799 5,081 1,702 
We focus on the three waves (Wave 5–7) conducted after reunification in 1990, which were 
collected in winter terms 1992/93, 1994/95, and 1997/98, giving us 23,542 observations. We 
restrict our analysis to this period to ensure that students educated in East German schools 
experienced at least several years of organized socialist treatment. Since we want to exploit 
the rich portfolio of possible control variables, we address a number of missing values in our 
multivariate regressions by imputing missing values of the control variables; replace missing 
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values with the variable mean in the case of metric variables; and creating an additional cate-
gory for missing values in the case of categorical variables. Values are not imputed for either 
our dependent variable or for our explanatory variable of interest: the East-West indicator or 
for the university site, which we use to calculate cluster-robust standard errors. As this proce-
dure does not directly effect the estimations of the coefficients of the respective variables, it 
enables us to make use of the full sample. Table 2 shows the students’ distribution among the 
23 universities (U) and universities of applied sciences (UAS) contained in the dataset. 
Table 2: Observations by University 
 all students raised in FRG raised in GDR 
U Berlin (TU) 1,556 1,230 324 
U Bochum 1,548 1,524 20 
U Essen 1,196 1,188 5 
U Frankfurt 1,506 1,472 29 
U Freiburg 1,779 1,744 31 
U Hamburg 2,216 2,160 53 
U Karlsruhe 1,842 1,815 24 
U München (LMU) 2,059 2,036 22 
UAS Coburg 421 364 57 
UAS Essen 299 290 6 
UAS Frankfurt 477 469 8 
UAS Hamburg 874 852 18 
UAS Kiel 494 476 17 
UAS Koblenz 416 407 9 
UAS München 1,201 1,179 15 
U Dresden 1,115 106 1,005 
U Leipzig 1,295 153 1,140 
U Magdeburg 687 35 647 
U Potsdam 435 99 334 
U Rostock 526 94 432 
UAS Erfurt 209 37 172 
UAS Magdeburg 198 23 173 
UAS Stralsund 149 18 128 
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4.5 Results 
Following the three-fold strategy introduced in Section 4.3, we initially estimate the effect of 
socialization and schooling in East and West Germany, respectively, where we consider being 
partly raised in East Germany before reunification as non-entrepreneurial treatment. The up-
per part of Table 3 provides our basic estimations where we stepwise include controls. All 
estimations include university fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects, and major fixed ef-
fects. We report both probit (Table 3a) and linear probability (Table 3b) specifications. 
Table 3a: Probit Estimations for the Whole Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All Students 
      
Raised in GDR -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.054*** -0.044*** -0.042*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Controls:      
  Education no yes no no yes 
  Socialization no no yes no yes 
  Job Experience & Perspectives  no no no yes yes 
  Individual Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes 
      
No. of Obs. 22195 22195 22195 22195 22195 
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.076 0.071 0.070 0.105 
  
All Students Who Finished School Before 1990 
      
Raised in GDR -0.082*** -0.073*** -0.090*** -0.077*** -0.073*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) 
Controls:      
  Education no yes no no yes 
  Socialization no no yes no yes 
  Job Experience & Perspectives no no no yes yes 
  Individual Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes 
      
No. of Obs. 10733 10733 10733 10733 10733 
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.073 0.073 0.075 0.104 
Notes: The table reports probit models with marginal effects at the sample mean. The dependent variable, entre-
preneurial intention, is unity if a student reports that he or she definitely wants to become a self-employed entre-
preneur or freelancer, zero otherwise. All specifications include university fixed effects, survey wave fixed ef-
fects, and major fixed effects. The control variables are described in more detail in Table A1 in the appendix. 
Cluster (university) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *denotes 10% level of significance, 
**denotes 5% level of significance, ***denotes 1% level of significance. 
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Table 3b: OLS Estimations for the Whole Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All Students 
      
Raised in GDR -0.052*** -0.052*** 0.054*** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Controls:      
  Education no yes no no yes 
  Socialization no no yes no yes 
  Job Experience & Perspectives no no no yes yes 
  Individual Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes 
      
No. of Obs. 22195 22195 22195 22195 22195 
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.075 0.076 0.074 0.106 
  
All Students Who Finished School Before 1990 
      
Raised in GDR -0.077*** -0.068*** -0.085*** -0.074*** -0.071*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
Controls:      
  Education no yes no no Yes 
  Socialization no no yes no yes 
  Job Experience & Perspectives no no no yes yes 
  Individual Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes 
      
No. of Obs. 10733 10733 10733 10733 10733 
R2 0.062 0.074 0.077 0.079 0.105 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimation results where the dependent variable, entrepreneurial intention, is unity 
if a student reports that he or she definitely wants to become a self-employed entrepreneur or freelancer, zero 
otherwise. All specifications include university fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects, and major fixed effects. 
The control variables are described in more detail in Table A1. Cluster (university) robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *denotes 10% level of significance, **denotes 5% level of significance, ***denotes 1% 
level of significance. 
In both panels of Table 3, Column (1) considers only those individual characteristics related 
to demographic variables of the respondents. The results suggest that East German students 
are significantly less likely to report entrepreneurial intentions than their West German coun-
terparts. In a next step, in Column (2), we add controls for the students’ previous and current 
education. Among other things, we control for grades in the high school certificate, grades in 
intermediate examinations, and assess whether the respondents started their university studies 
immediately after finishing secondary school. In Column (3), we control for the student so-
cialization. Specifically, we control for parental schooling and parental current occupation. In 
Column (4), we estimate a model containing control variables for the students’ previous job 
experiences and future job prospects. For instance, we add a variable on prior occupation, 
current occupation, and topic of study, as well as perceived problems in the future job market. 
Finally, in Column (5), we estimate a fully specified model containing all the control varia-
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bles mentioned above. Across all specifications, the treatment effect remains robust, i.e., it 
shows a significantly negative effect of socialist socialization and schooling on university 
student entrepreneurial intention. 
In the bottom part of Table 3, we run the same regressions conducted in the upper part of the 
table, but focusing on the subgroup of students who completed secondary school while Ger-
many still was divided and thus received either pure socialist or pure libertarian schooling and 
socialization. We expect these results differ from the whole sample of students that also in-
cludes East German students who received a mixed education, or, in other words, who re-
ceived at least some entrepreneurial treatment. Indeed, the impact of socialist education is 
stronger for those students who went to school exclusively in the GDR. Consequently the so-
cialist treatment effect is smaller for those who at least had some years of schooling in reuni-
fied Germany. 
In Table 4, we repeat the estimations from Table 3 for the subsample of students in West 
German university locations. Hence we exclude students at East German universities since the 
specific economic environment in the formerly socialist part of Germany might affect their 
entrepreneurial intentions. Moreover, we concentrate on those mobile students who finished 
school in East or West Germany and chose to attend a West German university located away 
from home. This procedure should mitigate the bias arising from comparing mobile students 
from East Germany to students in West Germany who did not move because mobility is pos-
sibly related to the presence or absence of certain entrepreneurial characteristics, for example, 
risk aversion. We use the full set of control variables for all specifications and report probit 
results (left panel) and linear probability model results (right panel) in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Probit and OLS Estimations for the Subsample of West German University Locations 
  Probit   OLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
All Students in the West 
Raised in GDR -0.062*** -0.072*** -0.063*** 
 
-0.063*** -0.073*** -0.063*** 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Controls: 
         Education yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
  Socialization yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
  Job Exp. & 
  Perspectives yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
  Individual  
  Characteristics 
yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
No. of Obs. 13033 7618 5340 
 
13033 7618 5349 
Pseudo R2 0.099 0.102 0.110 
 
0.100 0.104 0.111 
Students in the West Who Finished School Before 1990 
Raised in GDR -0.074*** -0.075*** -0.067*** 
 
-0.071*** -0.073*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Controls: 
         Education yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
  Socialization yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
  Job Exp. &  
  Perspectives yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
  Individual  
  Characteristics 
yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
No. of Obs. 6834 4114 3004 
 
6834 4119 3009 
(Pseudo) R2 0.097 0.105 0.117   0.099 0.106 0.119 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported at the sample mean. The dependent variable, entrepreneurial intention, is 
unity if a student reports that he or she definitely wants to become a self-employed entrepreneur or freelancer, 
zero otherwise. All specifications include university fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects, and major fixed 
effects. The control variables are described in more detail in Table A1. Cluster (university) robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses *denotes 10% level of significance, **denotes 5% level of significance, ***denotes 
1% level of significance. 
We consider different measures for mobility. Column (1) considers all mobile students at 
West German university locations who report that the university is not in their hometown. In a 
second step, we consider those students who report that they are at least 50 kilometers away 
from their hometown and, as shown in Column (2), the effect becomes stronger. In a third 
step, we retain only West German students who went to a different federal state to attend uni-
versity (Column (3)). Here, we find an effect similar to that reported in Column (1). Overall, 
the results do not significantly change with a focus on those students who completed a pure 
GDR socialist education before the 1990 reunification. The results are presented in the lower 
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part of Table 4. For this group, the coefficients are again somewhat higher. Continuing to find 
significant effects of schooling and socialization in the subsample of mobile East and West 
German university students at the same West German university suggests that selection into 
universities is not predominant in our analysis. 
Given that our results remain extremely robust to all specifications and control variables, we 
are confident that we can interpret the effect of being schooled and socialized in a non-
entrepreneurial environment as having a causal effect on the entrepreneurial intentions of uni-
versity students. Being raised in a non-entrepreneurial environment decreases the likelihood 
of having entrepreneurial intentions between around 4 and 7 percentage points. Given that the 
mean share of students with entrepreneurial intentions is about 23 percent, this effect is eco-
nomically important. Accordingly, we conclude that entrepreneurial education may indeed 
strengthen entrepreneurial endowments. When further distinguishing between the overall ef-
fect from socialization and the effect of schooling, we find that even a short period of school-
ing in a non-socialist regime increases the entrepreneurial intentions of university students, 
which again supports the idea that education in a market economy can have an impact on en-
trepreneurial intentions. Hence we conclude that education, either by parents, peers, or 
schools, can result in an enhancement of entrepreneurial endowments. 
4.6 Conclusions 
Our findings for a sample of German university students suggest that both socialization and 
schooling contribute to the development of entrepreneurial endowments that eventually im-
pact on student intention to become an entrepreneur. In an attempt to learn more about the 
relative importance of socialization and schooling, we use the quasi natural experiment result-
ing from the years around German reunification to consider the affect of pre-university educa-
tion on student entrepreneurial intention. Using surveys of university students who experi-
enced at least part of their secondary education under the socialist GDR regime and students 
from West Germany who were schooled under an education system that embraced the values 
of a market economy, we find significant differences in entrepreneurial intentions. Further-
more, East German students completing their secondary education before reunification in 
1990 have lower entrepreneurial intentions than those completing their secondary education 
after reunification. These results are robust for different specifications within groups of stu-
dents at West German universities where we stepwise exclude less alike students and, thus, 
rule out selection into university and related biases. 
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Our findings suggest that entrepreneurial intentions are, to some extent, determined endoge-
nously in the process of socialization and schooling. Our results further suggest that policy-
makers can influence entrepreneurial endowments via the schooling system. However, at this 
point, we can only confirm that changes in the education system might effect on entrepreneur-
ial endowments, but we cannot draw any conclusions about the most effective design for in-
creasing these endowments. Determining this requires further empirical research. 
The results from our study of the subsample of university students who finished their second-
ary education either in the GDR or in unified Germany, respectively, shows that teaching the 
values of a free market economy can affect the formation of entrepreneurial intentions, i.e., 
the interesting in becoming an entrepreneur. This initial finding makes us confident that a 
specialized entrepreneurship education could increase entrepreneurial endowments, i.e., de-
velop the preconditions necessary for the development of this desire. However, work on how 
entrepreneurial courses at school influence individual entrepreneurial intentions does not go 
beyond case studies and thus there is great scope for future research. Furthermore, the impact 
of entrepreneurship courses at universities must be investigated much more thoroughly.  
95 
 
5. Universities, Policies and Educational Effects on Entrepreneurial Pre-
ferences30 
5.1 Introduction 
From a humanist point of view universities are the strongholds of academic freedom and 
knowledge. But universities have probably always been seen as an instrument to foster eco-
nomic development as well, at least in modern times. Already in the 19th century policy plan-
ers in the US established land grant universities to induce economic growth by advancing 
agricultural techniques. Against the background of the Industrial Revolution, European coun-
tries built up a system of polytechnic universities to improve the education of engineers and 
scientists. Following the notions of Romer (1986), Krugman (1991) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), the role of universities as potential source of knowledge spillovers has at-
tracted the attention of policy makers again in the recent decades. Accordingly, governments 
around the world have implemented policies to facilitate the knowledge dissemination from 
universities to the private sector. Thus Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000, 110) speak of a 
“third mission” of academia, the “mission of economic development in addition to research 
and teaching”. 
One way in which universities can fulfill this mission is academic entrepreneurship. Indeed 
academic entrepreneurship can directly generate knowledge spillovers via university spin-
offs. There is ample evidence for the importance of university spin-offs for economic devel-
opment (c.f. Drucker and Goldstein, 2007). But entrepreneurship is very generally seen as 
driving force behind economic growth, and academics are a promising source for high-
technology start-ups in general (Fritsch, 2011b). In this sense universities might have a long-
dated impact on economic development not only by directly generating start-ups, but also by 
educating the entrepreneurs of the future. Consequently policy programs for supporting aca-
demic entrepreneurship are plentiful (c.f. Kuratko, 2005; Katz, 2003). They do not only target 
university spin-offs but strive to create an “entrepreneurial spirit” at universities that should 
raise students’ awareness for entrepreneurial opportunities and get students’ interested in an 
occupation as entrepreneur, either directly after graduation or in the future. Even though con-
crete measures for entrepreneurship education at universities are therefore numerous, there is 
little empirical evidence yet on the effectiveness of such measures.  
                                                 
30 This chapter is based on Gold, Robert (2012), Entrepreneurship Education for Academics: How Universities 
Affect Students’ Entrepreneurial Intentions, mimeo. 
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This chapter evaluates the effect universities have on their students’ entrepreneurial inten-
tions, i.e. the students’ propensity to aspire an occupation as entrepreneur. This question has 
become prominent since more and more universities have established measures of entrepre-
neurship education to support academic entrepreneurship. In Germany, the prevalent 
measures are the introduction of chairs for entrepreneurship and the participation in the feder-
ally funded “EXIST” program for entrepreneurship support at universities. I focus on these 
measures and the effects a university as organizational entity has on the body of students en-
rolled at this university. Using survey data on up to 27 German universities I assess whether 
universities that apply any or both of the most common measures for entrepreneurship educa-
tion affect their students’ attitude towards the question whether they would like to be perma-
nently employed as entrepreneur in the future in a diff-in-diff framework. Exploiting a com-
prehensive set of individual level control variables and additionally controlling for time invar-
iant and time variant differences in the institutional framework I find university effects on the 
students’ ability to express an opinion on whether they would take entrepreneurship as occu-
pational alternative into account, on the students’ overall interest in an entrepreneurial occu-
pation as well as an influence on the students’ propensity to have concrete entrepreneurial 
intentions. However, my analysis also reveals significant differences between the effects of 
the different measures applied.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 derives this chapter’s con-
tribution from the literature on university effects on entrepreneurship. Section 5.3 explains the 
empirical strategy with regard to the measures of entrepreneurship education under investiga-
tion. Section 5.4 introduces the data. Section 5.5 presents and discusses the empirical results. 
Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2 University Effects on Entrepreneurship 
The relevance of entrepreneurship for economic development is widely acknowledged (c.f. 
Parker, 2009). The major purpose of entrepreneurship is to sustain an innovative economic 
environment, either by directly introducing new products to the market (c.f. Van Praag and 
Versloot, 2008) or by exerting competitive pressure on incumbent firms (Aghion et al., 2009). 
Academic entrepreneurship is of particular interest in this respect, since academics are seen as 
valuable source for high-tech firm entry. Hence academic entrepreneurship could be a driving 
force behind the process of creative destruction as described by Schumpeter (1942, 83; c.f. 
Aghion and Howitt, 1998; 1992). Indeed, academic entrepreneurship is recognized as one 
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means by which knowledge created at universities can be transferred to economic use in the 
industry (Mueller, 2006). Accordingly, many empirical studies focus on university spin-offs 
when analyzing academic entrepreneurship and the relevance of universities for (regional) 
economic growth (Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008). 
Universities support economic performance in several ways (Drucker and Goldstein, 2007). 
Against notions of the “knowledge based economy”, their role as knowledge source has at-
tracted the interest of scholars as well as practitioners. Of course there exist various channels 
by which the public knowledge embodied in universities can be transferred to private use. 
Universities engage in collaborative research and generate patents and licenses (Henderson et 
al., 1998), thus providing core assets for corporate innovations (Mansfield and Lee, 1996). 
Above all, they provide well educated labor force that has been trained with state-of-the-art 
technologies as major input to the economy. With all these channels universities potentially 
generate knowledge spillovers that foster innovation and growth (Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996; Acs et al., 1992; Jaffe, 1989). In this respect university spin-offs, i.e. the creation of 
firms by academic staff employed at a university, are a very direct way to bridge the gap be-
tween basic research and its application. 
This facet of academic entrepreneurship has gained major attention, but university spin-offs 
are not the only way by which academics can become entrepreneur. Several academics decide 
to start an enterprise years after they have been employed in wage work (Mueller, 2010; Acs 
2008; c.f. Evans and Leighton, 1989). In many cases it could be very reasonable to train one’s 
own skills in wage work before starting an entrepreneurial endeavor. After all, the entrepre-
neurial return crucially depends on the least developed skill (Lazear, 2004) thus requiring 
successful entrepreneurs to be “jacks of all trades” with a balanced set of abilities (Lazear, 
2005). Hence whenever an academic self-selects into entrepreneurship, university education 
might affect this decision since it lays down the qualifications for future occupational choices 
(c.f. Unger et al., 2011). Apart from inseminating skills and technical knowledge, getting stu-
dents interested in entrepreneurship is an essential feature of entrepreneurial education at uni-
versities. For instance, creating “entrepreneurial awareness” is a major goal of many entrepre-
neurship courses. Anyhow, entrepreneurship courses must not necessarily lead to an increase 
in the participants’ willingness to become an entrepreneur (Oosterbeek et al., 2010). In gen-
eral, neither the goals nor the means of courses on entrepreneurship are very well evaluated 
(c.f. Astebro and Bazzazian, 2011). However, entrepreneurship education does not exclusive-
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ly target students enrolled in entrepreneurship courses. Many universities apply measures of 
information and consulting on entrepreneurship that potentially address a large body of stu-
dents from different fields of study. This is relevant, since particularly science students but 
also engineers are regarded to be a promising source for high-tech entrepreneurship (c.f. 
Souitaris et al., 2007) . 
This chapter analyzes university effects on the students’ overall attitude towards entrepre-
neurship as occupational alternative. Thus I do not investigate if the measures applied lead to 
an increase in the number of academics that become entrepreneur. But it is not farfetched to 
assume that having an interest in entrepreneurship and even more having entrepreneurial in-
tentions are a prerequisite for future academic entrepreneurship of university graduates. Falck 
et al. (2010) show that entrepreneurial intentions expressed already during adolescence are a 
good predictor for future entrepreneurship. In general, measuring university effects on the 
decision to become an entrepreneur would require a long term study, since this occupational 
choice might occur years after graduation. Ideally a study like that would identify new firms 
that would not have been founded if the founder would not have been treated with the respec-
tive measures of entrepreneurship education, and additionally control for the start-ups suc-
cess. For the measures at hand, the corresponding data is not available yet. Thus, I eventually 
investigate in how far universities succeed in raising their students’ awareness of an occupa-
tion as entrepreneur, an effect that would be in line with the goals of entrepreneurship educa-
tion – and that bears the potential for affecting the students’ occupational choice anytime in 
their life cycle. 
In the end the self-selection of academics into entrepreneurship is the result of an occupation-
al choice of these individuals. This choice is probably influenced by their genetic predisposi-
tions, possibly leading to a situation where “natural born entrepreneurs” follow their genetic 
imprint and found their own enterprise (Nicolaou and Shane, 2009). More generally, it is like-
ly that some natural endowments with regard to skills but also with regard to character or 
preferences (Rauch and Frese, 2007; Beugelsdijk and Noorderhaven, 2005; Mueller and 
Thomas, 2001; Steward et al. 1998; Brandstätter 1997) affect the occupational choice people 
make. But it is not very reasonable to assume that this choice is purely exogenous. It is much 
more likely that the formation of occupational preferences is a process related to the accumu-
lation of skills and the development of individual preferences and character traits (Roberts et 
al., 2003; Robins et al., 2001). Consequently, the desire to become an entrepreneur could be 
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influenced by educational measures, and an academic’s desire to become an entrepreneur 
should be influenced by measures of entrepreneurship education employed at the universities 
s/he visited.  
This raises two interrelated questions: Can some policy maker influence people’s entrepre-
neurial intentions? And, if yes: should she do so? This second question goes far beyond the 
interest of this study. But seemingly entrepreneurship support, specifically the support of aca-
demic entrepreneurship, is a policy issue in European countries. Policies are designed to 
equalize a suspected undersupply of entrepreneurs, particularly of innovative entrepreneurs in 
a Schumpeterian sense. One measure to increase the supply of entrepreneurs is arguably edu-
cation, i.e. the training of skills that are relevant for future entrepreneurs (c.f. Unger et al., 
2011) as well as adjustments to the curricula in order to arouse individual’s interest in entre-
preneurship as occupational alternative to wage work. So very generally, entrepreneurship 
education should help to improve the selection of individuals into entrepreneurship. Conse-
quently, this could lead to a situation where more academics self-select into entrepreneurship 
and contribute to innovation and growth. But it might very well be that not the number of en-
trepreneurs but their quality justifies policy intervention. In principle, one would optimally 
like to see a situation where those academics select themselves into entrepreneurship that can 
use their endowments more productive in self-employment than in wage work. This relates to 
the individual occupational choice from a micro perspective. An individual should choose 
self-employment if this occupation maximizes its income over the lifetime, particularly as 
compared to an activity as an employed person. This conjecture allows for the inclusion of 
non-pecuniary utility gains from entrepreneurship, e.g. some benefits from the very fact of 
being “one’s own boss” that might increase entrepreneurs’ life satisfaction (Benz and Frey 
2008; Hamilton, 2000). Apparently, these potential gains from entrepreneurship are difficult 
to discount for an individual ex ante. Anyhow, entrepreneurship education could help students 
to better predict benefits and challenges of entrepreneurial endeavors, thus helping to decrease 
the uncertainty related to occupational choices. 
There is not much evidence yet on the effects of entrepreneurship education at universities. 
Oosterbeek et al. (2010) show that a Dutch program for entrepreneurship education had no 
effect on the students’ self-assessed entrepreneurial skills and that this program even de-
creased their intention to become an entrepreneur. The authors speculate that this might be 
due to a formation of more realistic expectations on entrepreneurship. But Oosterbeck et al. 
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explicitly point out that their results are difficult to generalize, since the data stems from only 
one school. Falck et al. (2011) show that pre-university education significantly affects stu-
dents’ entrepreneurial attitudes. This  chapter contributes to this literature by examining the 
effects of different measures of entrepreneurship education applied at German universities. 
5.3 Measures of Entrepreneurship Education at Universities 
Entrepreneurship has led quite a miserable existence at German universities both in research 
and in teaching for a long time. But starting in the mid 90es, the issue became more and more 
prominent. On the one hand, the academic community became interested in entrepreneurship 
as research field. Consequently, there were also efforts to include entrepreneurship into the 
academic curricula. This development was led by the FGF (Foerderkreis 
Gruendungsforschung), an (academic) society for the advancement of entrepreneurship re-
search, education and policy in Germany. But the private sector supported this development 
as well, e.g. by (initially) endowing chairs for entrepreneurship. As a result, more and more 
universities established chairs for entrepreneurship, usually at economics or at engineering 
departments (FGF, 2008). Moreover, policy makers became aware of the relevance of entre-
preneurship for the knowledge transfer from research into economic use. Thus against the 
background of the “High-Tech-Strategy for Germany”, the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology introduced the EXIST (Existenzgruendungen aus der Wissenschaft / universi-
ty-based business start-ups) program in 1998 to improve the “entrepreneurial culture” at Ger-
man universities and to increase the number of academic start-ups (BMWI, 2006). This simul-
taneous development of establishing more and more chairs for entrepreneurship at German 
universities and the building up of a supportive infrastructure induced by EXIST can be used 
to assess whether universities that apply those measures succeed in affecting students’ attitude 
towards entrepreneurship as occupational alternative.  
Universities can potentially affect their students’ attitudes towards different occupations in 
various ways. First and foremost teaching can be expected to have an effect on these attitudes. 
Courses on entrepreneurship facilitate certain skills and knowledge that can be helpful in an 
entrepreneurial endeavor, thus potentially lowering the entry barrier into entrepreneurship. 
Apparently, the existence of a chair for entrepreneurship is a sufficient condition for the exist-
ence of entrepreneurship courses at a university. But it is by no means necessary. Certainly 
other chairs can offer entrepreneurship courses as well. Anyhow, the introduction of a specific 
chair for entrepreneurship represents a long term interest in this topic. Above all, it involves 
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some financial commitment of the university to establish a chair to incorporate entrepreneur-
ship into the university’s curriculum. Thus chairs for entrepreneurship are a way to sustaina-
bly implement entrepreneurship education since they tie some profound knowledge on the 
issue to a university. Moreover, chairs usually offer interdisciplinary lectures and events on 
entrepreneurship that are not part of the mandatory curriculum and address a larger auditori-
um of students. For instance chairs often engage in business plan seminars or invite external 
speakers for talks that are not exclusively attended by students enrolled in entrepreneurship 
classes. Accordingly, if a chair for entrepreneurship exists at a university, students are poten-
tially treated with information on chances and challenges related to entrepreneurship. This 
should help them to update prior beliefs on entrepreneurial occupations and to make up their 
minds about whether entrepreneurship could be an occupational alternative for themselves. 
The first chair for entrepreneurship at a German university was established in 1998 (FGF, 
1998). In the same year, the EXIST program started with a competition where universities 
could apply for funding with proposals on how to implement supportive measures for entre-
preneurship at their respective sites (BMWI, 2006). In the following years EXIST became a 
driving force behind the efforts of many universities to include entrepreneurship education 
into their portfolio. As diverse as the specific initiatives within the EXIST program might be, 
they usually include the implementation of an information office on entrepreneurship at the 
university campus, the organization of informational events on entrepreneurship and the pro-
vision of a network of internal and external partners to support academic entrepreneurship. 
Again, the participation in the EXIST program is no prerequisite to support wannabe entre-
preneurs at universities. But the program structure requires a certain institutional commitment 
to entrepreneurship education thus indicating that any participating university indeed is will-
ing to address the issue sustainably. As compared to the chairs for entrepreneurship, EXIST 
usually offers a broader scale and scope of events including general information as well as 
more specific coaching right up to concrete consulting of academic start ups. Moreover, EX-
IST typically involves the establishment of regional networks including partners outside the 
university (c.f. Minniti, 2005; Shane and Cable, 2003). Consequently EXIST more generally 
addresses the entire body of students while chairs usually have a stronger focus on certain 
faculties. Apart from the informational issues, EXIST provides concrete start-up advice, a 
feature not necessarily offered by chairs for entrepreneurship. Thus I expect some differences 
in the measures’ effects. 
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Both measures, the introduction of chairs for entrepreneurship and the participation in the 
EXIST program, relate to the most important dimensions of entrepreneurship education at 
German universities. The first dimension refers to teaching, i.e. the imparting of knowledge 
and skills that might be relevant for funding and for running a firm (Davidson and Honig, 
2003; Bates, 1990). The second dimension relates to supportive services for students interest-
ed in becoming an entrepreneur, particularly consulting, financial aid and the provision of 
potential partners. Both measures very basically imply an information function. As compared 
to universities that do not engage in entrepreneurship education, it is more likely that at uni-
versities that have a chair for entrepreneurship or that participate in the EXIST program the 
students get into contact with the topic “entrepreneurship”, a treatment that might affect their 
attitude towards entrepreneurship as occupational alternative.  
Both the establishment of chairs for entrepreneurship as well as the introduction of the EXIST 
program virtually took place simultaneously at German universities, yet not uniformly. In my 
analysis I will make use of the time structure related to the introduction of these measures for 
entrepreneurship education. In the course of time I observe universities that apply none of the 
measures, chairs, EXIST – or both measures at once. This group of universities that apply 
both measures is of special interest for my analysis. It is a clear indication of a strategic focus 
on entrepreneurship if a university has a chair for entrepreneurship and additionally partici-
pates in the EXIST program, since this involves significant financial and personnel effort. 
Thus I expect those “entrepreneurial universities” to have a particularly pronounced effect on 
students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship. 
I subdivide attitudes towards entrepreneurship into three different outcomes, i.e. opinion on 
entrepreneurship (the student can make any statement on whether s/he would consider entre-
preneurship as occupational alternative), interest in entrepreneurship (the student makes any 
positive statement), and entrepreneurial intentions (the student states that s/he certainly wants 
to become entrepreneur). Furthermore, I distinguish three different types of universities ac-
cording to the measures of entrepreneurship education they apply. First, there are universities 
that have a chair for entrepreneurship. Second, there are universities that participate in the 
EXIST program. Third, there are universities that apply both measures, i.e. that participate in 
the EXIST program and simultaneously have a chair for entrepreneurship. Universities that 
apply none of the measures form the control group. Since universities apply different 
measures at different points in time, the universities’ classification is dynamic. But my data 
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ensures that in the baseline year of analysis (winter term 1997/98) none of the universities 
observed applies any of the measures yet. 
Overall, I expect all three measures, i.e. chairs for entrepreneurship, participation in the EX-
IST program and the combination of both, to affect students’ attitude towards entrepreneur-
ship as occupational alternative. Particularly, I expect all measures to increase the probability 
that students express an opinion on whether they would like to become an entrepreneur, either 
positive or negative. All measures should increase the information students have on entrepre-
neurship, thus they all should help students to make up their minds on the question if entre-
preneurship could be an occupational alternative for themselves (c.f. Graevenitz et al, 2010). 
Furthermore, I expect all measures to be positively related to the students’ propensity to be 
interested in entrepreneurship as occupational alternative, i.e. to have a positive opinion on 
this issue. All measures are designated to increase the “entrepreneurial spirit” at universities, 
hence I assume that they encourage a couple of students to take a future as entrepreneur into 
account. Eventually, I expect all measures to affect the students’ entrepreneurial intentions, 
i.e. the probability that students state that they certainly want to become entrepreneur in the 
future. Anyhow, I have no clear prediction on the direction of this effect, since any valuable 
information on entrepreneurship should also lead to a situation where some students give up 
unfeasible business ideas. Consequently, the direction of the university effect on entrepre-
neurial intentions crucially depends on the quality of the information provided as well as the 
students’ predisposition. Finally, I expect universities that apply both measures to have the 
strongest effect on students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship. 
5.4 Data 
I use data from the students’ survey of the research group for university research at the Uni-
versity of Konstanz (Studiensituation und studentische Orientierung) to measure students’ 
attitude towards entrepreneurship. This survey regularly asks students at up to 27 German 
universities about their personal situation, study experience and job orientation. The survey 
started in winter term 1982/83, the last survey took place in winter term 2009/10 but is not 
available yet. Overall, approximately 96,000 students from all fields of study participated in 
eleven survey waves. The survey is funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Re-
search. I use data from the last wave before the introduction of the first chair for entrepreneur-
ship in Germany conducted in winter term 1997/98 (wave 7) to the last wave available con-
ducted in winter term 2006/07 (wave 10). This ensures that in the baseline year none of the 
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universities has established any of the measures of entrepreneurship education under investi-
gation. Furthermore, wave 7 is the first survey year that explicitly asks for the students’ will-
ingness to become an entrepreneur and not only for its willingness to be self-employed in the 
future. Waves 7 to 10 were conducted every three years at up to 27 full universities and uni-
versities of applied sciences all across Germany, where the same 22 universities are contained 
in each wave.31 This leaves me with 33,726 observations from four consecutive survey waves.  
Figure 1: University sites and number of observations differentiated by university type.  
Wave 9 of student survey conducted in winter term 2003/04.  
 
Notes: AG Hochschulforschung, University of Konstanz, in BMBF (2005, 9). The map shows the 27 universities 
contained in the dataset at the maximum. 
                                                 
31 I did the same analysis with this balanced sample of 22 universities. Since the results are quasi identical, I use 
the full, unbalanced sample of 27 universities. 
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I am interested in the students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship as occupational alternative. 
Each survey contains the question “In which area do you want to be permanently employed in 
the future?” with one subcategory “entrepreneur (own firm/trade/services)”. Answer options 
are “Yes, for sure”, “Yes, perhaps”, “Rather not” and “Certainly not” with an additional op-
tion “I do not know”.32  Overall, 33,024 out of 33,726 students answered this survey question. 
I use this question on entrepreneurship as occupational alternative to construct three outcome 
variables. First, I investigate whether the different measures of entrepreneurship education at 
universities affect the probability that students do have an opinion on entrepreneurship at all. 
This outcome variable is zero if a student answers “I do not know” on the given question and 
unity otherwise. Second, I assess whether the university measures affect the students probabil-
ity to have an interest in entrepreneurship as occupational alternative. This outcome variable 
is unity if the student chooses a positive answer, i.e. “Yes, perhaps” or “Yes, certainly”, and 
zero otherwise. In a final step I focus on university effects on students’ entrepreneurial inten-
tions. Here the outcome variable is unity if the student answers that s/he certainly wants to be 
permanently employed as entrepreneur in the future, and zero otherwise. Table 1 presents 
some descriptive statistics on the full dataset and the three groups of students that correspond 
to the previously defined outcome variables. 
                                                 
32 These are 5 distinct answer categories, not different values on a Likert scale. 
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Table 1: Descriptives 
  
All Observations 
with opinion on 
entrepreneurship 
with interest in 
entrepreneurship 
with entrepreneur-
ial intentions 
 
Number of observations 33,726 30780 15305 4080 
 
Wave 7 (1997/98) 7,271 (21.56%) 6,690 (21.73%) 3,615 (23.62%) 1,115 (27.33%) 
 
Wave 8 (2000/01) 8,130 (24.11%) 7,455 (24.22%) 3,781 (24.70%) 1,105 (27.08%) 
 
Wave 9 (2003/04) 9,975 (29.58%) 9,021 (29.31%) 4,398 (28.74%) 1,201 (29.44%) 
 
Wave 10 (2006/07) 8,350 (24.76%) 7,614 (24.74%) 3,511 (22.94%) 659 (16.15%) 
 
Field of studies: 
   
 
  linguistics and cultural stud. 5,303 (15.79%) 4,708 (15.35%) 1,507 (9.88%) 307 (7.54%) 
 
  psychology 745 (2.22%) 661 (2.16%) 267 (1.75%) 73 (1.79%) 
 
  pedagogy and social issues 2,815 (8.38%) 2,473 (8.06%) 812 (5.32%) 151 (3.71%) 
 
  sports 465 (1.38%) 425 (1.39%) 210 (1.38%) 48 (1.18%) 
 
  jurisprudence 2,036 (6.06%) 1,888 (6.16%) 925 (6.06%) 236 (5.80%) 
 
  social science 1,832 (5.45%) 1,693 (5.52%) 822 (5.39%) 205 (5.04%) 
 
  maths and natural science 5,433 (16.17%) 4,979 (16.23%) 2,321 (15.22%) 545 (13.39%) 
 
  Medicine 2,682 (7.98%) 2,280 (7.43%) 773 (5.07%) 215 (5.28%) 
 
  agronomy, forestry, nutrition 684 (2.04%) 645 (2.10%) 430 (2.82%) 158 (3.88%) 
 
  engineering 5,582 (16.62%) 5,271 (17.19%) 3,484 (22.84%) 975 (23.96%) 
 
  arts and music  1,052 (3.13%) 958 (3.12%) 466 (3.06%) 125 (3.07%) 
 
  economic sciences 4,584 (13.65%) 4,353 (14.19%) 3,067 (20.11%) 992 (24.37%) 
 
  misc. 379 (1.13%) 336 (1.10%) 168 (1.10%) 40 (0.98%) 
 
Academical semester (mean) 7.33 7.34 7.15 7.17 
 
Age (mean) 24.68 24.62 24.61 24.88 
 
Female 18,053 (53.68%) 16,158 (52.61%) 6,703 (43.90%) 1,600 (39.28%) 
 
Marital status: 
   
 
  married 2,089 (6.22%) 1,843 (6.01%) 831 (5.45%) 254 (6.24%) 
 
  single with perm. partner 17,442 (51.94%) 15,951 (52.00%) 7,900 (51.79%) 2,168 (53.29%) 
 
  single w/o permanent partner 13,819 (41.15%) 12,669 (41.30%) 6,421 (42.09%) 1,603 (39.41%) 
 
  widowed/divorced 231 (0.69%) 210 (0.68%) 102 (0.67%) 43 (1.06%) 
 
With children 2,070 (6.15%) 1,817 (5.91%) 843 (5.51%) 264 (6.48%) 
 
Any parent entrepreneur 5,329 (16.17%) 4,883 (16.20%) 2,963 (19.77%) 952 (23.89%) 
 
At universities with chair  10,211 (30.28%) 9,327 (30.30%) 4,724 (30.87%) 1,185 (29.04%) 
 
At EXIST universities 10,774 (31.95%) 9,802 (31.85%) 4,560 (29.79%) 1,004 (24.61%) 
 
At EXIST universities with chair 
for entrepreneurship 5,338 (15.83%) 4,866 (15.81%) 2,345 (15.32%) 510 (12.50%) 
Notes: Table presents number of observations for the full sample (Column 1) and the subsamples of students that 
express an opinion on the question whether they would like to be permanently employed as entrepreneur in the 
future (Column 2), that have an interest in an entrepreneurial occupation (Column 3), and that certainly want to 
be permanently employed as entrepreneur in the future (Column 4). Share of observations given in parentheses 
refers to the overall number of observations (Line 1) by subsample. 
In order to assess university effects on the students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship, I con-
centrate on three measures of entrepreneurship education: I identify universities that have a 
chair for entrepreneurship and take this as one measure (chair). Moreover, I identify those 
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universities that participate in EXIST and take this as second measure (EXIST). Eventually, I 
include the interaction effect of both measures, i.e. the simultaneous existence of a chair for 
entrepreneurship and the participation in the EXIST program, as third measure for university 
effects (chair*EXIST). 
To identify chairs for entrepreneurship, I use the reports on chairs for entrepreneurship in 
German speaking countries published by the society for the promotion of entrepreneurship 
research (Foerderkreis Gruendungsforschung, FGF). Since 1998 the academic association 
FGF regularly publishes reports that enlist all chairs for entrepreneurship at universities in 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Liechtenstein (FGF 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2004; 
2008). In 1998, the FGF report accounts for two existing chairs for entrepreneurship in Ger-
many, while many more are already in the process of being established at that time. The latest 
report from November 2011 accounts for 86 chairs for entrepreneurship at German universi-
ties. I observe chairs for entrepreneurship for the first time in wave 8 (winter term 2000/01) at 
7 out of 23 universities. This share raises up to 13 out of 25 universities in my last wave 10 
(winter term 2006/07). 
Based on the FGF reports I cross-checked the year of a chairs’ implementation with the 
chairs’ web pages and, if necessary, contacted the chairs directly. So my identification of 
chairs for entrepreneurship principally rests on the FGF identification, but I made two adjust-
ments: First, the FGF lists the “Institute for Innovation Research, Technology Management 
and Entrepreneurship” at the Ludwigs-Maximilian-University Munich (LMU) as Entrepre-
neurship chair from 2004 on. In the earlier reports this chair which was established in Decem-
ber 1998 is accounted for as “non-explicit chair for entrepreneurship”. Anyhow, I count the 
LMU as having a chair for entrepreneurship from wave 8 on (2000/01). The chair already 
mentioned in the FGF report 1998 developed a strong focus on entrepreneurship over time, 
sothat ex post it seems to be appropriate to account for this chair as entrepreneurship chair 
from the beginning on. This is particularly true since in 2000 the privately endowed ODEON 
center for entrepreneurship opened in at Munich University with the collaboration of this 
chair, so that from wave 8 on their definitely existed an institutionalized entrepreneurship 
education at the LMU. Second, the chair for entrepreneurship and sales at the University of 
Applied Sciences Stralsund is enclosed in the FGF report 2008 for the first time. The chair 
was established in 1996 as chair for marketing and management and changed its name and its 
focus in 2000. Thus, I count this chair as entrepreneurship chair from wave 8 on. 
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Figure 2: Chairs for Entrepreneurship at German universities in 2008 
 
Notes: FGF (2008, 9). The map shows Universities and Universities of Applied Sciences (FH) that have estab-
lished or announced a chair for entrepreneurship, or are planning to do so in April 2008. 
I draw information on the universities participating in the EXIST program from the program’s 
homepage.33 EXIST started in 1998 with a competition. Universities were asked to apply to-
gether with regional partners for a five year funding to foster academic entrepreneurship in 
their region. Out of 109 applicants a jury eventually chose 5 winners that got public funding 
of more than 20 Mio. Euro to realize their plans (BMWI, 2006). This necessarily included the 
implementation of an organizational structure for entrepreneurship support at the participating 
universities. In my data I observe one of these EXIST I universities, i.e. the Technical Univer-
                                                 
33 www.exist.de, retrieved October 11th 2011. I cross checked the information provided by EXIST with the 
homepages of the participating universities and made no adjustments. 
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sity Dresden. In 2002 the jury chose additional 10 regional networks around universities for 
funding under EXIST II. The resulting 15 networks received more than 25 Mio. Euro (ibid.). 
My data contain observations from 8 universities apart from the TU Dresden that participated 
in this second EXIST period. Finally, in a third funding period starting 2006, EXIST support-
ed projects on fostering academic entrepreneurship at 47 universities with approximately 40 
Mio. Euro (BMWI, 2010). Accordingly, in my data all but 4 universities participate in EXIST 
III. Since 2010 there is a fourth EXIST funding period going on, but this is not relevant for 
my analysis anymore.  
Figure 3: Universities Participating in the EXIST Program by Program Phase. 
 
Notes: EXIST (2011). The map shows universities participating in the EXIST program by the last program phase 
they participated in. 
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Like the existence of a chair for entrepreneurship hints at the existence of an institutionalized 
teaching in entrepreneurship, a university’s participation in the EXIST program hints at the 
existence of an institutionalized entrepreneurship support at these sites. As compared to uni-
versities with chairs for entrepreneurship, EXIST universities are arguably more likely to 
spread information on entrepreneurship across single faculties’ boundaries. Eventually, there 
are some universities that apply both measures of entrepreneurship education. Apparently, 
these universities strive to thoroughly institutionalize expertise in the field of entrepreneurship 
and to develop a strategic focus on entrepreneurship education. Thus I include the interaction 
effect between the existence of a chair and the participation in EXIST as third measure to as-
sess whether universities that strongly engage in entrepreneurship education have a particular 
effect on students’ occupational attitude. Table 2 illustrates the universities’ classification 
with respect to the measures of entrepreneurship education they apply. 
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Table 2: Number of Observations and Measures of Entrepreneurship Education Applied by University 
University 
wave 
7 
wave 
8 
wave 
9 
wave 
10 University 
wave 
7 
wave 
8 
wave 
9 
wave 
10 
Berlin – TU 452 499 466 409 Muenchen - UAS 325 390 309 297 
Chair 0 0 0 0 Chair 0 0 1 1 
EXIST 0 0 0 1 EXIST 0 0 0 1 
Bochum – UNI 431 499 480 450 Dresden - TU 493 548 588 713 
Chair 0 0 0 0 Chair 0 1 1 1 
EXIST 0 0 0 1 EXIST 0 1 1 1 
Essen – UNI 289 327 352 266 Leipzig - UNI 474 610 641 638 
Chair 0 0 0 1 Chair 0 0 0 0 
EXIST 0 0 0 1 EXIST 0 0 0 1 
Frankfurt – UNI 469 446 497 540 Magdeburg - TU 163 266 287 249 
Chair 0 0 0 0 Chair 0 1 1 1 
EXIST 0 0 1 0 EXIST 0 0 0 1 
Freiburg – UNI 571 513 626 566 Potsdam - UNI 214 295 329 260 
Chair 0 0 0 0 Chair 0 0 0 1 
EXIST 0 0 0 1 EXIST 0 0 1 1 
Hamburg – UNI 674 591 706 514 Rostock - UNI 287 355 313 261 
Chair 0 0 0 0 Chair 0 0 0 0 
EXIST 0 0 0 1 EXIST 0 0 1 1 
Karlsruhe – TU 621 528 584 433 Erfurt - UAS 136 157 152 124 
Chair 0 1 1 1 Chair 0 1 1 1 
EXIST 0 0 0 1 EXIST 0 0 0 0 
Muenchen - UNI 619 863 895 654 Magdeburg - UAS 107 151 114 164 
Chair 0 1 1 1 Chair 0 0 1 1 
EXIST 0 0 0 1 EXIST 0 0 0 0 
Coburg – UAS 118 142 123 129 Stralsund - UAS 88 148 124 102 
Chair 0 0 0 0 Chair 0 1 1 1 
EXIST 0 0 0 1 EXIST 0 0 1 1 
Essen – UAS 95 90 113 0 Kaiserslautern -UNI 0 0 309 207 
Chair 0 0 0 - Chair - - 0 0 
EXIST 0 0 0 - EXIST - - 0 1 
Frankfurt – UAS 97 118 159 139 Kassel - UNI 0 0 312 397 
Chair 0 0 0 0 Chair - - 1 1 
EXIST 0 0 1 0 EXIST - - 1 1 
Hamburg – UAS 242 263 268 249 Oldenburg - UNI 0 0 317 272 
Chair 0 0 0 0 Chair - - 0 1 
EXIST 0 0 0 1 EXIST - - 0 1 
Kiel – UAS 141 142 119 113 Regensburg - UNI 0 0 483 0 
Chair 0 0 0 0 Chair - - 0 - 
EXIST 0 0 1 1 EXIST - - 1 - 
Koblenz – UAS 108 133 149 123 Notes: Observations by university and survey wave. UNI and TU (Technical University) denote full university. UAS de-
notes university of applied sciences. Chair is unity if universi-
ty has a chair for entrepreneurship. EXIST is unity if a univer-
sity participates in the EXIST program. 
Chair 0 1 1 1 
EXIST 0 0 0 1 
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5.5 Results 
5.5.1 University Effects on Students’ Attitude towards Entrepreneurship 
The least one could expect from the introduction of measures for entrepreneurship education 
at universities is that they help students to form an opinion on entrepreneurship as occupa-
tional alternative. The average German student enters university directly after secondary 
school. Entrepreneurship is usually not part of the teaching at German schools. Thus it should 
make a difference if a chair for entrepreneurship, an institutionalized entrepreneurship support 
via EXIST or both measures exist at a university. The existence of any measure should in-
crease the probability that students are confronted with entrepreneurship as occupational al-
ternative. I assume that this informational treatment helps students to make up their minds. 
Accordingly, I expect students treated with educational measures to be less likely to be indif-
ferent towards entrepreneurship than students at universities where no institutionalized entre-
preneurship education exists. 
Thus in a very first step I use probit regressions to estimate a student’s probability to have an 
opinion on entrepreneurship as occupational alternative conditional on the existence of a chair 
for entrepreneurship, the universities’ participation in the EXIST program and the simultane-
ous existence of both measures at a university according to Equation 1. 
Equation 1: Probit Estimation 
imutimutututut
uttumimut
XEXISTchairEXISTchair
Y
?????
?????
?????
???????
4321 )*()()(...
....)|1Pr(
 
My outcome variable imutY  is zero if a student i studying major field m at university u in sur-
vey year t answers “I do not know” when asked whether s/he would like to be an entrepreneur 
in the future, and unity if s/he expresses an opinion. I simultaneously include three explanato-
ry variables: utchair)( is unity if a university u has a chair for entrepreneurship in survey year 
t. utEXIST )( is unity if a university u participates in the EXIST program in survey year t. The 
interaction term utEXISTchair )*(  is unity if a university u in survey year t simultaneously 
participates in the EXIST program and has a chair for entrepreneurship.  
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I include a set of baseline control variables on idiosyncratic attributes into the matrix imutX  
and will stepwise expand this matrix to control for study-related issues, job related issues, 
individual characteristics and the students’ social network. Overall, the survey data provides 
rich information on students’ personal characteristics potentially affecting their attitude to-
wards entrepreneurship. Additionally, I include university fixed effects u? to account for time 
invariant differences between the universities in this dynamic differences-in-differences ap-
proach. Furthermore, I use major fixed effects m? to control for time invariant differences 
between 13 aggregated fields of study. Survey year fixed effects t?  account for time variant 
factors influencing the outcomes at all universities alike. Eventually, I include the interaction 
effect of survey year fixed effects and university fixed effects ut? to control for time variant 
factors affecting the outcomes at each university differently. Amongst others, this interaction 
effect accounts for changes in the sample composition at the different universities that are not 
captured by the other control variables, but also for time-variant university-specific differ-
ences in the measures under investigation.34 In line with Moulton (1986), I cluster the stand-
ard errors imut? on the highest level of aggregation, i.e. the university level. Results are report-
ed in Table 3.  
In the subsequent tables Column (1) presents the results of the baseline model where I add 
some demographic controls and variables on the students’ personal background into the re-
gressions.35 Consequently, I always control for students’ age and gender. To account for fa-
milial liabilities I include variables on the students’ marital status and a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the students have children. Since parents might be relevant role models (c.f. 
Aldrich et al., 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Hout and Rosen, 2000) I add controls for 
the parents’ education (5 categories) as well as the parents’ occupation (5 categories). Addi-
tionally, I include a dummy variable that equals unity if any of the students’ parents is an en-
                                                 
34 In a different set of estimations not reported here I checked for potential lags in the effectiveness of the intro-
duction of chairs for entrepreneurship. Anyhow, I did find no evidence for the existence of a particular lag struc-
ture. Since I can only roughly account for the time span between the date some chair was established and the 
date the survey took place, I prefer to control for university specific time-variant effects by the introduction of 
fixed effects instead. These fixed effects also capture time variant differences in the realization of the EXIST 
program. 
35 A detailed description of all control variables can be found in Table A2 in the appendix. 
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trepreneur.36 Eventually, I control for the students’ aspired degree (8 categories, e.g. Master, 
Bachelor, Diploma), her study progress and whether s/he already holds an academic degree. 
5.5.1.1 University Effects on Students’ Opinion on Entrepreneurship 
Already the baseline regressions in column (1) of Table 3 suggest that all measures affect the 
students’ opinion on entrepreneurship. Anyhow, the results are somewhat surprising. Indeed, 
students at universities that have a chair for entrepreneurship are significantly less likely to 
express a distinct opinion towards this occupational alternative. The same is true for students 
at universities that participate in the EXIST program. Only at universities with a fully institu-
tionalized entrepreneurship education, i.e. universities that do participate in EXIST and do 
have a chair for entrepreneurship, are students more likely to be able to make up their minds 
about entrepreneurship as occupational alternative. 
Table 3: University Effects on Students’ Opinion on Entrepreneurship as Occupational Alternative 
  
(1) 
 
baseline 
(2) 
course of 
studies 
(3) 
job  
expectations 
(4) 
individual 
character. 
(5) 
social  
network 
(6) 
 
all controls 
opinion on entrepreneurship 
chair -0.091*** -0.080*** -0.138*** -0.064*** -0.086*** -0.087*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
EXIST -0.081*** -0.077*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.062*** -0.070*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
chair*EXIST 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
Controls 
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Study related No Yes No No No Yes 
Job related No No Yes No No Yes 
Individual  No No No Yes No Yes 
Social Network No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 31,241 29,399 30,189 29,598 30,578 26,759 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0376 0.0434 0.0445 0.0455 0.0388 0.0553 
Notes: Table reports probit marginal effects at the sample mean where the dependent variable ‘opinion on entre-
preneurship’ is unity if student gives any positive or negative answer to the question “Do you want to be perma-
nently employed as entrepreneur in the future” and zero if s/he answers “I do not know”. All specifications in-
clude university fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects, fixed effects for the students’ major field of studies and 
the interaction effect of university indicator and survey wave. The control variables are described in more detail 
in Table A2 in the appendix. Cluster (university) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *denotes 
10% level of significance, **denotes 5% level of significance, ***denotes 1% level of significance.
                                                 
36 Entrepreneur is a subcategory of the occupational category self-employed (c.f. Table A2 in the appendix).  
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In the other columns of Table 3 I stepwise include further control variables that account for 
the specific situation of the individual students (c.f. Table A2 in the Appendix). Column (2) 
presents results that additionally control for factors related to the students’ studies like his 
motives for deciding on his major, her final grade at secondary school, or if any of his or her 
major or minor subjects includes either engineering, or science, or economics. In column (3) I 
include variables that refer to the students’ future job. In this column I control amongst others 
for a student’s job expectations, perceived problems at the job market and on how well the 
student feels informed about the labor market. In column (4) I exploit a set of variables that 
control for the students’ individual characteristics like her attitudes towards competition and 
performance, whether he has personal or financial problems or how important several areas of 
life are to her. Column (5) shows the results of an estimation that controls, additionally to the 
baseline controls, for the students’ social network, i.e. how often they have contact to their 
peers, their family and others, and for some extra-curricular activities. Eventually, column (6) 
presents the results of an estimation that includes all control variables from the previous esti-
mations.37 Throughout all specifications I find a robust and significant positive effect of the 
coexistence of chairs and EXIST on the probability to have an opinion on entrepreneurial oc-
cupations. This result is in line with the expectations. But I do also find robust and significant 
negative effects of chairs and EXIST in general. Accordingly, the implementation of a chair 
for entrepreneurship as well as the participation in EXIST that go in hand with numerous in-
formational events on entrepreneurship do reduce the students’ ability to express a clear opin-
ion on whether they would take an occupation as entrepreneur into account. 
5.5.1.2 University Effects on Students’ Interest in Entrepreneurship 
In a next step I dwell upon the students’ opinion on entrepreneurship and look at a more dis-
tinct outcome: I repeat the previous estimations but focus on the students’ interest in entrepre-
neurship. So imutY  is unity if a student gives a positive answer (“Yes, perhaps”; “Yes, certain-
ly”) when asked whether s/he would like to be permanently employed as entrepreneur in the 
future, and zero otherwise. Results are shown in Table 4.  
Again, it is only the universities with fully institutionalized entrepreneurship education, i.e. 
universities that have a chair for entrepreneurship and participate in the EXIST program, that 
                                                 
37 Anyhow, I lose quite many observations when I use the full set of control variables due to accumulated miss-
ing values. I will deal with this problem later on. Up to now I urge cautiousness when interpreting the results of 
the estimations presented in column (6).  
116 
 
match the assumptions on the effects on their students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship as 
occupational alternative. The simultaneous existence of both measures significantly increases 
the probability that students are interested in becoming an entrepreneur. The main effects of 
universities with chairs for entrepreneurship or of universities that participate in the EXIST 
program are much less robust and do very much depend on individual circumstances. There is 
some indication that both measures could crowd out the interest in entrepreneurship. At least 
the results show that only “entrepreneurial universities” that focus on entrepreneurship educa-
tion by simultaneously applying both measures indeed get students interested in entrepreneur-
ship as occupational alternative.  
Table 4: University Effects on Students’ Interest in Entrepreneurship as Occupational Alternative 
  
(1) 
 
baseline 
(2) 
course of 
studies 
(3) 
job  
expectations 
(4) 
individual 
character. 
(5) 
social  
network 
(6) 
 
all controls 
interest in entrepreneurship 
chair -0.038*** -0.020*** -0.061*** 0.002 -0.043*** -0.009 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
EXIST -0.000 -0.026** -0.027*** 0.005 -0.001 -0.075*** 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
chair*EXIST 0.062*** 0.075*** 0.108*** 0.063*** 0.055*** 0.143*** 
 
(0.016) (0.022) (0.011) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) 
Controls 
Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Study related No Yes No No No Yes 
Job related No No Yes No No Yes 
Individual No No No Yes No Yes 
Social Network No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 31,241 29,399 30,189 29,598 30,578 26,759 
Pseudo R-squared 0.110 0.131 0.149 0.120 0.112 0.162 
Notes: Table reports probit marginal effects at the sample mean where the dependent variable ‘interest in entre-
preneurship’ is unity if student gives any positive answer to the question “Do you want to be permanently em-
ployed as entrepreneur in the future” and zero otherwise. All specifications include university fixed effects, sur-
vey wave fixed effects, fixed effects for the students’ major field of studies and the interaction effect of universi-
ty indicator and survey wave. The control variables are described in more detail in Table A2 in the appendix. 
Cluster (university) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *denotes 10% level of significance, 
**denotes 5% level of significance, ***denotes 1% level of significance. 
5.5.1.3 University Effects on Students’ Entrepreneurial Intentions 
Eventually, I further narrow down my focus on the most distinct outcome, i.e. the students’ 
entrepreneurial intentions. Here imutY  is unity if a student answers “Yes, certainly” when s/he 
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is asked whether s/he would like to be permanently employed as entrepreneur in the future, 
and zero otherwise. Results are reported in table 5. 
Once again, I find a significant and robust effect of universities that apply both measures of 
entrepreneurship education on students’ entrepreneurial intentions. Interestingly, applying 
both measures reduces the probability that students’ certainly want to become an entrepreneur 
in the future. This finding is in line with Oosterbeek et al. (2010) who measure a negative 
effect of a program for entrepreneurship education at students’ entrepreneurial intentions at a 
Dutch college. In contrast the participation in the EXIST program and the related provision of 
entrepreneurship support and consulting alone does affect the students’ entrepreneurial inten-
tions positively. Taken by itself, the existence of a chair does not seem to influence the stu-
dents’ entrepreneurial intentions. So it is the EXIST universities that foster entrepreneurial 
intentions – but if these universities additionally have a chair for entrepreneurship, this signif-
icantly reduces the students’ desire to become an entrepreneur. 
Table 5: University Effects on Students’ Entrepreneurial Intentions 
  
(1) 
 
baseline 
(2) 
course of 
studies 
(3) 
job  
expectations 
(4) 
individual 
character. 
(5) 
social 
 network 
(6) 
 
all controls 
entrepreneurial intention 
chair -0.002 0.011*** -0.006** 0.002 -0.004 0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
EXIST 0.078*** 0.073*** 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.078*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
chair*EXIST -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.076*** -0.081*** -0.085*** -0.076*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Controls 
      Baseline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Study related No Yes No No No Yes 
Job related No No Yes No No Yes 
Individual No No No Yes No Yes 
Social Network No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 31,241 29,399 30,189 29,598 30,578 26,759 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0376 0.0434 0.0445 0.0455 0.0388 0.0553 
Notes: Table reports probit marginal effects at the sample mean where the dependent variable ‘entrepreneurial 
intention’ is unity if students answer “Yes, certainly” to the question “Do you want to be permanently employed 
as entrepreneur in the future” and zero otherwise. All specifications include university fixed effects, survey wave 
fixed effects, fixed effects for the students’ major field of studies and the interaction effect of university indicator 
and survey wave. The control variables are described in more detail in Table A2 in the appendix. Cluster (uni-
versity) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *denotes 10% level of significance, **denotes 5% 
level of significance, ***denotes 1% level of significance. 
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With regard to the comprehensive set of control variables, I can state that it is particular stu-
dents that study any subject from the field of economics that have entrepreneurial intentions. 
Anyhow, students with a strong interest in their subject and students with an above average 
grade from school are less likely to have entrepreneurial intentions. Students with at least one 
parent who is entrepreneur are significantly more likely to have entrepreneurial intentions 
themselves. Students who are looking for a secure job are significantly less likely to have en-
trepreneurial intentions, while looking for a job with high income, responsibility, the possibil-
ity to lead people, where one can act independently and realize one’s own ideas are positive 
predictors for the desire to become an entrepreneur. Furthermore, students with entrepreneuri-
al intentions are less likely to expect problems in finding a job. Anyhow, students who cer-
tainly want to be employed as entrepreneur in the future have more problems with their stud-
ies and take their future job more serious than their studies. Eventually, having intense contact 
to one’s peers is negatively correlated with entrepreneurial intentions, while students who 
have often contact to people from the aspired occupational field are more likely to certainly 
wanting to become an entrepreneur. 
5.5.1.4 Robustness 
By now it is a little bit dissatisfactory that I lose so many observations when I include all con-
trol variables on study situation, job perspectives, individual characteristics and social net-
work into the regressions. Anyhow, not all controls are equally important for all outcomes. 
Thus as robustness check and to sum up the previous results, I repeat the estimations on opin-
ion on entrepreneurship, interest in entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial intention but retain 
only those control variables that turned out to have a significant effect on the respective out-
come.38 These regressions control for idiosyncratic differences between the students by ex-
ploiting the rich information given by the comprehensive survey questions in the best possible 
way. Results with this selection of significant control variables can be found in Table 6 in the 
columns with odd numbers.  
But one might speculate that the effects of universities on students’ attitude towards entrepre-
neurship as occupational alternative could still be driven by unobserved heterogeneity. Differ-
ences between the universities that result from differences in the economic environment at the 
universities’ sites already cancel out since I include university fixed effects. By now I also 
include fixed effects for the students’ field of studies and the survey wave to control for field 
                                                 
38 Those variables are indicated in Table A2 in the appendix. 
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specific and calendar time specific influences. Moreover, with the interaction effects of uni-
versity and survey year I account for time variant institutional differences between the univer-
sities. But there might still be time variant factors rooted in the institutional environment of 
the different university sites that selectively drive the outcomes of certain groups of students. 
Such factors could drive both, the probability that a student studies at a university that applies 
measures of entrepreneurship education and the students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship. 
In order to address this issue I make further use of the panel structure of my data and add a 
full set of interaction effects to thoroughly control for potential confounds of differences and 
changes in the institutional framework at the university sites. Thus in a final step I additional-
ly include the interaction effect between the university indicator and the indicator for the stu-
dents’ major subject, the interaction effect between the field of studies and the survey year 
and the interaction effect between university indicator, field of study indicator and the survey 
year into my regressions according to Equation 2. 
Equation 2: Probit Estimation with Full Set of Interaction Effects 
imutimutututut
umtmtumuttumimut
XEXISTchairEXISTchair
Y
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In this equation um?  explicitly controls for differences between universities with respect to 
different fields of study, e.g. a particular focus of some universities on certain subjects. mt?
takes time variant differences between the thirteen fields of study into account as they might 
result from changes in the labor market conditions. Eventually umt?  controls for time variant 
differences between the faculties as they might e.g. result from changes in the academic staff. 
Estimation results with this full set of interaction effects are reported in Table 6 in the col-
umns with even numbers. While these regressions further reduce unobserved heterogeneity by 
accounting for time invariant as well as time variant differences in the institutional conditions 
and the various university sites, they clearly reach the limit of what is possible with the data at 
hand.39  
  
                                                 
39 In fact, I did all estimations also with this full set of interaction effects. I actually lose several observations due 
to the small number of observations in some cells. Consequently, I regard these estimations as robustness check 
and rely on the estimations according to Equation 1 instead. The coefficients presented in Table 6 summarize the 
estimations results according to Equation 2 that are fully in line with the previous results quite well. Further 
results from estimations according to Equation 2 are available from the author upon request.  
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Table 5: Summary of University Effects on Students’ Attitude towards Entrepreneurship and  
Robustness Check 
 
(1) 
Opinion. 
All sign. 
Controls 
(Equation 1) 
(2) 
Opinion. 
Full set of 
Int. Effects 
(Equation 2) 
(3) 
Interest. 
All sign. 
Controls 
(Equation 1) 
(4) 
Interest. 
Full set of 
Int. Effects 
(Equation 2) 
(5) 
Intention. 
All sign. 
Controls 
(Equation 1) 
(6) 
Intention. 
Full set of 
Int. Effects 
(Equation 2) 
Attitude towards entrepreneurship 
chair -0.076*** -0.091*** -0.042*** -0.083* 0.002 0.034 
 
(0.004) (0.025) (0.007) (0.047) (0.003) (0.021) 
EXIST -0.075*** -0.045** -0.018* -0.027 0.072*** 0.026** 
 
(0.004) (0.021) (0.010) (0.035) (0.006) (0.013) 
chair*EXIST 0.043*** 0.030** 0.071*** 0.131*** -0.069*** -0.039*** 
 
(0.002) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.003) (0.012) 
Controls 
      Baseline All All All All All All 
Study related Selection Selection Selection Selection Selection Selection 
Job related Selection Selection Selection Selection Selection Selection 
Individual Selection Selection Selection Selection Selection Selection 
Social Network Selection Selection Selection Selection Selection Selection 
Observations 30,338 29,428 28,538 28,505 28,829 28,296 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0476 0.0756 0.160 0.177 0.166 0.185 
Notes: Table reports probit marginal effects at the sample mean. Dependent variable ‘opinion on entrepreneur-
ship as occupational alternative’ in Colums (1) and (2) corresponds to Table 3. Dependent variable ‘interest in 
entrepreneurship as occupational alternative’ in Colums (3) and (4) corresponds to Table 4. Dependent variable 
‘entrepreneurial intentions’ in Colums (5) and (6) corresponds to Table 5. All specifications include university 
fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects, fixed effects for the students’ major field of studies and the interaction 
effect of university indicator and survey wave. Columns (2), (4) and (6) additionally include interaction effects 
between university and major field of studies, survey wave and major field of studies, and university and major 
field of studies and survey wave. The control variables are described in more detail in Table A2 in the appendix. 
Cluster (university) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *denotes 10% level of significance, 
**denotes 5% level of significance, ***denotes 1% level of significance. 
By now I can conclude that the most important measures of entrepreneurship education at 
German universities, i.e. the establishment of chairs for entrepreneurship and the participation 
in the EXIST program do affect a university’s students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship as 
occupational alternative. If a university fully institutionalizes entrepreneurship education by 
applying both measures simultaneously, this has an independent additional effect on the stu-
dents’ attitude towards entrepreneurship. Anyhow, the measures affect students’ attitude to-
wards entrepreneurship as occupational alternative differently. 
The existence of a chair for entrepreneurship per se reduces the likelihood that students can 
express an opinion on whether they would like to be permanently employed as entrepreneur in 
the future. Moreover, students at universities with chair for entrepreneurship less often con-
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sider becoming an entrepreneur in the future to be an option than students at universities 
without chair for entrepreneurship. Anyhow, this decrease in the overall interest in entrepre-
neurship does not translate into a decrease in the likelihood of having entrepreneurial inten-
tions. Indeed, this outcome is unaffected by the existence of a chair for entrepreneurship. Ac-
cordingly, the existence of a chair for entrepreneurship does not seem to discourage students 
with concrete entrepreneurial intentions, but rather to dissuade students from seeing entrepre-
neurship as kind of an occupational backup option with the result that less students can clearly 
decide on whether they might be willing to take some remote entrepreneurial opportunity. 
The effect of the participation in the EXIST program is somewhat different. Quite surprising-
ly, the participation in EXIST, in other words the provision of informational services for stu-
dents interested in entrepreneurship and the establishment of entrepreneurship consultancies, 
decreases the likelihood that students express a clear opinion on whether they would like to be 
employed as entrepreneur in the future or not. So the increase of information about entrepre-
neurship at EXIST universities seems indeed to increase the students’ indifference towards 
this occupational alternative. But unlike chairs for entrepreneurship, the EXIST program does 
not significantly affect the students’ propensity to be interested in entrepreneurship. Although 
the EXIST measure does not affect the overall interest in entrepreneurship as occupational 
alternative, it nevertheless increases the likelihood that students express a distinct entrepre-
neurial intention. This is an indication that EXIST specifically affects wannabe entrepreneurs 
and indeed succeeds in eliciting entrepreneurial desires. 
Eventually, the simultaneous provision of both measures has the most pronounced effect. 
Universities that provide large scale of information on entrepreneurship at broad scope, i.e. 
universities that participate in the EXIST program and have a chair for entrepreneurship, sig-
nificantly affect students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship at all outcome levels. Students 
enrolled at those “entrepreneurial universities” are more likely to be able to express a clear 
opinion on whether they would consider becoming an entrepreneur in the future, and they are 
significantly more likely to be interested in this occupational alternative. So far, only universi-
ties that apply both measures have the ex ante expected effect on their students’ attitude to-
wards entrepreneurship. Although these universities increase their students’ interest in entre-
preneurship, they do not fill them with enthusiasm for a career as entrepreneur. On the contra-
ry, students’ at EXIST universities that also have a chair for entrepreneurship are significantly 
less likely to have entrepreneurial intentions than students at any other university. This could 
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be an indication that these “entrepreneurial universities” also raise the students’ awareness of 
the challenges related to entrepreneurship. 
Since all measures include an improved provision of information on entrepreneurship as oc-
cupational alternative I expected that all measures would help students to form an opinion on 
the question whether they would like to be employed as entrepreneur in the future. But only 
universities that apply both measures fulfill this expectation. Of course, my initial presump-
tion could be wrong. Perhaps the average student already has some predefined opinion on 
entrepreneurship when entering university, and the measures make her update her initial be-
liefs. The negative effect of chairs for entrepreneurship on interest in entrepreneurship would 
be in line with this reasoning. It could be that the improved information on entrepreneurship 
makes students give up some naïve visions about what life might be like as independent en-
trepreneur, but that only the full treatment at EXIST universities with chair really help them to 
form a new opinion. Anyhow, since I do not observe the students’ initial attitude towards en-
trepreneurship before starting their studies I cannot investigate this process of opinion for-
mation further.  
Another puzzle is the difference between the measures of entrepreneurship education on the 
students’ entrepreneurial intentions, particularly the difference between the EXIST main ef-
fect and the interaction effect between EXIST and chair. The existence of a chair for entre-
preneurship alone that reduces the overall interest in entrepreneurship does not affect the con-
crete intention to become an entrepreneur in the future. This is most probably the result of a 
more restricted scope of the chair effect, since chairs usually address students of particular 
faculties. EXIST universities do anyhow significantly increase their students entrepreneurial 
intentions, although these universities do not affect the overall interest in this occupation. Ap-
parently, the EXIST measure rather selectively affects students with a strong entrepreneurial 
affinity. EXIST universities that also have a chair for entrepreneurship do in contrast decrease 
their students’ entrepreneurial intentions although they manage to raise the overall interest in 
this occupation. If the combination of the EXIST measure with the chair measure was effi-
cient in practice, this could be the outcome of an improved selection where only those stu-
dents would express entrepreneurial intentions who do indeed have good chances to succeed 
as entrepreneur. In order to better understand these differences, I now turn my focus to these 
students with entrepreneurial intentions only. 
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5.5.2 Selective Effects on Students with Entrepreneurial Intentions 
In a final step I take a closer look at students who state that they certainly want to become an 
entrepreneur in the future (hereafter also referred to as “entrepreneurial students”). If entre-
preneurship education really helps students to update their beliefs on entrepreneurship, then it 
should be a different (since more selective) group of students that have entrepreneurial inten-
tions at universities that apply measures of entrepreneurship as compared to universities that 
do not apply such measures. But the previous results also suggest that students with entrepre-
neurial intentions could differ between universities that apply different measures. Particularly 
the differences between the EXIST main effect and the interaction effect for EXIST universi-
ties that also have a chair for entrepreneurship (hereafter also referred to as “entrepreneurial 
universities”) is interesting. If it was true that EXIST universities attracted more students from 
different fields to entrepreneurship, then this should translate into distinctive characteristics of 
the entrepreneurial students at EXIST universities. If EXIST universities with chair for entre-
preneurship really succeeded in dissuading the least promising wannabe entrepreneurs, then 
students with entrepreneurial intentions should be particularly skilled at these entrepreneurial 
universities.  
To investigate these differences, I restrict my data to the subsample of students with entrepre-
neurial intentions only. I use the baseline regressions according to equation 1 and regress a 
couple of individual characteristics on the university measures. The resulting coefficients in-
dicate in how far the measures of entrepreneurship education do selectively affect certain 
types of students. To ease the interpretation of the results I additionally present the correlation 
between the respective individual attribute and having entrepreneurial intentions at all for the 
full sample. The subsequent tables report the regression results for different sets of outcome 
variables. 
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Table 6: Differences between Students with Entrepreneurial Intentions by University Type  
– Study Situation 
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Students with entrepreneurial intention 
chair -0.080*** 0.070*** -0.001 0.074*** 0.027 -0.026 0.939*** 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.006) 
EXIST 0.151*** 0.135*** 0.251*** 0.619*** 0.113*** -0.199*** 0.995*** 
 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.035) (0.068) (0.019) (0.014) (0.001) 
chair*EXIST -0.168*** -0.231*** -0.183*** -0.038*** -0.093*** 0.360*** -0.213*** 
 
(0.026) (0.017) (0.034) (0.005) (0.014) (0.118) (0.008) 
        Observations 3,788 3,828 3,834 3,334 3,812 3,791 2,899 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0982 0.0879 0.0671 0.180 0.0786 0.121 0.147 
All students 
entrepreneurial -0.096*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.009*** 0.015** 0.019** 0.010** 
intention (0.010) s(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
        Observations 30,958 31,116 31,142 31,122 31,075 30,930 30,842 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0999 0.0669 0.0324 0.0713 0.0360 0.0804 0.0630 
Controls 
Baseline All All All All All All All 
Notes: Table reports probit marginal effects at the sample mean. Dependent variable “final grade (school) above 
average” is unity if a student’s final grade in his/her high school diploma is above the survey wave’s average, 
zero otherwise. “Afflicted by performance requirements” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer 
to the question “How much do you feel afflicted by your studies’ performance requirements?”, zero otherwise. 
“Fears s/he will not accomplish studies” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the question “In 
how far do you agree: I fear that I might not finish my studies at all”, zero otherwise. “Plans abandoning studies” 
is unity if a student gives top 2 positive answer to the question “Do you seriously think about abandoning your 
studies?”, zero otherwise. “Afflicted by personal problems” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer 
to the question “How much do you feel afflicted by personal problems?”, zero otherwise. “Afflicted by financial 
prospects” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the question “How much do you feel afflicted 
by your financial situation after graduation?”, zero otherwise. “Dislikes being a student” is unity if a student 
gives top 2 value negative answer to the question “Taken all together, do you like being a student?”, zero other-
wise. All specifications include university fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects, fixed effects for the students’ 
major field of studies and the interaction effect of university indicator and survey wave. The control variables are 
described in more detail in Table A2 in the appendix. Cluster (university) robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *denotes 10% level of significance, **denotes 5% level of significance, ***denotes 1% level of 
significance. 
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Only at EXIST universities do entrepreneurial students have had significantly better grades at 
school, while at other universities with measures for entrepreneurship education students are 
even less likely to have graduated from secondary school with a grade above average, an item 
already negatively correlated with having entrepreneurial intentions in general. Nevertheless, 
students with entrepreneurial intentions at EXIST universities are more likely to feel afflicted 
by the performance requirements of their respective studies. This goes so far that they fear not 
be able to finish their studies at all and are also have a higher probability to plan to giving up 
their studies. Entrepreneurial students at EXIST universities more often state that they have 
personal problems even though they are less likely to feel afflicted by their financial pro-
spects. Consequently, at EXIST universities entrepreneurial students are significantly more 
inclined to generally dislike their situation as student.  
With respect to these characteristics, entrepreneurial students at entrepreneurial universities 
are the exact opposite. Although they tend to have had worse grades at school they feel less 
afflicted by their studies than other students with entrepreneurial intentions, are more confi-
dent that they will finish and hence less likely to think about abandoning their studies. They 
are also less inclined to feel afflicted by personal problems but more concerned with their 
financial situation. Consequently, they are also less likely to dislike their studies. According-
ly, it seems as if students with entrepreneurial intentions at EXIST universities had some 
problems with their studies, while entrepreneurial students feel more comfortable with their 
overall situation at universities that additionally have a chair for entrepreneurship. 
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Table 7: Differences between Students with Entrepreneurial Intentions by University Type  
– Course of Studies 
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Students with entrepreneurial intention 
chair -0.098*** -0.026** 0.094*** 0.036** 0.294*** -0.067*** 0.078*** 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.027) 
EXIST 0.136*** 0.039** 0.117*** -0.251*** -0.210*** 0.108*** 0.891*** 
 
(0.040) (0.018) (0.014) (0.020) (0.031) (0.013) (0.009) 
chair*EXIST 0.008 -0.088*** -0.076*** 0.149*** 0.403*** -0.011 -0.239*** 
 
(0.094) (0.014) (0.006) (0.021) (0.048) (0.039) (0.003) 
        Observations 3,751 3,768 3,723 3,845 3,832 3,829 3,546 
Pseudo R-squared 0.113 0.148 0.0783 0.0683 0.0545 0.0509 0.0801 
All students 
entrepreneurial  0.015** -0.003 0.016*** -0.022** 0.044*** 0.025*** -0.002 
intention (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) 
        Observations 31,063 30,913 31,157 31,194 31,145 31,126 31,095 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0884 0.0995 0.0453 0.0416 0.0407 0.0321 0.0319 
Controls 
Baseline All All All All All All All 
Notes: Table reports probit marginal effects at the sample mean. Dependent variable “has changed major sub-
ject” is unity if a student gives positive answer to the question “Have you changed your major subject in the 
course of your studies?”, zero otherwise. “Has changed university” is unity if a student gives positive answer to 
the question “Have you changed the university you study at in the course of your studies?”, zero otherwise. 
“Does not study intensely” is unity if a student gives top 2 value negative answer to the question “In how far do 
you agree: I work intensely and much for my studies”, zero otherwise. “Strong interest in field of studies” is 
unity if a student gives top 2 positive answer to the question “In how far do you regard studies at a university to 
be useful to yourself: To learn more about the selected field”, zero otherwise. “Seeks comprehensive knowledge” 
is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the question “In how far do you regard studies at a uni-
versity to be useful to yourself: To develop a generally educated character?”, zero otherwise. “Wants to improve 
society” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the question “In how far do you regard studies 
at a university to be useful to yourself: To become able to contribute to the improvement of the society?”, zero 
otherwise. “Wants to delay working life” is unity if a student gives top 2 value negative answer to the question 
“In how far do you regard studies at a university to be useful to yourself: To delay the working life as long as 
possible?”, zero otherwise. All specifications include university fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects, fixed 
effects for the students’ major field of studies and the interaction effect of university indicator and survey wave. 
The control variables are described in more detail in Table A2 in the appendix. Cluster (university) robust stand-
ard errors are reported in parentheses. *denotes 10% level of significance, **denotes 5% level of significance, 
***denotes 1% level of significance. 
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Regarding the course of studies, entrepreneurial students at EXIST universities are more like-
ly to have changed their major subject and even the university they study at. Still they honest-
ly admit that they do not study intensely and much. It fits into the picture that these students 
are less inclined to have a strong interest in their field of studies. But they are interested in 
acquiring comprehensive general knowledge neither. Strong motives for studying are rather 
the wish to improve society and the desire to procrastinate work life. Again, students with 
entrepreneurial intentions at entrepreneurial universities differ significantly from those at EX-
IST universities. They are less likely to have changed the university they study at. They reject 
the statement that they do not study intense and much, but express a strong interest in their 
field of studies, an interest that is negatively correlated with the overall propensity to have 
entrepreneurial intentions. But they also want to acquire comprehensive general knowledge, a 
desire already positively correlated with the overall probability to have entrepreneurial inten-
tions. Improving the society is of no particular interest for entrepreneurial students at entre-
preneurial universities. But different from students at EXIST universities, they are significant-
ly less likely to use their study time to procrastinate work. Overall, students with entrepre-
neurial intentions at EXIST universities with additional chair for entrepreneurship seem to be 
focused on their studies and interested in knowledge acquisition, while entrepreneurial stu-
dents at EXIST universities tend to be more erratic. 
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Table 8: Differences Between Students with Entrepreneurial Intentions by University Type  
– Job Perspectives 
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Students with entrepreneurial intention 
chair -0.248*** -0.078*** -0.081*** 0.003 0.028 0.013 0.048*** 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.026) (0.021) (0.017) (0.014) 
EXIST -0.068*** -0.230*** 0.208*** 0.046** 0.084*** 0.241*** 0.118*** 
 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.027) (0.021) (0.032) (0.050) (0.010) 
chair*EXIST -0.136*** -0.130*** -0.236*** -0.105 -0.129 -0.193*** -0.146*** 
 
(0.026) (0.047) (0.010) (0.064) (0.145) (0.029) (0.032) 
        Observations 3,843 3,844 3,829 3,817 3,704 3,840 3,826 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0790 0.0753 0.0634 0.0560 0.0918 0.125 0.0827 
All students 
entrepreneurial -0.045*** 0.147*** 0.111*** 0.028*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.000 
intention (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
        Observations 31,187 31,195 31,057 31,119 30,529 31,155 31,089 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0457 0.0606 0.0914 0.0332 0.123 0.106 0.0575 
Controls 
Baseline All All All All All All All 
Notes: Table reports probit marginal effects at the sample mean. Dependent variable “secure job is important” is 
unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the question “What is important for you with respect to a 
job: Job security”, zero otherwise. “High income is important” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive 
answer to the question “What is important for you with respect to a job: High income”, zero otherwise. “Well 
informed about start up opportunities” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the question 
“How well do you feel informed about possibilities to start an own business?”, zero otherwise. “Well informed 
about labor market” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the question “How well do you feel 
informed about the labor market in your aspired field of occupation?”, zero otherwise. “Yet decided on future 
occupation” is unity if a student gives positive answer to the question “Have you already decided on your future 
occupation?”, zero otherwise. “Expects no difficulties on labor market” is unity if a student answers “hardly any 
difficulties to find a job” to the question “How do you evaluate your job perspectives after graduation?”, zero 
otherwise. “Labor market flexibility” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the question “If 
you had problems to realize your occupational plans due to the labor market conditions after graduation, what 
would you do: I would be willing to accept greater burdens (e.g. move, commute)”, zero otherwise. All specifi-
cations include university fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects, fixed effects for the students’ major field of 
studies and the interaction effect of university indicator and survey wave. The control variables are described in 
more detail in Table A2 in the appendix. Cluster (university) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*denotes 10% level of significance, **denotes 5% level of significance, ***denotes 1% level of significance.
 
129 
 
 
Interestingly, all three measures of entrepreneurship education decrease the probability that a 
student with entrepreneurial intentions is looking for an occupation with high job security. 
While job security is rather unimportant for entrepreneurial students in general, entrepreneuri-
al students at universities with entrepreneurship education seem to be even more prone to take 
occupational risks. Moreover, while overall students with entrepreneurial intentions are look-
ing for an occupation with high income, entrepreneurial students at universities with entrepre-
neurship education are less likely to rate high income as important. This hints at some infor-
mational success of all measures, since students with entrepreneurial intentions at universities 
with measures for entrepreneurship education seem to have somewhat more realistic expecta-
tions with regard to challenges and opportunities of an entrepreneurial endeavor than students 
with entrepreneurial intentions at a university from the control group. 
Anyhow, it is only the students at EXIST universities that do indeed feel well informed about 
start up opportunities. Students at universities with chair for entrepreneurship as well as stu-
dents at entrepreneurial universities are significantly less likely to feel well informed about 
possibilities to found their own enterprise than entrepreneurial students at any other universi-
ty. Whether this striking result is actually driven by differences in the quality of the infor-
mation provided cannot be evaluated here. Moreover, students at EXIST universities are more 
likely to state that they are well informed about the labor market in their field. Additionally 
they are more likely to have decided on their future occupation with certainty. Entrepreneurial 
students at EXIST universities do not expect difficulties on the labor market and tend to be 
flexible with regard to their future occupation, i.e. they are more inclined to “accept major 
burdens, e.g. move” when facing problems on the labor market. Entrepreneurial students at 
entrepreneurial universities are less relaxed with respect to their job expectations, but they are 
also less flexible. Thus overall, students at EXIST universities seem to be somewhat better 
prepared for the labor market. 
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Table 9: Differences between Students with Entrepreneurial Intentions by University Type  
– Job Expectations 
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Students with entrepreneurial intention 
chair 0.032* 0.025* -0.034** 0.081*** 0.025 0.162*** -0.090*** 
 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.022) 
EXIST -0.126*** 0.127*** 0.041*** -0.186*** 0.180*** -0.082*** -0.267*** 
 
(0.035) (0.014) (0.012) (0.028) (0.026) (0.010) (0.030) 
chair*EXIST 0.140 -0.425*** -0.149*** 0.288*** -0.193*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 
 
(0.089) (0.048) (0.025) (0.059) (0.042) (0.054) (0.031) 
        Observations 3,837 3,844 3,827 3,843 3,839 3,805 3,838 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0450 0.0663 0.0618 0.0410 0.0926 0.0763 0.0832 
All students 
entrepreneurial  0.128*** 0.139*** 0.180*** 0.194*** 0.028** 0.017*** 0.142*** 
intention (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.009) 
        Observations 31,123 31,191 31,202 31,190 31,169 31,135 31,164 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0336 0.0397 0.0371 0.0493 0.124 0.0657 0.0787 
Controls 
Baseline All All All All All All All 
Notes: Table reports probit marginal effects at the sample mean. Dependent variable “job is very important for 
life” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the question “How important are the following 
areas of life to you: job and work”, zero otherwise. “Job aspiration: realize own ideas” is unity if a student gives 
top 2 value positive answer to the question “What is important for you with respect to a job: To be able to realize 
own ideas”, zero otherwise. “Job aspiration: decide independently” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive 
answer to the question “What is important for you with respect to a job: To be able to decide independently”, 
zero otherwise. “Job aspiration: lead other people” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the 
question “What is important for you with respect to a job: Ability to lead other people”, zero otherwise. “Job 
aspiration: help other people” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the question “What is 
important for you with respect to a job: To be able to help other people”, zero otherwise. “Unimportant for job: 
usefulness to society” is unity if a student gives top 2 value negative answer to the question “What is important 
for you with respect to a job: To be able do something that is useful to society”, zero otherwise. “Job should 
grant advancement” is unity if a student gives top 2 value positive answer to the question “What is important for 
you with respect to a job: opportunity for advancement”, zero otherwise. All specifications include university 
fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects, fixed effects for the students’ major field of studies and the interaction 
effect of university indicator and survey wave. The control variables are described in more detail in Table A2 in 
the appendix. Cluster (university) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *denotes 10% level of sig-
nificance, **denotes 5% level of significance, ***denotes 1% level of significance. 
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Nevertheless, students with entrepreneurial intentions at EXIST universities are less likely to 
evaluate job and occupation to be very important for their lives. For them having a job where 
they can realize their own ideas and act independently is of principal concern. Leading other 
people is anyhow not essential to them. Another driving force for their job aspiration is to find 
an occupation where they can help other people. Consequently, finding a job that is useful to 
society is not unimportant for them. But they are seemingly not motivated by the desire to 
carve out a career. Students with entrepreneurial intentions at entrepreneurial universities 
have somewhat different job expectations. While finding a job that allows to realize own ide-
as or to decide independently are strong predictors for having entrepreneurial intentions in 
general, entrepreneurial students at entrepreneurial universities are less likely to expect this 
feature from their future occupation. For them leadership is an important job component. 
They are not looking for a job where they can help other people and are more likely to regard 
a job’s usefulness to society to be unimportant. All together entrepreneurial students at uni-
versities that apply both measures of entrepreneurship education seem to be more likely to 
evaluate their job prospects from a career point of view. Their counterparts at EXIST univer-
sities associate more altruistic goals with their job but also strive for independence. 
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Table 10: Differences between Students with Entrepreneurial Intentions by University Type  
– General Features 
 
any subject 
science 
any subject 
engineering 
any subject 
economics 
any parent 
entrepreneur female 
Students with entrepreneurial intention 
chair -0.525*** 0.992*** 0.107*** 0.079*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.008) (0.001) (0.022) (0.018) (0.025) 
EXIST -0.556*** -0.243*** -0.103*** -0.095** -0.266*** 
 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.040) (0.027) 
chair*EXIST 0.982*** 0.588*** -0.114*** 0.290 0.226*** 
 
(0.001) (0.102) (0.021) (0.180) (0.057) 
      Observations 3,556 3,048 3,817 3,853 3,837 
Pseudo R-squared 0.124 0.212 0.174 0.0428 0.148 
All students 
entrepreneurial  -0.029*** -0.001 0.069*** 0.087*** -0.111*** 
intention (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
      Observations 30,863 30,084 31,095 31,267 31,241 
Pseudo R-squared 0.150 0.361 0.164 0.0216 0.135 
Controls 
Baseline part part part part part 
Notes: Table reports probit marginal effects at the sample mean. Dependent variable “any subject science” is 
unity if a student studies any major or minor subject from the field of science, zero otherwise. “Any subject 
engineering” is unity if a student studies any major or minor subject from the field of engineering, zero other-
wise. “Any subject economics” is unity if a student studies any major or minor subject from the field of econom-
ic sciences, zero otherwise. “Any parent entrepreneur” is unity if a student’s father or mother is self-employed 
entrepreneur (no freelancer), zero otherwise. “Female” is unity if a student is female, zero otherwise. All specifi-
cations include university fixed effects, survey wave fixed effects, fixed effects for the students’ major field of 
studies and the interaction effect of university indicator and survey wave. The control variables are described in 
more detail in Table A2 in the appendix. Cluster (university) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*denotes 10% level of significance, **denotes 5% level of significance, ***denotes 1% level of significance. 
Eventually, I take a look at some very general issues that I used as baseline control variables 
in the previous estimations. These regressions analyze some fundamental differences between 
the groups of students with entrepreneurial intentions at the different types of universities. 
First, the composition of the group of entrepreneurial students with respect to their field of 
studies attracts some notice. In general, it is most of all economics students that express en-
trepreneurial intentions. Students from the field of sciences are significantly less likely to 
have such intentions. At universities with only a chair for entrepreneurship, it is even less 
probable that students with entrepreneurial intentions come from the field of science. But as 
compared to all other students with entrepreneurial intentions, at these universities entrepre-
neurial students are more likely to study engineering or economics. This result probably re-
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flects the comparably limited focus of most chairs for entrepreneurship that concentrate on 
certain faculties. At universities that do not only have a chair for entrepreneurship but also 
participate in the EXIST program, entrepreneurial students are significantly less likely to 
study economics. At these universities students with entrepreneurial intentions not only re-
cruit from the field of engineering, but also science students are significantly more inclined to 
have entrepreneurial intentions. The composition of the group of entrepreneurial students at 
EXIST universities is entirely different. They are significantly less likely to come from the 
fields of science, engineering, or economics. Also children of entrepreneurs are less often 
among them. But male students even more probably belong to the group of students with en-
trepreneurial intentions at EXIST universities. With respect to gender, universities with chairs 
for entrepreneurship and particularly entrepreneurial universities have significantly more fe-
male students in the group of entrepreneurial students, a promising result since female stu-
dents are usually significantly less likely to have entrepreneurial intentions.  
Altogether these results indicate that EXIST universities in general manage to raise their stu-
dents’ entrepreneurial intentions, but that they attract particular students to entrepreneurship. 
These students are neither very focused on their studies, nor are they extraordinarily self-
interested. Moreover, they do come from field of studies that are not the stereotypical sources 
of high-tech entrepreneurship. By now means do I want to speculate about their chances of 
entrepreneurial success. Indeed, I do not have any information on that. It is just worth noticing 
that EXIST universities manage to foster entrepreneurial intentions by attracting a larger vari-
ety of students to entrepreneurship as occupational alternative. 
EXIST universities that also have a chair for entrepreneurship on the contrary do reduce the 
overall probability that students’ have entrepreneurial intentions. But the remaining group of 
students with entrepreneurial intentions can be regarded to be a selective one as well. They 
are very focused on their studies and driven by career considerations. But they are also some-
what less flexible and expect problems on the labor market, so it cannot be ruled out that 
some of them see entrepreneurship as a fallback option. Anyhow, they are significantly more 
likely to study engineering or science, two promising fields for academic entrepreneurship. 
This is some indication that the overall reduction in the students’ entrepreneurial intentions 
could indeed be the result of discouraging students with not too serious intentions. The com-
position of the remaining group of entrepreneurial students does at least not contradict the 
suggestion that entrepreneurial students at entrepreneurial universities are particularly skilled 
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for entrepreneurship. However, the results are not sufficiently conclusive to make a strong 
claim on the quality of entrepreneurial students at entrepreneurial universities yet.  
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter shows that measures for entrepreneurship education applied at universities do 
significantly affect students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship as occupational alternative – 
and that different measures affect students’ attitude differently. Interestingly, the establish-
ment of a chair for entrepreneurship reduces the probability that students can express an opin-
ion on the question whether they would like to be permanently employed as entrepreneur in 
the future. Moreover, this measure makes students less likely to be interested in entrepreneur-
ship as occupational alternative. This could be the result of students becoming more sensitive 
for the challenges related to entrepreneurial endeavors when treated with the information pro-
vided by the chairs. Even though chairs do not affect the students’ overall probability to have 
concrete entrepreneurial intentions, the group of students with entrepreneurial intentions at 
universities with chair for entrepreneurship is somewhat selective. Chairs for entrepreneurship 
particularly affect students from the fields of economics and engineering, i.e. students from 
the faculties the chairs usually belong to. 
Universities that participate in the EXIST program and thus provide a variety of informational 
and consultative services also increase the probability that students are indifferent towards the 
question whether they would like to become an entrepreneur in the future. While these uni-
versities have no effect on the students’ overall interest in entrepreneurship, they significantly 
increase the probability that students have concrete entrepreneurial intentions. The group of 
students with entrepreneurial intentions is anyhow quite specific. EXIST universities attract 
students to entrepreneurship whose subjects are usually somewhat distinct to stereotypical 
entrepreneurial endeavors. Thus it seems that EXIST universities succeed in eliciting entre-
preneurial intentions among students that usually do not tend to have a strong interest in en-
trepreneurship. Whether this is an actual success cannot be evaluated here. Anyhow, it is evi-
dent that EXIST universities spread the “entrepreneurial spirit” comparably widely. 
The most conclusive effect on students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship is obtained by uni-
versities that fully institutionalize entrepreneurship education, i.e. universities that participate 
in the EXIST program and have a chair for entrepreneurship. Only at these entrepreneurial 
universities are students significantly more likely to be able to express an opinion on whether 
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they consider entrepreneurship to be an occupational alternative for themselves. Furthermore, 
these universities succeed in increasing the overall interest in entrepreneurship. But interest-
ingly, students at entrepreneurial universities are significantly less likely to have concrete en-
trepreneurial intentions. When looking at this selective group it turns out that the reduction of 
the overall share of students with entrepreneurial intentions could indeed be the result of stu-
dents giving up unrealistic and even naïve beliefs on this occupation. Moreover, entrepreneur-
ial universities also succeed in getting female students and particularly students from the field 
of science interested in entrepreneurship. 
Controlling for a variety of potential confounds in a diff-in-diff-framework I assess significant 
university effects on the students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship. But the channels of these 
effects remain somewhat unclear. It could be that the educational treatments make students 
change their attitudes on entrepreneurship. But the application of measures of entrepreneur-
ship education could also lead to a selection of particular students into certain types of univer-
sities. The resulting differences in the students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship would be 
university effects either way – but since I cannot account for the potential selection bias, the 
results have to be interpreted with caution. Further research is needed to assess in how far 
measures of entrepreneurship education causally affect students’ attitude, and by what extend 
they attract particular students to specific universities.  
This study suggests that only universities with a strong focus on entrepreneurship succeed in 
establishing an “entrepreneurial culture” at their sites. This is a clear indication that entrepre-
neurship education requires some effort and a broad commitment to succeed. Apparently, 
those universities that fully institutionalize entrepreneurship education arouse the students’ 
interest in entrepreneurship and help them to make up their minds. Whether this leads to an 
increase in the number of academic startups is another question. Given the results at hand one 
could at least suspect that entrepreneurial universities might perhaps not increase the total 
number of academic entrepreneurs, but they may indeed contribute to an improved selection 
of skilled academics into entrepreneurship. In any case, the results obtained in this chapter 
propose that the education of academic entrepreneurs is a strategic task that cannot be fulfilled 
by offering the one or the other entrepreneurship course alone. 
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6. Information Dissemination and Institutional Change40 
6.1 Introduction 
A growing body of literature analyses the political economy of mass media. This literature 
shows that the emergence of newspapers, the radio and television gradually facilitated the 
distribution of information among larger and larger shares of the population thus changing the 
way people think about politics and, as a consequence, the way people vote. This effect is 
largely attributed to selection and filtering during the editorial process of media production 
which eventually influence the formation of voters’ opinions. It seems that more information 
provided by mass media comes at the cost of a potential media-induced bias as scale econo-
mies in the provision of information imply some concentration of media outlets. Biases may 
e.g. arise from media actively supporting a certain political ideology (cf. DellaVigna and 
Kaplan 2007; Durante and Knight, 2012); or the media might concentrate on political issues 
of general interest at the expense of local topics since the media serve increasingly integrated 
markets (Snyder and Strömberg, 2010; Gentzkow, 2006). 
The emergence of the Internet as the new mass medium of the 21st century now changes the 
market of mass media substantially. Information can be distributed at high speed, low cost, 
and broad scope and as a result, there is egalitarian access to the production and the consump-
tion of news (cf. Prat and Strömberg, 2011). The unanswered question is whether the possibil-
ity to avoid editorial filtering did indeed influence political preferences and voting behavior. 
We might expect a more differentiated supply of information but it might just as well be the 
case that editorial offices of existing media outlets employ the Internet to distribute their news 
at an even larger scale. Unfortunately, little is yet known about the role of the Internet with 
the result that “some of the allegedly greater democracy in cyberspace is based more on hope 
and hype than on careful research” (Putnam, 2000, p.173). 
This chapter analyzes the effect of the new mass medium Internet on voting behavior. We 
combine rich panel data on German elections with unique telecommunication data that docu-
ment the availability of broadband Internet access across roughly 12.000 German municipali-
ties.41 The panel structure of our data allows us to compare voting behavior before the Internet 
                                                 
40 This chapter is based on Falck, Oliver, Gold, Robert and Heblich, Stephan (2012), E-Lections: Voting Behav-
ior and the Internet, CESifo Working Paper No. 3827 / IZA Discussion Paper No. 6545. 
41 Broadband Internet access provides a speed of at least 1 Mbit/s. We explicitly concentrate on broadband Inter-
net access as necessary standard to access information through the Internet. At lower rates, it is not possible to 
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era (before the year 2000) to voting behavior after the Internet era began (after the year 
2003).42 Based on this data, we analyze three potential effects of the Internet on voting behav-
ior: (i) the effect of the Internet on voter turnout since mass media are considered to be an 
effective measure for mobilization; (ii) the relative importance of the Internet for established 
parties since the introduction of new media might challenge the established parties’ (often 
exclusive) presence in traditional media; and (iii) whether the Internet provides small parties 
at the left and right fringes a new platform to promote their political ideologies since the tradi-
tional media often filter information on these rather extreme parties and their political goals.  
In all cases, the effect of the Internet on voting behavior is not entirely clear a priori and the 
identification of a causal relation is additionally complicated by endogeneity concerns. Roll-
ing out the infrastructure for high-speed Internet is quite costly what makes it efficient to ex-
ploit scale economies in densely populated areas. Accordingly, the mere correlation between 
Internet availability and voting behavior is rather uninformative because it might just as well 
reflect selective migration to agglomerated areas. If, for instance, people in urban areas were 
more (less) interested in politics or political participation, OLS estimates would be upward 
(downward) biased. We resolve this endogeneity problem by exploiting exogenous variations 
in the transmission capacity of the preexisting voice-telephony network the Internet builds up 
upon.43 
Our identification strategy exploits the incidence that the first generation of DSL broadband 
technology in Germany was entirely built on the existing telephone network which was not 
fully supporting the DSL technology.44 The traditional public switched telephone network is 
based on copper wires which were rolled out long before the Internet era with the officially 
defined goal to provide universal telephone service to all German households. For our pur-
pose, the relevant part of the telephone network is the copper wires that connect households to 
a main distribution frame (MDF). The maximal distance between households and the MDF is 
10 kilometers (6.21 miles). As the exact distance did not affect the quality of telephone ser-
                                                                                                                                                        
effectively access online newspapers and similar information sources. 
42 Broadband Internet infrastructure was initially rolled out in Germany between the years 2000 and 2004. Con-
sequently, we discard this “rollout period” from our analysis. 
43 This strategy is similar to other identification strategies that exploit exogenous variation in technological pos-
sibilities to determine the effects of comparable media on voting behavior and political participation. For in-
stance, Strömberg (2004a) uses geological features that affect the quality of radio reception as instruments for 
the share of households with a radio and Olken (2009) exploits topographical differences that affect signal 
strength to identify the effect of exposure to television. 
44 Digital subscriber line (DSL) is the dominant Internet technology in Germany. DSL includes all technologies 
that employ the wires of a local telephone network to transmit digital data. 
138 
 
vices, the layout of this last connection part was mostly determined by the availability of 
buildings to host MDFs. In contrast to telephone services, the capacity of the DSL technology 
does depend on the length of the copper wire between the household and the MDF. When 
surpassing a threshold of 4.2 kilometers (2.61 miles), DSL technology is no longer feasible 
and parts of the copper wire need to be bypassed with fiber wire. This involves costly earth-
works as wires are rolled out subsurface in Germany and as result, the probability of a munic-
ipality having access to broadband Internet decreases above the threshold. We exploit this 
structural break at the threshold of 4.2 kilometers as exogenous explanation for a systemati-
cally lower availability of DSL. 
Another distance related instrument exploits “wrongly” connected municipalities as source of 
exogenous variation in the availability of DSL. About 6% of the municipalities in Germany 
were connected to an MDF at a distance of more than 4.2 kilometers even though there exist-
ed a MDF closer to this municipality at a distance below the threshold. The choice of these 
“wrong” MDFs reflects the geographic layout of the telephone access areas. At a time when 
distances did not affect the quality of telephone services, organizational considerations of the 
state-owned monopolistic operator of the telephone network (Deutsche Bundespost) deter-
mined the choice of an MDF. And if it was a better fit with the regional structure of the tele-
phone areas, a more distant MDF was chosen. Now that distance does play a role for Internet 
transmission quality, it is often cheaper for the telecommunication carrier to provide DSL to a 
municipality via the closer MDF than the “wrong” MDF that actually serves the municipality. 
This leaves us with an exogenous explanation why some of the municipalities across the 
threshold are more likely to have DSL access.  
Beyond these distance-related instruments, we employ one additional instrument that exploits 
the exogenous variation from a technological mistake that affects the provision of broadband 
Internet till today. After the German reunification in 1990, there was a lack of telephone ac-
cess lines in many parts of East Germany. The new infrastructure that closed this gap was 
built on the basis of a special type of fiber wires instead of copper wires. This new OPAL 
technology was expected to dominate the ICT future as it was suitable for voice-telephony 
services, ISDN services, and for a limited amount of data transmission. However, the ongoing 
request for higher bandwidths soon overextended the OPAL capacities and DSL became the 
leading access technology for broadband Internet in Germany instead. This development was 
the misfortune of roughly 11% of the East German households because the fiber wires were 
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not compatible with the copper cable based DSL technology. Large investments were neces-
sary to reverse this mistake and as a result, many of these areas cannot access DSL until to-
day. This leaves us with an additional source of exogenous variation in DSL availability that 
is not based on geographical distance. 
These sources of exogenous variation turn out to be highly relevant in our instrumental varia-
ble estimations and they all show the expected signs. The results of our voting behavior esti-
mations suggest that an increase in DSL availability from 0 to 100 percent decreases voter 
turnout by 1.3 to 1.8 percentage points. The magnitude of this effect is comparable to the ef-
fect of TV on voter turnout reported in Gentzkow (2006). He estimates that the introduction 
of television in the 1940s and 1950s reduced voter turnout in congressional races by 2 per-
centage points. The direction of our effect supports the hypothesis that the Internet carries less 
political information than the media that it crowds out. Recent research suggests that the In-
ternet does only slightly crowd out TV viewing (Liebowitz and Zentner, 2012). Thus, our 
effect may rather point to a crowding out of newspapers. 
Our findings further suggest that small parties cannot benefit from the Internet as platform to 
increase their publicity. In fact, evidence goes to the opposite direction. Increasing DSL avail-
ability from 0 to 100 percent translates into a 2.1 to 3.3 percentage points higher vote share 
for established parties at the expense of small and especially extreme right-wing parties. The 
latter experience a decrease in their vote shares by 0.4 to 0.5 percentage points. On the ex-
treme left wing of the political spectrum we do not find significant effects on the vote share. 
Overall, these results suggest that established parties make better use of the Internet in the 
post-roll-out phase between the years 2004 and 2008. 
Several robustness tests confirm the validity of our results. First, we consider the existence of 
time-persistent effects which explain systematic differences between the complier municipali-
ties and the control municipalities that are not related to the introduction of DSL. To test for 
this competing explanation, we exploit the panel structure of our data and shift the window of 
our analyses to elections before the emergence of the Internet, i.e. before 2000. In line with 
our arguments, we do not find any indication of differing voting behaviors between complier 
municipalities and control municipalities. In a second set of robustness checks, we consider an 
alternative explanation for the observed effect of the Internet on voting behavior. Imagine that 
the Internet improved the economic conditions of the complier municipalities systematically. 
If better economic conditions influenced voting behavior this would provide an alternative 
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explanation for the observed differences in voting behavior. To test this competing explana-
tion, we perform comparable instrumental variable regressions with a municipality’s unem-
ployment rate as outcome variable. We find no significant effect of DSL availability on the 
unemployment rate suggesting that we indeed identify an information effect of the Internet on 
election outcomes. In a third set of robustness checks we analyze the heterogeneity of the ob-
served effects in more detail and present subsample estimations for East- and West Germany 
and elections at the national level, state level and municipality level. One interesting finding is 
that the effect of the Internet on voter turnout seems to be driven by supra-regional elections 
at the state level and the national level. These effects contrast Gentzkow’s (2006) finding that 
the negative effect of the introduction of TV was especially pronounced in local elections.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the existing litera-
ture on the political economy of mass media and discusses the expected effect of the Internet 
on voting behavior. Section 6.3 introduces the data and shows the association between Inter-
net availability and voting behavior in a multivariate framework. Section 6.4 advances our 
empirical strategy to a causal analysis and introduces our instrumental variable strategy. In 
this section, we also present our baseline results and provide a number of robustness tests to 
support the validity of our findings. Section 6.5 concludes. 
6.2 The Political Economy of Mass Media  
Media are the main source of information for voters about government policies and ideologi-
cal positions of parties and politicians. Theoretical models that formally express this relation-
ship suggest that more information is generally good for voters because it helps them monitor 
politicians more efficiently (cf. Besley and Prat, 2006; Strömberg, 2004b). This simple insight 
is reflected in freedom of information legislations that guarantee access to government infor-
mation. However, the quality of information provided by the media may vary across political 
issues and across regions thus giving rise to different kinds of media bias. One obvious bias 
would arise from a situation where the broad range of mass media was strategically employed 
to manipulate the public opinion (cf. McMillan and Zoido, 2004). We usually observe this in 
rather totalitarian regimes. However, even in the absence of strategic manipulation, media can 
still exert a tendentious influence on the public opinion as they might strengthen voters’ pre-
dispositions by pervasive selection and filtering (cf. Prat and Strömberg, 2011). The intense 
Media coverage of an issue can make people believe that this issue is important (agenda set-
ting); people may evaluate politicians’ decisions based on the issues covered in the media 
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(priming); and the way an issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence on how 
it is understood by audiences (framing). 
These different sources of biases seem especially feasible in the context of traditional mass 
media like newspapers, the radio or TV, where editorial boards determine which topics are 
covered. For instance, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) analyze the impact of the introduction 
of Fox News in the United States on voting behavior between 1996 and 2000 and find that the 
market entry of Fox News had a significant effect on the Presidential elections in 2000 with 
the Republican vote share increasing by 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points. Similarly, Enikolopov, 
Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2009) analyze the expansion of the first private Russian TV chan-
nel (NTV) which supported the opposition in the 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia. 
Their estimations suggest that the presence of the independent TV channel decreased the ag-
gregate vote for the government party by 2.5 percentage points while the combined vote for 
major opposition parties increased by 2.1 percentage points. Moreover, Prat and Strömberg 
(2006) analyze the introduction of a new commercial TV channel in Sweden as additional 
source of political information. Using survey data from the same respondents in two consecu-
tive general elections before and after the entry of the commercial channel in 1990, they find 
significant effects on voters’ political knowledge and voter turnout. 
For the case of information provided by newspapers, Snyder and Strömberg (2010) find that a 
poor fit between newspaper markets and political districts reduces press coverage significant-
ly. Increasing the congruence of newspaper markets and political districts from 0 to 1 is asso-
ciated with 170 more articles written about the district’s congressman. The authors then em-
ploy this variation in press coverage to infer on voter information and its effect on politicians’ 
actions and policies. They find that voters living in areas with less coverage of their U.S. 
House representative are less likely to recall their representative’s name and they are less able 
to describe and rate her. This lack of information (and accountability) leads to significantly 
lower amounts of federal funds flowing into less congruent districts.45 Newspaper coverage 
does also influence voting behavior. Gentzkow et al. (2011) analyze the effect of increased 
newspaper coverage in a panel of all U.S. newspapers published in English language that ex-
isted between 1869 and 2004. They estimate that one extra newspaper is associated with a 0.3 
percent increase in voter turnout. These effects appear to be stronger in the period before 
1929, i.e. before the rise of radio and TV. 
                                                 
45 A similar relationship between newspaper penetration and government spending is also reported by Besley and 
Burgess (2002) for the case of India. 
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Studies on the effect of the introduction of radio and television on political participation again 
suggest an effect of mass media on voting behavior. Strömberg (2004a) analyses the introduc-
tion of the radio in the United States in the period from 1920 to 1940 in the context of an un-
employment relief program that was implemented during the diffusion period of the radio 
between 1933 and 1935. He estimates that an increase in the share of households owning a 
radio from 0 to 1 increases the voter turnout by 7 percentage points in this period. Regions 
with higher radio reception furthermore received higher funds from the unemployment relief 
program. This supports the idea that voters’ access to mass media influences voter turnout and 
government policies. 
Gentzkow (2006) studies the effect of the introduction of television in the U.S. on voter turn-
out in an attempt to explain the observed decrease of voter participation in the period from 
1940 to 1970. Using variation across regions in the timing of the introduction of this mass 
medium, he shows that the introduction of television had a negative effect on voter participa-
tion. The estimations suggest that the introduction of television in the 1940s and 1950s re-
duced the turnout in congressional races (without simultaneous presidential elections) by two 
percent. Gentzkow argues that the effect is caused by TV crowding out media with more ex-
tensive coverage on political issues thus reducing the electorates’ knowledgeability of politi-
cal issues. In line with this, the introduction of television in a region was accompanied by a 
strong decrease of the diffusion of newspapers and radio in this region. By contrast, 
Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2009) estimate that the introduction of local Spanish-
language television increases voter turnout among Hispanics in a metro area by 5 to 10 per-
centage points. 
This chapter focuses on the new mass medium of the 21st century, the Internet, and the effect 
of its introduction on political preferences as they are expressed by voting behavior. Previous 
research on the effect of mass media on voting behavior suggests that the Internet may simi-
larly crowd out traditional media thus affecting voter turnout and election outcomes. In 
providing direct and cheap access to the consumption and production of information, the In-
ternet offers a way to get around editorial filtering. However, the absence of editorial filtering 
may also come at some costs as people now filter news by themselves. When they only con-
sume the information and topics they want to hear and read about anyhow this might cause 
ideological lock-ins (Sunstein, 2001). While the consumption of traditional media such as 
newspapers, radio or even TV still urges people to encounter diverse viewpoints and exposes 
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them to new topics and ideas, self-selected news consumption according to prior beliefs bears 
the risk of segregating thus leading to ideological polarization.46 Accordingly, the introduc-
tion and diffusion of the Internet may increase or decrease the range of news and opinions 
people are exposed to. Consequently, we hypothesize that the Internet like other mass media 
does affect voting behavior, but we do not have a priori assumptions about the direction of its 
effects. 
In an attempt to get a better understanding of the potential ideological bias caused by a selec-
tive use of the Internet, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) analyze the ideological segregation of 
individuals’ online news consumption. Their data for the U.S. suggest that segregation on the 
Internet is low, however higher than in most traditional media, and significantly lower than 
segregation in face-to-face interactions. Online news consumption is mostly concentrated on a 
small number of relatively centrist outlets whereas ideologically extreme outlets such as polit-
ical blogs or activist sites account for a very small share of online news consumption. This 
chapter takes the initial studies on the effect of the Internet on political participation and polit-
ical opinions one step further: It analyzes how the introduction of the Internet and the possi-
bility to consume online news affects actual voting behavior, and assesses the causality of this 
relationship.  
6.3 High-Speed Internet Availability and Voting Behavior  
6.3.1 High-Speed Internet Availability in German Municipalities 
Data on high-speed Internet availability are taken from the German broadband atlas (Breit-
bandatlas Deutschland), an annual survey on broadband Internet availability conducted by the 
German Ministry of Economics and Technology since the year 2005. Network providers self-
report the geographic areas they cover with their networks. This information is combined in a 
comprehensive dataset documenting the percentage of households that can access DSL across 
more than 12,000 German municipalities.47 DSL is the dominant high-speed Internet access 
technology in Germany which provides a bandwidth of at least 1 Mbit/s. This bandwidth is 
                                                 
46 Campante and Hojman (2010) find that the introduction of radio and TV contributed to   a reduction in the 
ideological polarization of the United States in the mid-20th century. 
47 For the interpretation of the subsequent results, one has to keep in mind that in our data the DSL rate on the 
municipality-level is measured as DSL availability, i.e. the percentage of households in a municipality for which 
a DSL connection is available. However, it is not the pure availability of DSL but its use that will affect the 
outcome variables on voting behavior. We thus estimate the effect of DSL availability on the outcome variable 
and not the effect of DSL use. Technically, we thus estimate the intention to treat effect and not the treatment 
effect, a procedure that does overcome the endogeneity problems related to assessing the effect of DSL use. 
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the minimum requirement to use the Internet to access news online properly. For example, the 
webpage Spiegel Online, one of the most retrieved news sites in Germany, loads within 15 
seconds at a connection of 1Mbit/s. With a dial-up Internet connection of 56k, loading the 
same site takes more than one minute. 
Figure 1: Development of Broadband Connections in Germany by Technology 
 
Notes: Bundesnetzagentur (2010, 75). The figure shows the development of broadband connections in Germany. 
The lower, lighter bars show the number of DSL connections that are realized via DSL. The upper, darker bars 
represent the number of broadband connections that are realized via other technologies, mainly via the cable TV 
network. 
Figure 1 shows the development of broadband connections in Germany from 2001 to 2009. 
Broadband connections via DSL technology were introduced to the market for private house-
holds in July 1999 by the incumbent network provider Deutsche Telekom. By the end of the 
year, 100,000 connections existed (Bundesnetzagentur, 2000). The increasing importance of 
the Internet pushed the success of DSL and led Deutsche Telekom and its competitors to in-
vest into the further development of the broadband infrastructure. DSL networks where set up 
in larger cities and as a result, 8% of the population could access DSL in 2001 (Bundesnet-
zagentur, 2001). Out of 1.9 million broadband connections registered in the year 2001, only 
30,000 relayed on another technology than DSL. This underlines the role of DSL as dominant 
technology for broadband Internet connections which persisted over time. Only in 2007, 
broadband connections via other technologies (mainly via the cable TV network) reached 
more than 5% market share. While this share is increasing since then, DSL is by far the most 
commonly used technology to access the Internet in Germany. We disregard the initial years 
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of DSL technology and begin our analysis in 2004 when an adequate number of households 
were connected to broadband Internet. 
We now turn to the question for what purposes individuals use the Internet. We are interested 
in the information function of the Internet thus implicitly assuming that individuals use the 
Internet to some extent to access news. To assess this, we employ a study by Arbeitsgemein-
schaft Media-Analyse that asked nearly 19,000 individuals for which purpose they use the 
Internet (cf. Table 1). The survey was conducted in 2007 and allowed multiple answers. The 
most frequent answer was “Information Search” (94.6 %) closely followed by “Email” 
(89.4%) and “News” (71.7%). By contrast, “Entertainment” has been chosen by only 48.8% 
of the interviewees. These figures suggest that the Internet does have an information function 
and with its various news sites and information channels, the Internet has become an impor-
tant player in the mass media market.  
Table 1: Internet Usage 
 Yes % No % No answer Total 
News 13,594 71.7% 5,312 28.0% 48 18,954 
Information search 17,939 94.6% 984 5.2% 31 18,954 
Entertainment 9,258 48.8% 9,581 50.5% 115 18,954 
Services 10,400 54.9% 8,481 44.7% 73 18,954 
Shopping 10,475 55.3% 8,418 44.4% 61 18,954 
Banking 8,326 43.9% 10,550 55.7% 78 18,954 
Discussion forums 6,153 32.5% 12,727 67.1% 74 18,954 
E-Mail 16,937 89.4% 1,984 10.5% 33 18,954 
Notes: Survey by Arbeitsgemeinschaft Media Anaylse in 2007 among 18,954 Internet users. Interviewees were 
asked for which purpose they use the Internet. Multiple answers were allowed. 
6.3.2 Election data 
We measure the effect of the Internet on three aspects of voting behavior: (i) voter turnout, 
(ii) the vote share of established parties, and (iii) the vote share of radical parties. We observe 
these outcome variables at the municipality-level for elections at the three main levels of gov-
ernance in Germany, i.e. elections for the Federal Parliament (Bundestagswahlen), elections 
for the State Parliaments (Landtagswahlen), and elections for the municipal- or city councils 
(Gemeinderatswahlen or Stadtratswahlen).48 The data are obtained from the statistical offices 
                                                 
48 Note that many German cities do not belong to a county (kreisfreie Staedte). Those municipalities elect their 
own city council, but they do not participate in elections for a county council. Hence we discard elections for the 
county councils that always take place simultaneously to the elections for the municipality councils from our 
analysis. 
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of the 16 German states.49 For each election type, we consider three elections - two elections 
from the time before the year 2000, i.e., before the DSL infrastructure roll-out, and one elec-
tion after the year 2003, i.e., a time when DSL diffusion has surpassed a critical mass of users. 
The resulting time structure of our data is summarized in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Time Structure of the Data 
 
Notes: Roll-out period is discarded from analysis. Effects are measured for post-roll-out-period. Pre-roll-out and 
pre-pre-roll-out periods are used to control for time trends and for placebo estimations. 
We collapse data from different municipalities if municipalities merged during the period of 
our analysis to fully exploit the panel structure of our election data. We include data on all 
elections mentioned above to exploit as many data points in time as possible. Our final dataset 
is a balanced panel of election data that draws a precise picture of political preferences and 
their changes across roughly 12,000 German municipalities over the last 20 years. Table 2 
summarizes the timing of the three types of elections selected for our analysis. 
In the absence of early elections, Federal elections take place every four years. The legislative 
periods of state parliaments vary between 4 and 5 years. Federal parliaments and state parlia-
ments are both legislative bodies that elect and control the respective government. For all 
German parliaments, the electoral system mainly rests on the principle of proportionality, i.e. 
a party’s vote share translates into its share of seats in the elected parliament. Voters deliber-
ately choose their preferred parties and this decision expresses their preference for a party’s 
political profile. Accordingly, the proportional vote is an appropriate approximation of the 
policy-orientation within a specific region.50 
                                                 
49 Namely these are the Statistisches Amt fuer Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein (Hamburg and Schleswig-
Holstein), Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen-Anhalt (Saxony-Anhalt), Amt fuer Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 
(Berlin and Brandenburg), Bayerisches Landesamt fuer Statistik und Datenverarbeitung (Bavaria), Statistisches 
Landesamt Baden-Wuerttemberg (Baden-Wuerttemberg), Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt (Hesse), Statisti-
sches Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz (Rhineland-Palatinate), Statistisches Amt Saarland (Saarland), Landesbetrieb 
fuer Statistik und Kommunikationstechnologie Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), Landesbetrieb Information und 
Technik Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia), Statistisches Landesamt Bremen (Bremen), Statisti-
sches Landesamt des Freistaates Sachsen (Saxony), Statistisches Amt Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Mecklen-
burg-Western Pomerania) and Thueringer Landesamt fuer Statistik (Thuringia). 
50 Note that federal elections and many state elections also contain an element of majority vote as voters can use 
a second ballot to elect their districts representative. With this ballot, voters decide on individual nominees who 
1990 1995 2000 2004 2008
Pre-pre-roll-out Pre-roll-out Roll-out Post-roll-out
No DSL No DSL DSL set up DSL available
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Elections for the municipal- or city councils are held every 4 to 6 years. Those councils do not 
have legislative authority but control and advice authorities at the corresponding regional lev-
el. Nevertheless, councils influence local policy outcomes, since their resolutions are binding 
for the local authorities, thus determining the overall goals and measures of political action on 
the local level. The actual election systems for the municipal- or city councils vary signifi-
cantly between states, mainly with regard to the way mandates are distributed. But nearly all 
municipalities still distribute the seats in the respective councils by proportional rule. The few 
remaining municipalities who apply majority rule as major principle to their council elections 
are discarded from our analysis. We further exclude the three city-states (i.e. Hamburg, Bre-
men and Berlin) from our analysis. Elections on the sub-national level are subject to the spe-
cial institutional setup in these small city states and a comparison with sub-national elections 
in the other 13 states would likely be biased. 
Table 2: The Timing of Elections 
 
pre-pre-period  
(1990-1994) 
pre-period  
(1995-1999) 
post-period  
(2004-2008) election type 
Schleswig-Holstein 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
- 1996 2005 state 
- 1998 2008 local 
Lower Saxony 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1990 1998 2008 state 
1991 1996 2006 local 
North Rhine-Westphalia 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1990 1995 2005 state 
1994 1999 2004 local 
Hesse 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1991 1995 2008 state 
1993 1997 2006 local 
Rhineland-Palatinate 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1991 1996 2006 state 
1994 1999 2004 local 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1992 1996 2006 state 
1994 1999 2004 local 
Bavaria 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1994 1998 2008 state 
1990 1996 2008 local 
...     
                                                                                                                                                        
are mostly party delegates. If they win a majority of votes in their election district, they are elected for parlia-
ment. As the election of individual candidates does not affect the distribution of seats in parliaments, the propor-
tional vote is the decisive vote in all German federal and state elections. Therefore, we restrict our outcome to 
the proportional vote ballots. 
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Saarland 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1990 1999 2004 state 
1994 1999 2004 local 
Brandenburg 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1990 1999 2004 state 
1993 1998 2008 local 
Mecklenburg- 
Western Pomerania 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1990 1998 2006 state 
1994 1999 2004 local 
Saxony 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1990 1999 2004 state 
1994 1999 2004 local 
Saxony-Anhalt 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1990 1998 2006 state 
1994 1999 2004 local 
Thuringia 
1994 1998 2005 federal 
1990 1999 2004 state 
1994 1999 2004 local 
Notes: The Table plots the elections years employed in the paper by state, period (relative to DSL rollout), and 
election type (level of governance). 
The vote shares for established parties, extreme right-wing parties, and extreme left-wing par-
ties are calculated as share of the overall votes in an election and municipality. “Established 
Parties’ vote share” is the combined election results of the conservative parties CDU and 
CSU51, the social democratic party SPD, the liberal party FDP and the ecologist green party 
GRUENE. These parties are active on all levels of governance, have sub-organizations in all 
German states, always participate in all German elections, regularly gain seats in the German 
parliaments, and usually provide the federal government and state governments respectively. 
All five parties have been active for at least 30 years and arguably dominate the political life 
in Germany during the time window of our analysis.  
We refer to all other parties that are not established parties as small parties. This group con-
sists of numerous organizations of different sizes and ideological backgrounds that only occa-
sionally gain seats in state parliaments or the federal parliament52. Within the group of small 
parties, we are especially interested in the election outcomes of parties from the extreme right-
wing and the extreme left-wing of the political spectrum. The most prominent among the “ex-
treme right wing parties” include the radical nationalist parties NPD, DVU and REP.53 At the 
                                                 
51 With the CSU being the Bavarian branch of the CDU. 
52 Nevertheless they might play some role when it comes to city or municipality councils. 
53 We did separate estimations for this pretty selective group of radical nationalist and anti-democratic parties 
with very similar results. These are available from the authors upon request 
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other end of the political spectrum, we look at the combined election results of various Marx-
ist and Leninist parties, first and foremost the socialist party LINKE and its predecessors PDS 
and WASG, and summarize them as “extreme left wing parties’ vote share.”54 
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Election Outcomes, 2004-2008 
 
Observa-
tions Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
National Elections 
     Turnout 12205 0.728 0.070 0.396 0.957 
Vote share established parties 12205 0.851 0.109 0.478 1 
Vote share ext. right-wing parties 12205 0.028 0.022 0.000 0.207 
Vote share ext. left-wing parties 12205 0.105 0.099 0.000 0.449 
State Elections 
     Turnout 12205 0.591 0.098 0.280 1 
Vote share established parties 12205 0.817 0.123 0.345 1 
Vote share ext. right-wing parties 12205 0.034 0.034 0.000 0.382 
Vote share ext. left-wing parties 12205 0.085 0.093 0.000 0.482 
Municipality Elections 
     Turnout 10783 0.609 0.105 0.271 1 
Vote share established parties 10783 0.548 0.336 0.000 1 
Vote share ext. right-wing parties 10783 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.252 
Vote share ext. left-wing parties 10783 0.030 0.070 0.000 0.988 
Notes: The Table presents descriptive statistics for our four outcome variables by election type in the Internet 
era, i.e. the post-rollout period from 2004 to 2008. 
Table 3 shows summary statistics on different election outcomes. From the year 2004 on, vot-
er turnout varied between about 60 percent and 73 percent depending on the type of elections. 
The vote share of established parties reached more than 80 percent in supra-regional elections. 
In local elections, established parties only reached a vote share of about 55 percent. The vote 
share of extreme right wing parties was about 3 percent in supra-regional elections and close 
to zero in local elections. Note that, in general, a single party must reach a vote share of 5 
percent in supra-regional elections to get a seat in the respective parliament. Extreme left 
                                                 
54 However one might think of accounting for the socialist party LINKE as sixth “established” German party as 
well. LINKE is a merger of the PDS, i.e. the successor of the socialist unity party formerly ruling the German 
Democratic Republic and thus mostly active in East Germany, and some leftist parties and factions rooted in 
West Germany. While LINKE nowadays manages to gain a fair amount of votes all across Germany, during our 
period of analysis it was mainly an East German party. Anyhow, we do not find significantly different results 
(available from the authors upon request) for the East German subsample when we include LINKE votes to 
calculate the established parties’ vote share. But it was also at that time of analysis when the merger of the PDS 
and other leftist parties took place, a process provoking some noise in our data on votes related to nowadays’ 
LINKE especially in the West German subsample. Hence we decided to account for the socialist LINKE and its 
predecessors as extreme leftwing parties and stick to the five parties being active all across Germany for so many 
years only to assess established parties’ election outcomes. 
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wing parties reached vote shares of up to 10 percent which is mainly driven by the socialist 
party LINKE and its predecessors PDS and WASG. 
6.3.3 The Association between High-Speed Internet Availability and Voting Behavior  
Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Table 3 show the results of simple multivariate regressions of the 
DSL rate, i.e. the share of households having access to broadband Internet by municipality, on 
our voting outcomes of interest conditional on a set of municipality-level control variables 
including surface, population, female population share, age structure of the population, and 
unemployment rate. For this purpose we concentrate on elections after the DSL infrastructure 
roll-out, i.e., elections from 2004 on. We pool the three types of elections and add election 
type dummies as controls. We further add year of election dummies. In order to only compare 
municipalities that are close to each other and thus arguably similar in many respects with the 
exception of DSL availability, we add a full set of county dummies. The average German 
county contains about 27 municipalities and represents a quite homogenous regional entity. 
We cluster our standard errors on the municipality level in order to account for the fact that 
voting outcomes in the three types of election might be correlated within a municipality.  
Conditional on our municipality-level control variables, election type dummies, year of elec-
tion dummies, and county dummies, we find a significantly negative association between the 
DSL share in a municipality and voter turnout; a significantly positive association between 
DSL share and the vote share of establishes parties; and a significantly positive association 
between DSL share and the vote share of extreme left-wing parties. We find no significant 
association between DSL share in a municipality and the vote share of right wing parties. 
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We do not interpret these results as a causal effect of the DSL availability on voting outcomes 
since there might be unobserved municipality characteristics that are correlated with both the 
DSL share and voting outcomes. Such a bias might arise from the endogenous regional distri-
bution of individuals with different traits, for example, if open-minded and highly educated 
individuals who are also interested in politics preferred to move to dense areas rich of ameni-
ties and job opportunities. At the same time, dense areas face cost advantages in the provision 
of a broadband infrastructure because of scale effects in the roll-out process. Combined with a 
large number of broadband Internet subscriptions in dense areas —presumably from young 
and highly-educated individuals — profit-oriented telecommunication carriers most likely 
started rolling out broadband infrastructure in dense areas. As result our OLS estimates should 
be upward biased. Of course, one can think of many other stories why OLS estimates might 
tell us little about the true underlying causal relationship between broadband Internet access 
and voting behavior. 
To overcome these various sources of estimation bias, we exploit the panel structure of our 
data and include the respective voting outcomes as well as the trend in voting outcomes from 
the years before the introduction of DSL in 2000. This procedure should capture all time in-
variant factors that might bias our results. The results of this next step are shown in Columns 
2, 4, 6, and 8 of Table 3. We still find a significant negative association between DSL share 
and voter turnout and a positive association between DSL availability and the vote share of 
established parties. The association between DSL share and the vote share of extreme left-
wing parties becomes negative and the association between DSL share and the vote share for 
extreme right-wing parties becomes significantly positive. 
While this second step should control for all time invariant factors that might bias our results, 
we still worry about biases from time varying factors that simultaneously came up with the 
DSL technology and that are correlated with voting outcomes. To overcome this, we turn to 
instrumental variable estimations where we exploit path dependencies in the roll-out of DSL 
infrastructure. 
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6.4 Assessing Causality: Path-Dependencies in the Telephone Infrastructure 
6.4.1 Technical Foundations of DSL Infrastructure 
We develop our instrumental variables from technological peculiarities of the traditional pub-
lic switched telephone network in Germany which affect certain municipalities’ possibilities 
to access broadband Internet. The voice network was rolled out at a time when considerations 
of its suitability for DSL technology were not a concern. As early as 1936, we observe 6,647 
local telephone networks with about 3.4 million connections and the network was further de-
veloped to its current layout from the 1950s on. This allows us to identify a treatment group 
of municipalities that got worse initial conditions to access DLS technology at a time when 
DSL was not yet thought of. In the following, we will explain the technological peculiarities 
underlying our instrumental variable estimations in more detail. 
The early generations of DSL technology in Germany completely rely on the copper wires 
between the household and the main distribution frame (MDF) – the so called ‘last mile’ – of 
the traditional public switched telephone network. Employing the existing wires is a signifi-
cant cost advantage because all wires are rolled out subsurface in Germany. Further note that 
the public switched telephone network was rolled out at a time when the provision of tele-
phone services was a state monopoly and the declared goal was to provide universal telephone 
service to all German households. While dense municipalities would always have had an own 
MDF, more rural municipalities typically share an MDF. The length of the copper wires was 
irrelevant for the quality of the telephone services and accordingly, the choice of MDF loca-
tions in more rural areas was determined by restrictions like the availability of buildings to 
host a MDF. However, in a DSL access network distance does play a crucial role because the 
maximum bandwidth attainable depends on the length of the copper wire between the house-
hold and the MDF. When surpassing a threshold of about 4.2 kilometers, DSL technology is 
no more feasible and one has to bypass parts of the copper wire by fiber wire which involves 
costly earthworks that further increase with the length of the bypass. Figure 3 schematically 
summarizes the structure of a DSL network. Figure 4 depicts the distribution of MDFs across 
Germany.  
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Figure 3: The Structure of a DSL Network  
 
Notes: Anell et al. (2007). The access network is based on the traditional copper wires of the public switched 
telephone network (PSTN). The early generations of DSL technology connect the copper wires of the access 
network to the backbone network at the main distribution frame by means of a DSLAM (Digital Subscriber Line 
Access Multiplexer). This structure allows bandwidth of up to 16 Mbit/s. For the newer VDSL technology which 
allows bandwidths of up to 50 Mbit/s and for areas where the distance between households and MDfs are too 
long to make DSL feasible the copper wire between the MDF and a node which is nearer to the household, e.g., a 
street cabinet is bypassed by fiber wire and an (Outdoor-) DSLAM is installed at this node (street cabinet). 
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Figure 4: The Spatial Distribution of Main Distribution Frames (MDF) in Germany
 
 
Notes: The map shows the spatial distribution of the over 8,000 main distribution frames (MDF) in Germany.  
Using GIS, we calculate the geographic distance from the geographic centroids of all munici-
palities to the MDF that serves the municipality. There are more than 8,000 MDFs in Germa-
ny which underlines the ‘micro-geographic’ structure of our data (cf. Figure 4). Figure 5 plots 
the DSL rate of a municipality against its distance to the actual MDF. The plot shows all mu-
nicipalities around the critical threshold of 4,200 meters (2.6 miles). For clarity, the figure 
plots the average DSL availability of municipalities in bins of 100 meters (0.06 miles) as dots 
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while the fitted lines depicting the DSL share (conditional on distance to the MDF) are calcu-
lated on the basis of all single observations. The figure shows the kink in the DSL share at the 
threshold of 4,200 meters (2.6 miles). Municipalities with distances below 4,200 meters all 
have DSL shares between 70 to 80 % (red line). At distances above the critical threshold DSL 
availably begins to decrease sharply (blue line). 
Figure 5: DSL Rate of Municipalities Conditional on Distance to MDF 
 
Notes: The Figure plots the share of households with DSL access in a municipality (municipalities are averaged 
across bins of 100 meter) against the distance from the geographic centroid of the municipality to the actual main 
distribution frame (MDF). The red line to the left of the technological threshold and the blue line to the right of 
the threshold are both fitted lines on the basis of individual observations. 
A second source of exogenous variation comes from some 6% of the municipalities with a 
distance to their actual MDF that is greater than 4,200 meters where a closer MDF exists at a 
distance below the threshold of 4,200 meters. This peculiarity is the result of the geographic 
layout of the telephone access areas that were designed when distance was irrelevant. At that 
time, organizational considerations determined the allocation of municipalities’ to certain tel-
ephone access areas. The assignment to a certain telephone access area tied the municipality 
to a particular MDF which, in some cases, was further away than a neighboring telephone 
access area’s MDF. In such a situation it is now often cheaper for the telecommunication car-
rier to provide DSL to a municipality via the closer MDF than the “wrong” MDF the munici-
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pality is actually connected to. We construct a dummy variable that equals unity for munici-
palities that are actually connected to a “wrong” MDF at a distance of more than 4,200 meters 
which could be connected to another MDF at a distance below 4,200 meters. We expect this 
dummy variable to have a significant positive impact on DSL availability in the municipality.  
The third source of exogenous variation is independent of distance. After the German reunifi-
cation in 1990, there was a huge lack of telephone access lines in many parts of East Germa-
ny. To close gap, telephony infrastructure was rolled out which was built on the basis of a 
special type of fiber wires, the so called OPAL technology, instead of the traditionally used 
copper wires. In the early 1990s, this technology was regarded to be the state-of-the-art tech-
nology that would dominate the ICT future. It is suited for voice-telephony services, ISDN 
services, and for a limited amount of data transmission. OPAL technology was eventually 
rolled out in 213 East German areas (c.f. Figure 6). But then things changed dramatically: The 
world saw the Internet revolution taking over with the Internet becoming a mass phenomenon 
and services on the Internet demanding higher and higher bandwidths; for reasons described 
above, DSL technologies became the leading access technologies for broadband Internet in 
Germany. This was, however, misfortune for the thought-to-be-high-tech OPAL areas. The 
reason for this is that OPAL technology is simply not compatible with DSL technologies. In 
order to still provide broadband Internet to OPAL areas, one was confronted with two very 
costly alternatives. One could either replace the OPAL wires of the access network by copper 
wires or, what is even more expensive; install new hardware and software at the network’s 
nodes. We construct a dummy that equals unity for municipalities being situated in a (former) 
East German OPAL access area. We expect this dummy to have a significant negative impact 
on DSL availability. 
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Figure 6: OPAL Access Nodes in East Germany 
 
Notes: The map shows the Opal access nodes in East German that provided about 11 percent of the East German 
population with OPAL technology. 
Table 4 show the results of a multivariate regression where we regress the DSL share in a 
municipality on the variables that are technically derived from the characteristics of the pre-
existing voice-telephony network. These variables are the distance to the actual MDF, a 
threshold dummy for distances above 4,200 meters, the interaction between distance and the 
threshold dummy, a dummy for municipalities which are actually connected to a “wrong” 
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MDF, a dummy for municipalities that are actually connected to a “wrong” MDF with another 
MDF at a distance below 4,200 meters, and an OPAL dummy. 
Table 4: DSL Share in Municipalities and Characteristics of the Pre-Existing Voice-Telephony Network 
 DSL share 
Distance (in km) 
(minus 4.2km) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Threshold (4.2 km) -0.039*** 
(0.008) 
Distance * threshold -0.055*** 
(0.005) 
“Wrong” MDF dummy -0.012* 
(0.007) 
Actual MDF > 4.2 km & 
closer MDF <4.2 km 
0.101*** 
(0.010) 
OPAL dummy -0.076*** 
(0.017) 
R² 0.394 
Notes: Municipality-level regression of technical characteristics of the pre-existing voice telephony network on 
the share of households for which DSL is technically feasible in a municipality. Clustered standard errors on the 
municipality-level are reported in parentheses. *** 1 % significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% sig-
nificance level. 
The results clearly confirm our technical predictions. Distance turns out to be irrelevant for 
DSL availability in a municipality below the critical threshold of 4,200 meters. At the thresh-
old, the DSL share drops by 3.9 percentage points. Above this threshold the DSL share de-
creases by 5.5 percentages points with every kilometer the municipality is farer away from the 
MDF. Not being connected to the closest MDF only shows a small negative effect. However, 
for municipalities that are actually connected to a MDF farer away than 4.2 kilometers but for 
which another MDF is closer by the DSL share increases by 10.1 percentage points due to the 
potential to redirect DSL access to the closer MDF. Finally, the DSL share of municipalities 
lying in OPAL areas is 7.6 percentage points lower. In a next step, we exploit these technical 
features of the pre-existing voice telephony network in an instrumental variables approach to 
identify an arguably causal effect of DSL availability on voting behavior. 
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6.4.2 The Causal Effect of High-Speed Internet Availability on Voting Behavior 
We use the instruments for the DSL share in a municipality derived in Section 6.4.1 in a 2SLS 
procedure to estimate the causal effect of high-speed Internet availability on voting behavior. 
Column 1 of Table 5 shows the results for our full sample where we consider the outcomes of 
elections after 2004 at the three main levels of governance in Germany, i.e. elections for the 
Federal Parliament (Bundestagswahlen), elections for the State Parliaments 
(Landtagswahlen), and elections for the municipal- or city councils (Gemeinderats- or 
Stadtratswahlen). Each cell shows the DSL share coefficient from a separate regression. All 
regressions include contemporaneous municipality characteristics (surface, population, female 
population share, age structure of the population, and unemployment rate), pre-DSL-
infrastructure-roll-out election outcomes and time trends in election outcomes, election type 
dummies, county dummies, and year dummies. We cluster our standard errors at the munici-
pality level. 
Table 5: Instrumental Variable Results 
 Full sample 
 
(1) 
>3000m 
 
(2) 
No own mdf 
 
(3) 
No own mdf 
Placebo 
(4) 
Turnout -0.037*** 
(0.007) 
-0.013* 
(0.008) 
-0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
Vote share 
Incumbents 
0.041*** 
(0.011) 
0.033*** 
(0.012) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
Vote share 
Ex. right-wing parties 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Vote share 
Ex. left-wing parties 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
Unemployment rate 0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
Number of observations 31,930 15,392 17,857 17,842 
F test of ex. Instruments 59.74 55.43 61.17 60.76 
Notes: Municipality-level pooled 2SLS regressions for elections after 2004 at three main levels of governance in 
Germany, i.e. elections for the Federal Parliament (Bundestagswahlen), elections for the State Parliaments 
(Landtagswahlen), and elections for the municipal- or city councils (Gemeinderatswahlen or Stadtratswahlen). 
Each cell shows the DSL share coefficient from a separate regression. All regressions include contemporaneous 
municipality characteristics (surface, population, female population share, age structure of the population, and 
unemployment rate), pre-DSL-infrastructure roll-out election outcomes and trends in election outcomes, election 
type dummies, county dummies, and year dummies. Clustered standard errors on the municipality-level are re-
ported in parentheses. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level 
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The F-test of excluded instruments underlines the high relevance of our instruments. The DSL 
share coefficients in Column 1 are – except for vote shares of the extreme left- and right-wing 
parties – similar to those observed in the comparable multivariate regressions of Table 3, but 
they tend to be somewhat bigger. This might either signify that our OLS estimates were 
downward biased or a violation of the exclusion restriction that our instruments only affect 
voting outcomes through the DSL share. As argued in section 6.4.1, we do not believe that the 
location choice of the MDF is as-good-as random in densely populated areas. However, we 
believe that the MDF location is truly random for more rural areas where several municipali-
ties share a MDF and the choice of the location of the MDF was determined by other re-
strictions, such as the availability of buildings to host the MDF. We thus restrict our sample to 
more rural areas by either restricting our sample to municipalities with a distance of at least 
3000 meters to the MDF they are connected to (Column 2) or by restricting our sample to 
municipalities without own MDF (Column 3), i.e. municipalities that are connected to an 
MDF of a neighboring municipality.55 The latter subsample is our preferred sample because it 
only contains municipalities that were not lucky to get an own MDF and some of them had 
the additional misfortune that the next MDF is relatively far away. Hence for this subsample, 
the location of the MDF can most certainly be considered to be truly orthogonal to our out-
comes of interest.  
Our results clearly show a negative effect of DSL availability on voter turnout. An increase in 
DSL availability from 0 to 100 percent is estimated to have decreased voter turnout by 1.3 
(Column 2) to 1.8 (Column 3) percent. The magnitude of this effect is comparable to the neg-
ative effect of TV on voter turnout found by Gentzkow (2006). He estimates that the introduc-
tion of television in the 1940s and 1950s reduced the turnout in congressional races by 2 per-
centage points. Our results are in line with the hypothesis that the Internet carries less political 
information than the media that it crowds out. Recent research suggests that the Internet does 
only slightly crowd out TV viewing. Thus, our effect might especially point to a crowding out 
of newspapers. 
We further find that DSL availability increases the vote share of established parties at the ex-
pense of small parties and especially extreme right-wing parties. The vote share of established 
parties increases by 2.1 to 3.3 percentage points when DSL availability increases from 0 to 
100 percent. By contrast, the vote share of extreme right-wing parties decreases by 0.4 to 0.5 
                                                 
55 We ran estimations for a variety of subsamples with different distances to the MDF and ranges around the 
threshold which yielded similar results. Overall, our selected subsamples provide conservative estimates. 
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percentage points. We find no significant effect on the vote share of extreme left-wing parties. 
These results suggest that despite the low cost of news production in the Internet, the estab-
lished parties are more successful to make use of the Internet for their purposes.  
One might argue that our complier municipalities already differed from the other municipali-
ties in terms of voting outcomes before the introduction of DSL. Although we already control 
for pre-DSL-infrastructure-roll-out election outcomes and trends in election outcomes, we 
additionally run placebo regressions. In the placebo regressions, we regress pre-DSL-
infrastructure voting outcomes from the years 1995 to 1999 on instrumented DSL availability. 
In fact, (instrumented) DSL availability cannot affect voting behavior in these years, since the 
technology did just not exist. Hence measuring significant placebo coefficients would be an 
indication for an omitted variables bias in our IV regressions. Again, these placebo regres-
sions include contemporaneous municipality characteristics from the pre-roll-out period (sur-
face, population, female population share, age structure of the population, and unemployment 
rate), pre-DSL-infrastructure-roll-out election outcomes, election type dummies, county 
dummies, and year dummies. We also cluster our standard errors at the municipality level. 
The results are shown in Column 4 of Table 5. All coefficients are not significant different 
from zero and the point estimate of most of them is also close to zero. This provides confi-
dence that we indeed identify a causal effect of high-speed Internet availability on voting be-
havior which does not simply reflect persistent differences between municipalities. 
Another argument might be that we indeed identify a causal effect of the Internet on voting 
behavior but that the channel is an economic one rather than an information channel. The idea 
behind is that broadband availability may foster economic growth in a municipality and that 
people vote differently in prospering municipalities. Indeed, Kolko (2012) finds evidence for 
the US that local broadband fosters economic growth whereby the effect is especially strong 
in more rural areas. Czernich et al. (2011) show important economic growth effects of broad-
band infrastructure in a cross-country analysis. To account for that, we ran comparable in-
strumental variable regressions with a municipality’s unemployment rate as outcome. The 
results are presented in Line 5 of Table 5. This setup considers the unemployment rate to be 
an indicator for a municipality’s overall economic situation. Apart from the likely biased es-
timate for the full sample, we find no significant effect of DSL availability on the unemploy-
ment rate which is in contrast to Kolko’s results. The difference in the results might be ex-
plained by two facts: First, broadband appeared in the US several years earlier than in Germa-
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ny and local broadband affects economic growth only in the long run. Second, economic ac-
tivities were initially more evenly distributed across space in Germany than in the US such 
that local broadband is more important for rural areas in the US to bridge distances than in 
Germany. This result confirms that we indeed identify an information effect of the Internet on 
voting behavior. 
Finally, we turn to the heterogeneity of the effect of DSL availability on voting outcomes 
(1) across election types, i.e., federal - , state -, and municipality elections, and (2) between 
East and West Germany.56 Table 6 shows the effects of DSL availability on our voting out-
comes of interest across the three election types. These subsample analyzes suggest that the 
effect of the Internet on voter turnout is driven by supra-regional elections at the federal and 
state level while the effect of the Internet on the vote share of established parties is mainly 
driven by municipality elections. Interestingly, the effects on voter turnout contrast 
Gentzkow’s (2006) finding that the negative effect of the introduction of TV was especially 
pronounced in local elections with the TV crowding out newspapers. A possible explanation 
for this puzzle could be that the Internet indeed crowds out national newspapers but not local 
newspapers.57  
  
                                                 
56 Remember that we account for this heterogeneity by (i) including election type dummies and (ii) including 
county fixed effects in all previous regressions. 
57 This would be line with findings on crowding out of social capital by TV and the Internet. Local newspapers 
are often seen as a measure for local social capital or the “civicness” of the local population (Putnam 1993). 
Olken (2009) shows that TV crowds out local social capital while the Internet does not seem to crowd out social 
capital measured over several dimensions (Bauernschuster et al. 2011). 
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Table 6: IV Regressions by Election Type 
 Turnout Vote share 
Incumbents 
Vote share 
Ex. right-wing 
parties 
Vote share 
Ex. left-wing 
parties 
Federal elections (Municipalities without own MDF) 
DSL availability -0.019*** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
Number of observations 6,897 6,897 6,897 6,897 
R² 0.684 0.908 0.630 0.920 
F test of ex. Instruments 53.98 54.41 54.15 54.58 
State elections (Municipalities without own MDF) 
DSL availability -0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
Number of observations 6,190 6,190 6,190 6,190 
R² 0.715 0.872 0.743 0.905 
F test of ex. Instruments 74,02 73.98 74.20 74.20 
Municipality elections (Municipalities without own MDF) 
DSL availability -0.005 
(0.020) 
0.116*** 
(0.057) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
Number of observations 4,783 4,783 4,783 4,783 
R² 0.698 0.777 0.092 0.664 
F test of ex. Instruments 17.68 17.60 17.94 18.01 
Notes: Municipality-level IV regressions for elections after 2004. All regressions include municipality character-
istics (surface, population, female population share, age structure of the population, and unemployment rate), 
pre-DSL-infrastructure roll-out election outcomes and trends in election outcomes, election type dummies, coun-
ty dummies, year dummies. Clustered standard errors on the municipality-level are reported in parentheses. 
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level. 
Table 7 shows effect differences between West and East Germany. These subsample analyzes 
suggest that the effect of the Internet on voter turnout is driven by West German municipali-
ties while the effect on the vote share of incumbents is driven by East Germany. The zero 
effect on voter turnout in East Germany suggests that the Internet did not crowd out other 
media in this part of Germany. In fact, TV was regarded to be ideologically biased and did not 
enjoy a good reputation in East Germany. Furthermore, after reunification only local newspa-
pers emerged while important supra-regional newspapers do not exist in East Germany. The 
strong effect of the Internet on the vote share of established parties might also reflect a lack-
ing experience with democracy among East Germans. After decades of socialist rule, East 
Germans had to initially build up political preferences from scratch. Against this background, 
information provided by an entirely new and thus “unbiased” medium like the Internet might 
contribute to a harmonization of voting patterns between East and West Germans. 
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Table 7: IV Regressions for West and East Germany 
 Turnout Vote share 
Incumbents 
Vote share 
Ex. right-wing 
parties 
Vote share 
Ex. left-wing par-
ties 
West Germany (Municipalities without own MDF) 
DSL availability 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Number of observations 11,171 11,171 11,171 11,171 
R² 0.725 0.892 0.632 0.607 
F test of ex. Instruments 76.80 76.66 76.73 76.68 
East Germany (Municipalities without own MDF) 
DSL availability 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
0.041* 
(0.024) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
Number of observations 6,686 6,686 6,686 6,686 
R² 0.727 0.816 0.637 0.808 
F test of ex. Instruments 16.01 16.21 16.10 16.29 
Notes: Municipality-level pooled IV regressions for elections after 2004 at three main levels of governance in 
Germany, i.e. elections for the Federal Parliament (Bundestagswahlen), elections for the State Parliaments 
(Landtagswahlen), and elections for the municipal- or city councils (Gemeinderatswahlen or Stadtratswahlen). 
All regressions include municipality characteristics (surface, population, female population share, age structure 
of the population, and unemployment rate), pre-DSL-infrastructure roll-out election outcomes and trends in 
election outcomes, election type dummies, county dummies, year dummies. Clustered standard errors on the 
municipality-level are reported in parentheses. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% sig-
nificance level. 
6.5 Conclusions  
This chapter analyses the effect of the Internet on voting behavior. Research on the introduc-
tion of the equally influential mass media radio and TV shows that increased media coverage 
provides more information for voters. However, while more information is generally good for 
voters because it promotes accountability of politicians, research on the political economy of 
mass media also suggests that editorial filtering and the selection of certain topics can lead to 
adverse effects. If the media disseminate biased information, more information does not nec-
essarily imply more transparency. In the Internet, editorial filtering is per se not a problem. 
Everyone can consume and produce information without any restriction and at reasonable 
costs. At the same time, the almost unlimited possibility to supply information bears the risk 
of an information overflow. As a result, people may concentrate on a limited number of topics 
and areas they want to hear and read about which may foster segregation and ideological po-
larization. An alternative reaction to an overflow of information would be that people demand 
aggregated sources of information. In this case, existing media outlets could simply use their 
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infrastructure to provide their news and information through an additional channel, the Inter-
net.  
Our analysis tests the effect of the Internet on three different aspects of voting behavior. First, 
we look at voter participation and find small negative effects of Internet access on voter turn-
out. One possible explanation could be that the Internet crowds out other media that contain 
more or “better” information. Such effects have been found for the introduction of TV which 
led to a crowding out of newspapers. Another possible interpretation of this finding could be 
that the Internet promotes other ways of political participation than elections. This might es-
pecially be the case for people who are interested in topics off the main policy issues. Before 
the Internet era, voting for small parties without a chance to win a significant vote share was 
one way to make a political statement. In the Internet era, blogging may be a more effective 
way to express political opinions on specific topics. In line with this, analyzing vote-shares of 
established parties as second outcome variable shows positive effects on incumbent parties’ 
vote shares. This goes in line with a decrease in votes for small parties which might reflect 
established parties’ better presence on the web. Finally, analyzing the vote shares for radical 
parties at the ideological fringes as third outcome variable does not provides evidence for ide-
ological polarization. 
We believe that our instrumental variable strategy enables us to report plausibly causal effects 
of the Internet on three different aspects of voting behavior, i.e. (i) turnout; (ii) established 
parties’ vote shares; and (iii) radical parties’ vote shares. The effect sizes are in the range of 
what other studies found for the introduction of the radio and TV. However, the direction of 
the effects also suggests that the Internet is a different medium than traditional mass media. 
While Gentzkow (2006) argues that TV crowds out local newspapers with negative effects on 
voter turnout in local elections, we find no Internet effect on local elections’ voter turnout. 
The negative effect of the Internet on voter turnout in state elections and federal elections 
could nevertheless be an indication of a crowding out of national newspapers. But we believe 
that it requires more research on the joint effect of the Internet and traditional mass media on 
voting behavior to establish these mechanisms. Regarding the positive effect on established 
parties’ vote share, we should stress that our analysis only suggests that incumbent parties 
benefit from the introduction of the Internet. Further research is needed to assess whether this 
advantage persists, or whether small parties are able to catch up in mobilizing voters via this 
new medium. 
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7. Epilogue 
This thesis’ goal is to explore the interrelation between institutions and entrepreneurship. The 
mere existence of this correlation does certainly not come as a big surprise. Anyhow, disen-
tangling the effects of explicit and implicit institutions, this thesis tracks down the effects of 
implicit institutions and provides evidence that cultural values and traditional norms exert a 
significant influence on entrepreneurship to a degree that was not necessarily expected ex 
ante. Those informal rules and codes of conduct affect individuals’ preferences, and conse-
quently influence the occupational choice people make. Since implicit institutions are region-
ally sticky, they restrict the entrepreneurial potential of regions to a fair degree. Accordingly, 
part of the variation Audretsch and Fritsch (2002) find in the levels of entrepreneurship be-
tween growth-regimes could relate to differences in the implicit institutions of these regimes.  
Anyway, the effects of implicit institutions are a policy issue – at the latest when it comes to 
entrepreneurship policies. In the best case, cultural norms and values are supportive of entre-
preneurship and can act as complements to policy measures taken to enhance entrepreneur-
ship in some regions. In the worst case, implicit institutions represent obstacles to entrepre-
neurship in other regions that cannot be overcome by policy either. Overall, policies designed 
to support entrepreneurship must take regional differences in the implicit institutions into ac-
count. Measures that are highly effective in one region might have adverse effects in other 
regions if cultural norms and traditional values are neglected. Particularly, policies designed 
to raise people’s interest in entrepreneurship must account for regional heterogeneity in order 
to be successful. 
This is particularly true for differences in the implicit institutions between East and West 
Germany. This thesis confirms that implicit institutions change rather slowly, so that the so-
cialist experience in the Eastern part of Germany has its prolonged aftermath in entrepreneur-
ship-skeptical norms and values. Anyhow, this thesis fails to account for the within variance 
in East Germany with respect to institutions and entrepreneurship. Already under the socialist 
regime in the GDR, there were regions with a fair amount of entrepreneurial activity in East 
Germany (Wyrwich, 2010), what might hint at differences in the implicit institutions as well. 
The origins of the regional differences in entrepreneurial activity in the GDR and the question 
in how far these differences translate into differences in the performance of East German re-
gions in reunified Germany leave much room for further research. If other former socialist 
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countries show similar effects of implicit institutions on entrepreneurship is another question 
for future work. However, this thesis shows that the transition of East Germany could proba-
bly be fastened if the implicit institutions changed. This is possibly true for other regions and 
countries as well. 
One measure to support the adaptation of institutions is education. This thesis clearly shows 
that the socialist regime in the GDR shaped entrepreneurship-adverse institutions by educa-
tion from childhood on. This thesis also provides some hints for the adversative effect of 
schooling in a libertarian regime that partly reverses the negative effects of a previous social-
ist treatment. Consequently, an individual’s attitude towards entrepreneurship is affected by 
education, whereby already pre-university schooling influences the formation of individual 
preferences. Of course, in a liberal market economy nobody would honestly propose that 
school education would be a good way to manipulate students’ preferences in favor of entre-
preneurship. But one might discuss the picture drawn from the role of the entrepreneur within 
society in the classroom. Apparently, the GDR managed to indoctrinate their citizens by 
drawing a negative picture of the exploitative capitalist. Integrating entrepreneurship into sec-
ondary schools’ curricula and discussing entrepreneurial achievements in class might perhaps 
elicit students’ interest in entrepreneurship – at least it would raise their awareness of this is-
sue. But whatever measures of entrepreneurship education could be taken, this thesis suggests 
that entrepreneurship education effectively starts at secondary school, the latest.   
Anyhow, the formation of entrepreneurial preferences continues after graduation from sec-
ondary school, as this thesis illustrates. Indeed, measures of entrepreneurship education still 
affect the attitude towards entrepreneurship of university students. But this thesis also shows 
that entrepreneurship education needs a strategic concept to be effective. Only if entrepre-
neurship education comprises broad information combined with consultancy services students 
can form an opinion on whether they would like to become an entrepreneur. Additionally, 
entrepreneurship education requires a comprehensive approach to actually raise students’ in-
terest in an occupation as entrepreneur. Consequently, policies designed to improve entrepre-
neurship education and attract people to a self-employed occupation cannot be implemented 
en passant, but need a prospective focus and an organizational commitment so succeed. Ad-
mittedly, the formation of occupational preferences, particularly the time dimension of the 
development of attitudes towards entrepreneurship, needs more thorough investigation in or-
der to give concrete policy advice. 
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Nevertheless, this thesis suggests that it is information that contributes to the effects of entre-
preneurship education. Indeed, it is information that matters most for an individual facing an 
occupational choice. Against the information asymmetries necessarily associated with a deci-
sion that should maximize income over one’s own life-cycle, the decision in favor of or 
against self-employment is undeniably a difficult one, even more if labor market rigidities 
induce path-dependencies. This dilemma is described by Smith (1759/1982, 157), where the 
“man of today” has to deal with the decisions of the “man of yesterday”. And Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1998) show that many men of today working as employees wish that the man of 
yesterday had decided to become an entrepreneur. Against the veil of uncertainty under which 
occupational choices have to be made, information is probably the only means to achieve su-
perior results. Of course, policy cannot entirely overcome the information asymmetries related 
to an individual’s decision to become an entrepreneur. But the provision of information on 
entrepreneurship as well as offering supplementary services like coaching and consultancy 
must certainly be part of a holistic concept of entrepreneurship education, that aims at improv-
ing the mechanisms of self-selection into entrepreneurship.       
In the end, it is individuals’ decisions that account for the levels of entrepreneurship realized 
in a region – and for regional differences with respect to entrepreneurship. This thesis sug-
gests that these decisions are made according to individual preferences that are affected by 
implicit institutions. Another influences factor on preferences is information, as this thesis 
confirms. Accordingly, information may lead to an adjustment in the implicit institutions, if 
preference structures change sustainably. In order to predict these processes more precisely, 
more research is needed on the interplay between institutions and entrepreneurship. This the-
sis anyhow suggests that new technologies like the Internet might help to fasten institutional 
change. Accordingly, it is not only the content of information, but also the channel of its dis-
semination that matters – even though these are most likely two sides of the same coin. Any-
how this thesis demonstrates that new technologies for information dissemination provide 
opportunities for those how know how to make use of it, i.e. that understand how to utilize 
new communication channels to bring their message across. Thus, the Internet could prove to 
be a medium that helps to raise individual’s awareness of entrepreneurship as occupational 
alternative, if it is employed appropriately. Providing information on entrepreneurship via the 
Internet and offering support to wannabe-entrepreneurs could increase people’s interest in this 
issue and also to fasten the convergence of implicit institutions within Germany. At least, it is 
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apparently an attractive channel to advertise the respective policies, thus potentially advanc-
ing the interplay between institutions and entrepreneurship.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Detailed variable description of the data used in chapter 4 
Category Variable Description 
Dependent 
Variable 
Entrepreneurial 
intention 
Question: In which area do you want to be permanently 
employed in the future? Option self-employed 
(entrepreneur or freelancer). Answers on a 4-point-scale. 
Variable is unity if respondent chooses “yes, certainly” and 
zero otherwise. 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Raised in the 
GDR 
Variable is unity if respondent graduated from school in 
East Germany (former GDR), zero otherwise. 
Control:  
Education 
Final degree 
aspired 
Six categories indicating which degree the respondent 
finally wants to reach (Diploma, Magister Artium, state 
examination, etc.). 
 High school 
certificate 
Demeaned variable indicating the grade reached in high 
school certificate. 
  Immediate 
start 
Variable is unity if respondent started studies immediately 
after school, zero otherwise. 
  Intermediate 
examination 
For categories indicating that intermediate examinations 
exist, whether the respondent has taken this examination 
and whether it was passed. 
Control:  
Socialization 
 
School 
education 
father  / 
School 
education 
mother 
Categorical variable indicating the level of school 
education for the respondent’s father and mother 
separately. Discriminates secondary school (8th grade), 
middle school (10th grade), high school (12th/13th grade), 
and no graduation (less than 8th grade). 
 Occupation 
father / 
Occupation 
mother 
Categorical variable indicating the actual occupation of the 
respondent’s mother, respectively, father. Discriminates 
public officials, white-collar workers in the public sector, 
white-collar workers in the private sector, blue-collar 
workers in the public sector, blue-collar workers in the 
private sector, self-employed, and others. 
Control:  
Job experience 
and perspectives 
Job experience Binary variable indicating whether respondent has been 
working before starting studies 
Student job Binary variable indicating whether respondent has a 
student job 
  Decided on job Binary variable indicating whether respondent has yet 
decided on future occupation 
  Job 
perspectives 
Categorical variable indicating the student‘s self-assessed 
job perspective 
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Control:  
Individual 
characteristics 
Field of study Thirteen categories indicating the respondent’s major: 
linguistic and cultural studies; psychology; pedagogics; 
sport; law; social sciences; economic sciences; 
mathematics & natural science; medicine; agronomy, 
forestry, nutrition science; engineering; arts; other. 
 Wave Wave 5: winter term 1992/93; Wave 6: winter term 
1994/95, Wave 7: winter term 1997/98. 
  Kind of studies Four categories indicating whether respondent is obtaining 
first degree, second degree, doctoral degree, or doing other 
postgraduate courses. 
  Term Number of terms the respondent has already been studying 
his/her major. 
  Marital status Four categories: married, not married but living with 
permanent partner, single without permanent partner, 
widowed/divorced. 
  Children Number of children. 
  Age Continuous variable 
  Sex Dummy variable 
  University Dummies for 23 German universities (universities, 
technical universities, and universities of applied sciences). 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Dissertationsschrift „Institutions and Entrepreneurship“ beschäftigt sich mit 
institutionellen Einflussfaktoren auf Entrepreneurship, d.h. (innovatives) Unternehmertum im 
Sinne Schumpeters. Die fünf Kapitel des Hauptteils der Arbeit basieren auf fünf Forschungspa-
pieren, welche den Zusammenhang von institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen und Entre-
preneurship aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln beleuchten. Den Kern der Arbeit bildet die empiri-
sche Analyse der Einflüsse institutionellen Wandels auf die individuelle Entscheidung, den Beruf 
des Unternehmers zu ergreifen. Dabei wird nach den Effekten expliziter Institutionen, d.h. des 
formellen Regelrahmens für Marktaustauschprozesse, wie er sich aus kodifizierten Regeln, Ge-
setzen und Verträgen ergibt, und den Effekten impliziter Institutionen, d.h. informeller Normen, 
Werte und Verfahrensweisen, die aus Kultur und Tradition resultieren, differenziert.  
Die Dissertation zeigt auf, dass gerade jene impliziten Institutionen einen nachhaltigen Einfluss 
auf die berufliche Selbstselektion von Individuen in die Tätigkeit als Unternehmer haben. In die-
sem Zusammenhang wird die Bedeutung von Erziehung für die Ausbildung Entrepreneurship-
affiner Präferenzen analysiert. Die Dissertation legt anhand von Untersuchungen zu den berufli-
chen Absichten von Hochschulstudenten dar, dass sowohl die voruniversitäre Erziehung als auch 
Maßnahmen zur Entrepreneurship-Ausbildung an Hochschulen das Interesse am Beruf des Un-
ternehmers signifikant beeinflussen. Schließlich wendet sich die Arbeit dem institutionellen 
Wandel an sich zu und analysiert den Einfluss von Information und Informationsvermittlung auf 
institutionelle Wandlungsprozesse, v.a. auf die Ausbildung impliziter Institutionen. Dabei wer-
den Effekte des Internets als Informationsmedium auf das Wahlverhalten als Indikator für Norm- 
und Wertorientierungen identifiziert. 
Nach einleitenden Erörterungen zu den Wechselbeziehungen von Institutionen und 
Entrepreneurship in Kapitel 1 beschäftigt sich Kapitel 2 zunächst mit der Unterscheidung von 
expliziten und impliziten Institutionen und ihren Einflüssen auf die Selbstselektion in das Berufs-
feld Unternehmertum. Unter Ausnutzung der deutschen Geschichte von Teilung und Wiederver-
einigung als quasi-natürlichem Experiment wird der Effekt impliziter Institutionen, wie sie sich 
im Osten Deutschlands durch die kollektive Erfahrung des sozialistischen Regimes ausgebildet 
haben, herausgearbeitet. Während sich der explizite Institutionenrahmen seit der Wiedervereini-
gung in allen Landesteilen einheitlich darstellt, unterscheiden sich die impliziten Institutionen in 
den Neuen Bundesländern signifikant von denen der Alten Bundeländer. In den Werten und 
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Normen, denen die ostdeutschen Individuen anhängen, finden sich auch Jahre nach der Wieder-
vereinigung noch die Einflüsse sozialistischer Prägung. Diese Werte und Normen sind negativ 
mit der Wahrscheinlichkeit, den Beruf des Unternehmers auszuüben, korreliert. Entsprechend 
haben Individuen in Ostdeutschland c.p. eine geringere Wahrscheinlichkeit Unternehmer zu 
werden als Individuen der westdeutschen Kontrollgruppe. Nichtsdestotrotz zeigt eine verglei-
chende Untersuchung auf Landkreisebene, dass die Gründungsrate in ostdeutschen Regionen 
signifikant höher ist als in vergleichbaren westdeutschen Regionen. Dies verweist darauf, dass 
die speziellen Marktbedingungen in den Neuen Bundesländern, die sich aus der wiedervereini-
gungsbedingten Sonderkonjunktur ergeben, die negativen Effekte der impliziten Institutionen 
dominieren. 
Kapitel 3 greift diese Ergebnisse auf und beschäftigt sich detailliert mit den Einflüssen des sozia-
listischen Regimes der DDR auf die Ausbildung Entrepreneurship-relevanter Präferenzen in den 
Neuen Bundesländern. In einer multivariaten Analyse zeigen sich ostdeutsche Individuen relativ 
skeptisch gegenüber marktwirtschaftlichen Mechanismen und Leistungsanreizen, während west-
deutsche Individuen stärkere Präferenzen für eigenverantwortliches Handeln offenbaren und 
Staatseingriffen vergleichsweise ablehnend gegenüber stehen. Diese Präferenzen sind wiederum 
mit der Wahrscheinlichkeit, Unternehmer zu sein, korreliert. Tatsächlich zeigt die empirische 
Untersuchung, dass ostdeutsche Individuen ceteris paribus sogar eine höhere Neigung zu 
Entrepreneurship hätten als westdeutsche Individuen, d.h. wenn die Präferenzen in ganz 
Deutschland gleichverteilt wären. Diese Unterschiede in der Präferenzordnung werden auf die 
Einflüsse des sozialistischen Regimes zurückgeführt. Dabei unterscheidet Kapitel 3 zwei Wir-
kungskanäle dieses institutionellen Einflusses: Einerseits hat die staatlich organisierte Indoktrina-
tion mit der sozialistischen Lehre die im Osten Deutschlands vorherrschenden impliziten Institu-
tionen nachhaltig geprägt, was sich in den individuellen Präferenzen niederschlägt. Andererseits 
findet Kapitel 3 deutliche Hinweise darauf, dass auch selektive Migration eine Rolle gespielt 
haben könnte, da vor dem Bau der innerdeutschen Mauer vor allem Individuen mit hoher Präfe-
renz für Eigenverantwortung und liberale Werte die DDR gen Westen verlassen haben.  
Kapitel 4 verlagert den Untersuchungsschwerpunkt hin zu den Einflüssen expliziter Institutionen 
auf Entrepreneurship. Methodisch knüpft das Kapitel dabei an die vorangegangen Analysen an. 
Die Ergebnisse der Kapitel 2 und 3 verweisen darauf, dass die impliziten Institutionen im Osten 
Deutschlands eine Eintrittsbarriere für Entrepreneurship darstellen. Daraus ergibt sich die Frage, 
durch welche Mechanismen sich diese Institutionen unter dem sozialistischen Regime ausgebil-
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det haben. In der Konsequenz ist weiterhin fraglich, ob sich die kulturell vermittelten Normen 
und Werte im Zeitverlauf zwischen beiden Landesteilen angleichen werden, und durch welche 
Mechanismen dies geschehen könnte. Vor diesem Hintergrund analysiert Kapitel 4 den Einfluss 
von (voruniversitärer) Erziehung auf die beruflichen Pläne deutscher Hochschulstudenten, insbe-
sondere auf deren Absicht, Unternehmer zu werden. Hochschulstudenten sind für die übergeord-
nete Fragestellung der Dissertation eine relevante Gruppe, da sie ein vielversprechendes Potenti-
al für innovatives Entrepreneurship im Sinne Schumpeters darstellen. Um den Einfluss von Er-
ziehung zu bestimmen werden diejenigen Studenten identifiziert, die zumindest für einige Jahre 
in der DDR zur Schule gegangen sind. Die Studenten, die stets in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land zur Schule gegangen sind, bilden die Kontrollgruppe. Es zeigt sich, dass Erziehung in der 
DDR einen signifikant negativen und robusten Einfluss auf die Absicht, Unternehmer zu werden, 
hat. Im Vergleich der Studenten, die permanent in der DDR die Schule besucht haben mit den 
Studenten, die zwar noch in der DDR eingeschult wurden, aber schon im wiedervereinigten 
Deutschland ihre Schullaufbahn abgeschlossen haben, offenbart sich, dass einige Jahre Schulbe-
such im marktwirtschaftlichen System das Interesse an Entrepreneurship erhöhen. Daraus lässt 
sich schlussfolgern, dass Erziehung ein effektives Mittel zur Beeinflussung von Präferenzen ge-
genüber Entrepreneurship ist.   
Basierend auf demselben Datensatz analysiert Kapitel 5 die Effekte zweier konkreter Maßnah-
men zur Entrepreneurship-Ausbildung an Hochschulen, nämlich der Einrichtung von 
Entrepreneurship-Lehrstühlen und der Teilnahme am staatlich geförderten EXIST (Existenz-
gründungen aus der Wissenschaft) Programm, auf die Einstellung von Studenten gegenüber Un-
ternehmertum als beruflicher Alternative. Die empirische Analyse verwendet die Basiseffekte 
der Lehrstühle und der EXIST-Teilnahme sowie den Interaktionseffekt der gleichzeitigen An-
wendung beider Maßnahmen als erklärende Variablen. In aufeinander folgenden Analyseschrit-
ten werden deren Einflüsse auf die zu erklärenden Variablen i) Meinung zu Entrepreneurship, 
d.h. jedwede positive oder negative Einstellung, ii) Interesse an Entrepreneurship, d.h. jede posi-
tive Einstellung gegenüber dem Beruf des Unternehmers, iii) sichere Absicht, Unternehmer zu 
werden, analysiert. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass die verschiedenen Maßnahmen recht unter-
schiedlich wirken. Lehrstühle haben für dich genommen die geringste Auswirkung auf die Ein-
stellung gegenüber Entrepreneurship. Nur wenn Universitäten sowohl am EXIST Programm 
teilnehmen als auch über einen Lehrstuhl für Entrepreneurship verfügen hilft dies den Studenten, 
sich überhaupt eine Meinung darüber zu bilden, ob sie als Unternehmer tätig werden wollen. 
Außerdem erhöht nur die gleichzeitige Anwendung beider Maßnahmen das Interesse am Beruf 
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des Unternehmers. Allerdings ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Studenten an solchen Universitä-
ten mit starkem Fokus auf der Entrepreneurship-Ausbildung die konkrete Absicht, Unternehmer 
zu werden äußern, signifikant geringer als an allen anderen Universitäten. Das EXIST-
Programm für sich genommen erhöht hingegen die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Studenten konkrete 
Absichten im Bezug auf Entrepreneurship haben. Allerdings zeigt sich auch, dass die verschie-
denen Maßnahmen selektiv verschiedene Typen von Studenten ansprechen. Entsprechend finden 
sich Hinweise, dass an Universitäten, die beide Maßnahmen zur Entrepreneurship-Ausbildung 
anwenden, diejenigen Studenten mit unternehmerischen Absichten besonders geeignet für inno-
vatives Unternehmertum sein könnten. Insgesamt bestätigt Kapitel 5 jedenfalls die Effektivität 
erzieherischer Maßnahmen bei der Beeinflussung von Präferenzen gegenüber Entrepreneurship. 
Vor dem Hintergrund der zuvor erzielten Resultate entfernt sich Kapitel 6 inhaltlich vom The-
menkomplex Entrepreneurship und wendet sich dem institutionellen Wandel aus allgemeinerer 
Perspektive zu. Aus den Ergebnissen der ersten beiden Kapitel lässt sich ableiten, dass 
Entrepreneurship durch eine Anpassung der impliziten Institutionen im Osten Deutschlands ge-
stärkt werden könnte. Allerdings bleibt offen, durch welche Mechanismen sich ein solcher Pro-
zess vollziehen könnte, und wie lange er gegebenenfalls dauern würde. Kapitel 4 und 5 stellen 
die Rolle von Erziehung für die Veränderung von Präferenzen und damit langfristig auch die 
Entwicklung impliziter Institutionen heraus. Eine zentrale Rolle kommt dabei der Informations-
vermittlung zu, wie sie z.B. im Zuge der in Kapitel 5 untersuchten Maßnahmen zur 
Entrepreneurship-Ausbildung erfolgt. Dieser Wirkungszusammenhang von Informationsvermitt-
lung und Präferenzänderung, der die Grundlage des Wandels vor allem impliziter Institutionen 
bildet, ist Gegenstand des sechsten Kapitels. Hierin werden Effekte des Internets auf das Wahl-
verhalten analysiert. Die Einführung des Internets wirkte wie ein technologischer Schock auf den 
Markt für Informationsmedien ein und hat die Mechanismen von Informationsangebot und In-
formationsnachfrage nachhaltig verändert. Vor dem Hintergrund der in den Kapiteln 2 bis 5 er-
zielten Resultate ist davon auszugehen, dass dies auch Einfluss auf individuelle Präferenzen hat. 
Wenn die in den vorangegangenen Kapiteln angestellten Vermutungen über die Rolle von In-
formation für die Ausbildung von Präferenzen korrekt sind müsste die die Einführung des Inter-
net einen messbaren Wandel der Präferenzordnung und damit längerfristig auch der impliziten 
Institutionen bewirken. Kapitel 6 findet entsprechend signifikante Einflüsse des Internet auf poli-
tische Präferenzen, wie sie sich in den Wahlergebnissen wiederspiegeln. Dabei fällt auf, dass 
gerade die etablierten Parteien von der Einführung des Internet profitieren und ihre Stimmanteile 
ausbauen können. Kleine Parteien und insbesondere Parteien vom rechten Rand des politischen 
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Spektrums verlieren hingegen durch die Einführung des Internet. Darüber hinaus wirkt sich die 
Einführung des Internet signifikant negativ auf die Wahlbeteiligung aus. Dies ist konsistent mit 
Ergebnissen aus Kapitel 5 die aufzeigen, dass ein mehr an Information (über Entrepreneurship) 
unter Umständen zu einem mehr an Indifferenz (gegenüber Entrepreneurship) führt. Damit un-
terstreicht Kapitel 6 die Bedeutung von Information für die Präferenzbildung und legt nahe, dass 
die Ausbildung impliziter Institutionen durch die Vermittlung von Informationen beeinflusst 
wird. Kapitel 7 diskutiert zusammenfassend die Implikationen der zuvor erzielten Forschungser-
gebnisse und schließt mit einem Ausblick.  
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